Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 January 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 49585,HAYES-ALBION
• Citation: 302 N.W.2d 606,103 Mich.App. 90
• Parties: Paul HRAB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. 103 Mich.App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 606

302 N.W.2d 606

Paul HRAB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAYES-ALBION CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 49585.

103 Mich.App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Jan. 22, 1981.

Rehearing Denied March 10, 1981.

Released for Publication March 10, 1981.

[103 MICHAPP 92] John M. Sims, Albion, for plaintiff-appellant.

John H. Brown, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellee.

Before R. B. BURNS, P. J., and MAHER and KALLMAN, ^* JJ.

R. B. BURNS, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for wrongful discharge from employment and breach of their employment agreement. In October, 1973, plaintiff was hired by defendant as an hourly union laborer. Plaintiff worked in such a capacity until September, 1977, when he accepted an offer from defendant to become a member of its supervisory staff pursuant to an oral contract of employment. In his complaint, plaintiff claimed that he was discharged (1) in bad faith and with malice and/or (2) in retaliation for his having filed a petition for workers' disability compensation benefits or to forestall his filing a petition for such benefits.

Defendant responded by filing a motion for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff had failed to set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted and that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. GCR 1963, 117.2(1) and (3). Both parties submitted affidavits in support of their respective positions. Plaintiff conceded, in his affidavit,[103 MICHAPP 93] that the employment contract was for an indefinite term; however, he further alleged therein that pursuant to the contract he could be discharged only for good cause. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted defendant's motion. Plaintiff appeals, and we reverse.

The issue in the case at bar is whether the oral contract of employment between the parties was, as a matter of law, terminable at will notwithstanding the provision that plaintiff could be discharged only for good cause.

Courts have generally construed employment contracts for an indefinite term to be terminable at the will of either party. Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 687, 273 N.W. 315 (1937). However, such a construction is not appropriate in every case. Where special consideration has passed from the employee to the employer, other than the services to be performed by the employee, Courts have held that the employment contract is not terminable at will, even if the contract was for an indefinite term. Lynas, supra. See also Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich.App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979). In addition, although at will employment contracts are generally terminable at any time for any reason by either party, exceptions have been recognized where discharge would contravene some settled public policy. Trombetta v. Detroit T & I R Co., 81 Mich.App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978), Sventko v. The Kroger Co., 69 Mich.App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).

In the recently decided case of Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 598, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a provision of an employment contract providing that the employee shall not be discharged except for cause is legally enforceable even though [103 MICHAPP 94] the contract is for an indefinite term. Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiffs' testimony that they were told that they would not be discharged so long as they did their jobs "made submissible to the jury whether there was an agreement for a contract of...