Hoyt v. Gouge

• Decision Date: 18 November 1904
• Citation: 101 N.W. 464,125 Iowa 603
• Parties: HOYT v. GOUGE ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

125 Iowa 603

101 N.W. 464

HOYT

v.GOUGE ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 18, 1904.

Appeal from District Court, Hamilton County; J. R. Whitaker, Judge.

This is an action in equity, which would have been denominated under the old chancery practice as a bill of interpleader, wherein plaintiff asks the court to adjudge and determine which of the two defendants is entitled to a commission for the sale of certain real estate made by plaintiff to one Hodge. Issue was tendered by each of the defendants, and the case was tried to the court, resulting in a decree dismissing plaintiff's petition, and he appeals. Affirmed.Wesley Martin, for appellant.

Jesse Gouge and D. C. Chase, for appellees.

DEEMER, C. J.

While there is no express statute authorizing interpleader, except in actions of replevin (Code, § 3487), yet there is a general statute providing that a plaintiff may prosecute his action by equitable proceedings in all cases where courts of equity before the adoption of the Code had jurisdiction (Code, § 3427). In Stephenson v. Stephenson, 64 Iowa, 534, 21 N. W. 19, we recognized the continued existence of such a remedy, although there was no direct challenge there of the right of a court to do so. But it seems to be the general rule everywhere that the action of interpleader is concurrent with, and is not superseded by, statutory remedies authorizing defendants in law actions to bring in other parties, or to have other parties substituted. Crane v. McDonald, 118 N. Y. 648, 23 N. E. 991; Board of Education v. Scoville, 13 Kan. 17; Cullen v. Dawson, 24 Minn. 66; Fahie v. Lindsay, 8 Or. 474; Barry v. Ins. Co., 53 N. Y. 536;Lane v. Ins. Co., 56 Hun, 92, 9 N. Y. Supp. 52.

Assuming, then, that plaintiff had the right to bring such an action, we have to determine whether or not the trial court was in error in dismissing his petition. To do that, we must consult the old rules of chancery practice with reference to such matters. In order to sustain such a bill, it must appear, among other things, that two or more persons claim the same debt or duty from the plaintiff by different or separate interests, and, he not knowing to which of the claimants he ought of right to render the debt or duty, fears that he may suffer some injury from their conflicting claims; and he asks that they may be compelled to interplead, and to state their several claims, so that the court may determine to whom the debt or duty belongs. Generally the bill will not lie when one has a clear and unembarrassed remedy at law; and it is also held, although there is some dispute on the proposition, that there must be a privity of estate or contract between the defendant claimants. See Crane v. McDonald, supra; Stone v. Reed, 152 Mass. 179, 25 N. E. 49;Kyle v. Mary Lee Coal & Ry. Co., 112 Ala. 606, 20 South. 851; Morristown Bank v. Bininger, 26 N. J. Eq. 345. Just how far this last rule should be carried, we are not called upon at this time to decide. But it is everywhere held that the object of the bill is not to protect a party against double liability, but against a double vexation in respect of one liability. Green v. Mumford, 4 R. I. 313. This is reasonable doctrine. If plaintiff is liable to both claimants, there is no case for interpleader. See McCormick v. Supreme Council, 6 App. Div. 175, 39 N. Y. Supp. 1010. Although it is a general rule that liability must be under the same and identical contract (Conley v. Ins. Co., 67 Ala. 472), still we think that if there is but one liability--one debt--although evidenced by separate contracts, the action will lie, although in such a case the obligations must be identical, and the consideration the same. In other words, the case must be such that plaintiff, upon interpleader decreed, may step out of the case altogether. If this were not true, a claimant might be deprived of his right to trial by jury, and unduly delayed in his legal remedies.

With these rules settled. we now go to the case in hand, and find that, under the allegations of the petition, plaintiff had listed his lands for sale with each of the defendants; that they were each claiming to have produced Hodge, the purchaser, and each claiming the agreed commission of $200; that he (plaintiff) was ready to pay said sum to such one of the defendants as should be found entitled thereto, but that he could not get them to agree; that the defendant Gouge had commenced suit in the district court of Hamilton county, claiming $200 of him (plaintiff); and that defendant Lee, although not having commenced action, was claiming the commission for the reason that he, and not Gouge was the procuring cause of the sale of the land. He further pleaded that he could not pay either without danger of liability to the other, and he asked that the action already commenced be enjoined, and that the other defendant, Lee, be...