Hoyt v. Gutterz Bowl & Lounge L.L.C.

• Citation: 829 N.W.2d 772
• Decision Date: 05 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–0085.,11–0085.
• Parties: Curtis Gene HOYT, Appellant, v. GUTTERZ BOWL & LOUNGE L.L.C., Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

829 N.W.2d 772

Curtis Gene HOYT, Appellant,

v.GUTTERZ BOWL & LOUNGE L.L.C., Appellee.

No. 11–0085.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 5, 2013.

Gary D. Dickey Jr. of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Mark J. Wiedenfeld and James W. Russell of Wiedenfeld & McLaughlin, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellee.

HECHT, Justice.

The plaintiff sued a bar for injuries sustained when he was assaulted in the bar's parking lot. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the bar. The court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling, concluding questions of fact precluded summary judgment. On further review, we affirm the court of appeals decision and reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

The summary judgment record taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff–appellant Hoyt supports the following factual findings. Defendant–appellee Gutterz Bowl & Lounge (Gutterz) is a bowling alley and tavern located in Guthrie Center, Iowa. On March 20, 2009, Curtis Hoyt and several members of his construction crew finished work and went to Gutterz for refreshments. Curtis Knapp was also a customer at Gutterz that afternoon. Hoyt soon came to believe that Knapp was scowling at him. Hoyt and Knapp had formerly been friendly, but tension had arisen between them as a result of Hoyt's alleged mistreatment of the sister of Knapp's friend. The record reveals no evidence tending to prove the staff of Gutterz had any knowledge of this history between Hoyt and Knapp.

After consuming a few beers, Hoyt and coworker Chris Brittain approached and verbally confronted Knapp. Knapp did not respond and continued to scowl at Hoyt. The waitress serving Hoyt and Brittain observed their behavior with concern and threatened to discontinue serving them unless they calmed down. Hoyt and Brittain ignored the waitress's warning and thus she requested and secured permission from Gutterz's owner, Rodney Atkinson, to discontinue serving them. Atkinson, who had been preparing food in the kitchen, went to the bar area to assess the situation. Hoyt and Brittain complained to Atkinson that they were no longer being served and continued to taunt Knapp.

Shortly thereafter, Atkinson grew concerned that an altercation might occur. He requested that Hoyt and Brittain leave.¹ Hoyt finished his beer and exited the tavern. As Hoyt walked through the parking lot toward his vehicle, somebody approached him from behind and struck him in the back of the head, knocking him unconscious. Hoyt suffered several injuries including a compound fracture of his ankle. Knapp admitted to police who later arrived on the scene that he had struck Hoyt, but claimed he had done so in self-defense.²

On September 25, 2009, Hoyt filed this action alleging that Knapp and Gutterz were liable for the injuries he sustained when Knapp assaulted him. Gutterz moved for summary judgment, alleging Gutterz owed Hoyt no duty of reasonable care, there was no evidence of a breach of any duty, and the assault by Knapp and Hoyt's injury were not foreseeable. The district court granted Gutterz's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Gutterz from the lawsuit. The district court found as a matter of law that the assault in the parking lot and Hoyt's resulting injury were not foreseeable to Gutterz. Having found Hoyt's injury was not foreseeable to Gutterz, the district court further found

insufficient evidence to generate a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether Gutterz employees failed to exercise reasonable care to discover the likelihood of harm or failed to provide an adequate warning after discovering a potential danger to Hoyt.³

We granted Hoyt's application for interlocutory appeal, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court's summary judgment ruling. In reversing, the court of appeals cited our opinion in Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009). In Thompson, we adopted the general duty formulation set forth in section 7 the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm and explained that “the assessment of the foreseeability of a risk” is no longer part of the duty analysis in evaluating a tort claim, and instead is to be considered when the fact finder decides whether a defendant has failed to exercise reasonable care. Id. at 835. Consistent with its understanding that foreseeability is no longer part of the duty determination, the court of appeals applied section 40 of the Restatement (Third), entitled “Duty Based on Special Relationship With Another,” in analyzing Hoyt's claim. Concluding Gutterz owed Hoyt a duty under section 40 and finding Hoyt had raised fact questions as to foreseeability related to the issues of breach of duty and scope of liability, the court of appeals reversed the summary judgment ruling. We granted Gutterz's application for further review.

II. Scope of Review.

The district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for correction of errors of law. Id. at 832. A party is entitled to summary judgment when the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must: “(1) view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and (2) consider on behalf of the nonmoving party every legitimate inference reasonably deduced from the record.” Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Iowa 2009).

III. Discussion.

Hoyt contends the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Gutterz did not breach a duty of reasonable care under these circumstances. Further, Hoyt contends, the district court erred in its consideration of foreseeability of injury to Hoyt in making its summary judgment ruling. Gutterz urges that the summary judgment ruling should be affirmed because: (1) the district court correctly analyzed the question of duty, (2) even if a duty existed, Gutterz acted reasonably as a matter of law, and (3) Hoyt's injuries here were, as a matter of law, outside the scope of harms typically resulting from the risks associated with Gutterz's conduct.

A. Duty. Before examining the record for a factual question regarding whether Gutterz breached a duty to Hoyt, we must consider whether Gutterz owed Hoyt a duty of care, and if so, the nature of that duty under these circumstances. While summary adjudication is rarely appropriate in negligence cases, the determination of whether a duty is owed under particular circumstances is a matter of law for the court's determination. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 834;Sankey v. Richenberger, 456 N.W.2d 206, 207 (Iowa 1990). Traditionally, Iowa courts examining whether a landowner has a duty to protect visitors from the conduct of third parties relied upon section 344, comment f, of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to conclude that a property owner “is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur.” Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437, 438 (Iowa 1988); Martinko v. H-N-W Assocs., 393 N.W.2d 320, 322–23 (1986); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. f, at 225 (1965) [hereinafter Restatement (Second) ]. That general proposition was subject to the caveat that a duty would be imposed in scenarios where the property owner knew or had reason to know of a likelihood of third party conduct that could endanger visitors or where the place or character of the business was such that the property owner should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct by third parties. Galloway, 420 N.W.2d at 439–40;Martinko, 393 N.W.2d at 322–23; Restatement (Second) § 344 cmt. f, at 225–26.

Recently, in Thompson, we examined not a landowner–visitor scenario, but a scenario in which the trampoline of a landowner had been blown by high winds into a nearby roadway, obstructing the travel of and causing injury to a driver. 774 N.W.2d at 831–32. We questioned and then rejected an assessment of foreseeability of risk in determining whether the landowner owed the driver a duty. We adopted the general duty formulation of section 7 of the Restatement (Third) and explained:

An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm. Thus, in most cases involving physical harm, courts need not concern themselves with the existence or content of this ordinary duty, but instead may proceed directly to the elements of liability set forth in section 6 [of the Restatement (Third) ]. The general duty of reasonable care will apply in most cases, and thus courts can rely directly on section 6 and need not refer to duty on a case-by-case basis.

Id. at 834–35 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We joined the drafters of the Restatement (Third) in explicitly disapproving of the use of foreseeability, or lack thereof, in making no-duty determinations. Id. at 835. Instead, we explained, no-duty rulings should be limited to exceptional cases in which “ ‘an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases.’ ” Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm § 7(b), at 77 (2010) [hereinafter Restatement (Third) ] ). Such reasons of principle or policy justifying departure from a general duty to exercise reasonable care would not depend on the foreseeability of harm in any given case. Id. Instead, assessment of foreseeability should be allocated to the fact finder, as part of its determination of whether appropriate care has been exercised in any given scenario. Id.

Section 40 of the Restatement (Third) describes duty principles, some of which overlap with section 7's general duty, more specifically for...