HRC Hotels, LLC v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals Div. II of Marion Cnty.

• Decision Date: 10 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 49A04–1307–PL–313.,49A04–1307–PL–313.
• Citation: 8 N.E.3d 203
• Parties: HRC HOTELS, LLC, Appellant/Petitioner v. METROPOLITAN BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS DIVISION II OF MARION COUNTY, Indiana, Jeffrey R. Baumgarth and The Myers Y. Cooper Company, Appellees/Respondents.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

8 N.E.3d 203

HRC HOTELS, LLC, Appellant/Petitioner

v.METROPOLITAN BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS DIVISION II OF MARION COUNTY, Indiana, Jeffrey R. Baumgarth and The Myers Y. Cooper Company, Appellees/Respondents.

No. 49A04–1307–PL–313.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 10, 2014.

Libby Y. Goodknight, Krieg DeVault LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Blake P. Holler, Krieg DeVault LLP, Carmel, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Brian J. Tuohy, John J. Moore, Doninger Tuohy & Bailey LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees Jeffrey R. Baumgarth and The Myers Y. Cooper Company.

Beth A. Garrison, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals Division II of Marion County Indiana.

OPINION

VAIDIK, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

Myers Y. Cooper Corporation (“Myers Cooper”) requested a variance for its property to build a pet day-care facility. At the hearing, I–465 LLC, the owner of an adjacent Hilton Homewood Suites Hotel, protested due to the noise that would be caused by pets staying so close to its hotel. After the Marion County Metropolitan Development Commission Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) granted the variance, HRC Hotels, LLC (“HRC Hotels”), the parent company of I–465 LLC, filed a petition for judicial review in the trial court. Myers Cooper responded, arguing that HRC Hotels lacked standing to file the petition for judicial review. After the deadline to file a review petition, HRC Hotels filed a motion to amend the petition for judicial review to substitute I–465 LLC as the real party in interest. The trial court dismissed HRC Hotels's petition concluding that HRC Hotels lacked standing to file a petition for judicial review and therefore the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider HRC Hotels's motion to substitute the real party in interest. HRC Hotels now appeals.

We conclude that the standing requirements under Indiana Code section 36–7–4–1603 are procedural rather than jurisdictional. Therefore, HRC Hotels's alleged lack of standing when the petition was filed does not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the trial court does have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider HRC Hotels's motion to amend its petition for judicial review, it should substitute I–465 LLC as a real party in interest and hear the merits of the petition for judicial review. We reverse the trial court's decision and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

In September 2012 Myers Cooper filed a petition for a variance with the BZA for 4048 West 94th Street in Indianapolis (“the Property”). Appellant's App. p. 24. In its petition, it requested permission to establish “a domestic canine and feline boarding and day-care facility also providing grooming services with fenced outdoor exercise area for supervised daytime use, operating under the name PetSuites” on the Property. Id. The Property is located in a C–6 zone, which does not allow kennel or dog-boarding services to be established.

At the November 13, 2012 BZA meeting, Raymond Cooper presented Myers Cooper'spetition.¹ I–465 LLC, which owns the Hilton Homewood Suites Hotel immediately to the west of the Property, appeared at the hearing to contest the variance petition. Specifically, I–465 LLC was concerned about the noise of the animals that would be staying adjacent to its hotel and believed that its hotel would be substantially and adversely affected if the BZA granted Myers Cooper's proposed variance. Id. at 73.

The BZA approved the variance at the November meeting on the condition that animals would be permitted in the outside play area only between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. Only I–465 LLC and not its parent company—HRC Hotels—appeared or participated in the November BZA public hearing. Id. at 68–80. Moreover, HRC Hotels did not present any evidence opposing the variance before, during, or after the hearing. It also did not submit any written statement to the BZA contesting the variance. Id.

HRC Hotels and not I–465 LLC filed a timely petition for judicial review of the BZA's grant of the variance under Indiana Code sections 36–7–4–1600 through 36–7–4–1616 (the “1600 Series”). Id. at 13. In turn, Myers Cooper filed a motion to dismiss the petition for judicial review, arguing that HRC Hotels lacked standing and that its petition failed to describe specific facts demonstrating that it is entitled to judicial review. Id. at 82.

In its response to Myers Cooper's motion to dismiss, HRC Hotels included an operating agreement, which shows that it is a parent company to I–465 LLC (“Exhibit 1”).²Id. at 143. Exactly thirty days after Myers Cooper filed its motion to dismiss, HRC Hotels also filed a motion to amend its petition for judicial review and substitute HRC Hotels with I–465 LLC, the real party in interest, under Trial Rules 15 and 17(A)(2). The motion to amend its petition in order to substitute I–465 LLC as the real party in interest was filed more than thirty days after the BZA rendered its decision. Myers Cooper filed a response to HRC Hotels's motion to amend its verified petition for judicial review, arguing that HRC Hotels could not amend its petition because HRC Hotels did not have standing to file the petition and therefore failed to invoke the court's jurisdiction. It also argued that I–465 LLC waived its right to judicial review because it did not file a petition for judicial review within thirty days of the BZA's decision. Id. at 177. Myers Cooper also filed a motion to strike Exhibit 1 from HRC Hotels's response because it was not contained in the record of proceedings before the BZA and did not relate to the validity of the BZA's decision. Id. at 180.

The trial court held a hearing on these issues on April 9, 2013. At the hearing, Myers Cooper again argued that HRC Hotels did not have standing when it filed its petition for judicial review of the BZA's decision. Tr. p. 8. According to Myers Cooper, the lack of standing deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. As to its motion to strike, Myers Cooper argued that I–465 LLC's operating agreement showing HRC Hotels is the parent company of I–465 LLC could not be considered because “review is limited to the [BZA] record on these disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 22.

HRC Hotels responded, essentially arguing that the standing determination should be made when the court considers its motion to amend the pleadings and that it should be allowed to substitute I–465 LLC because “[a] validly passed trial rule trumps the statute and Trial Rule 17 says that you allow the real party in interest such as I[-]465 to come in.” Id. at 29. Regarding the motion to strike, HRC Hotels argued that it should have the opportunity to submit evidence showing that it had equitable ownership of I–465 LLC and thus did have standing to appeal the BZA's decision. Id. at 24.

One week after the hearing, the trial court issued an order granting Myers Cooper's motion to dismiss and denying HRC Hotels's motion to amend its petition for judicial review. Appellant's App. p. 9. In its order, the court concluded that “[t]he statutory requirements of Ind.Code § 36–7–4–1601, et seq. are jurisdictional.” Id. at 10. For this reason, it concluded that HRC Hotels's petition failed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the matter. It also concluded that HRC Hotels's motion to amend “was filed more than thirty (30) days after the BZA's decision, and since HRC's original Petition failed to invoke this Court's jurisdiction, HRC's [motion to amend] should be denied.” Id. Because it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, it concluded that Myers Cooper's motion to strike was moot. Id. HRC Hotels then filed a motion to correct errors, which was denied.

HRC Hotels now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

HRC Hotels contends that that the trial court improperly granted Myers Cooper's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Moreover, it argues that the trial court should have considered its motion to amend its petition under Indiana Trial Rules 15 and 17(A)(2). Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law when the facts related to the jurisdictional question are not in dispute. Bellows v. Bd. of Comm's of Cnty. of Elkhart, 926 N.E.2d 96, 111 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citing GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind.2001)). We afford no deference to the trial court because the appellate courts independently, without deference to the trial court, evaluate questions of law. Id.

In order for a party to be entitled to judicial review, it must have standing. SeeInd.Code § 36–7–4–1603. In addition, a party must timely file a petition for judicial review within thirty days. Ind.Code § 36–7–4–1605. The petition must also be verified. Ind.Code § 36–7–4–1607. In this case, it is undisputed that HRC Hotels's petition was verified and timely filed. And it is also undisputed that HRC Hotels's motion to amend its petition for judicial review to substitute I–465 LLC as the real party in interest was not filed within thirty days of the BZA's decision.

Our Supreme Court has explained that there are only two types of jurisdiction in Indiana: subject matter and personal. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind.2006). As explained by the Supreme Court, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs.” Id. Where subject-matter jurisdiction exists, “a court's decision may be set aside for legal error only through direct appeal and not through collateral attack.” Id. K.S. continued by explaining that “[a]ttorneys and judges alike frequently characterize a claim of procedural error as one of jurisdictional dimension.” Id. at 541. Instead, “[t]he question of subject matter jurisdiction entails a determination of whether a court has jurisdictionover a general class of actions to which a particular case belongs.” Id. at 542 (internal quotation omitted). This is contrasted with, “ [r]eal...