HRRMG. v. County of Suffolk
| Decision Date | 17 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | 05-CV-0483 (JFB)(WDW).,No. 03-CV-3777 (JFB)(WDW),03-CV-3777 (JFB)(WDW) |
| Citation | 687 F. Supp.2d 237 |
| Parties | HUMAN RESOURCE RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., d/b/a Homeworks, and Oxford House, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, Defendant. Vincent Reynolds, Edsel Calderone, Mary Monroe, Barbara Johnson, Frank Farino, Jan Pflanzer, Alicia Turner, Mike Josell, Estelle Lyons, Harold Walker, Dina Travis, and Oya Bangura, Plaintiffs, v. Suffolk County, Suffolk County Department of Social Services, and Suffolk County Department of Health Services, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Robert L. Schonfeld, Moritt Hock Hamroff & Horowitz LLP, Garden City, NY, for Plaintiff Oxford House, Inc.
John Claude Bahrenburg, Windwood Meadow, Inc., Medford, NY, for Plaintiff HRRMG.
Robert Briglio, Esq., Nassau/Suffolk Law Services Committee, Inc., Islandia, N.Y. and Martin J. Coleman, Law Offices of Martin J., Coleman, Woodbury, NY, for the Reynolds plaintiffs.
Patrick M. Murphy, McCabe, Collins, McGeough & Fowler LLP, Carle Place, NY, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs in this case bring a facial challenge to S.C.C. ? 450, a Suffolk County law regulating substance abuse recovery houses in Suffolk County, alleging that the local law violates the United States and New York State Constitutions, as well as the federal Fair Housing Act, the federal Americans With Disabilities Act and various provisions of New York State law. This Memorandum and Order disposes of motions for summary judgment in two separate actions, Human Resource Research and Management Group, Inc., d/b/a Homeworks, and Oxford House, Inc. v. County of Suffolk (No. 03-cv-3777) (hereinafter the "Oxford House action") and Reynolds et al. v. Suffolk County et al. (No. 05-cv-0483) (hereinafter the "Reynolds action"), which are consolidated for purposes of these motions. Plaintiff Oxford House, Inc. (hereinafter "Oxford House") moves for summary judgment against defendant Suffolk County (03-cv-3777). Plaintiffs in the Reynolds action (hereinafter the "Reynolds plaintiffs") also move for summary judgment against Suffolk County, the Suffolk County Department of Social Services, and the Suffolk County Department of Health Services (05-cv-0483).1 Plaintiffs in both actions ask the Court to declare S.C.C. ? 450 unconstitutional and violative of the above-mentioned federal anti-discrimination laws and to enjoin the local law's enforcement. The Reynolds plaintiffs also seek additional declaratory and injunctive relief against Suffolk County for an alleged pattern of discrimination against disabled persons recovering from alcoholism or substance abuse.
The Court declines to address plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the law because, as discussed below, the Court concludes that the challenged law violates the Fair Housing Act based upon the uncontroverted record in this case. In particular, there are four provisions of S.C.C. ? 450 at issue, all of which the Court concludes violate the Fair Housing Act: (1) a site-selection provision that establishes a notice requirement and approval procedure to assess the desirability of the proposed substance abuse house in the area under consideration; (2) a requirement that each substance abuse house must have a "certified site manager" living on-site 24-hours per day, seven days per week; (3) a limitation of six individuals receiving substance abuse services in the house; and (4) a licensing requirement, which includes a fee and an inspection provision. The Court recognizes that this statute was enacted in response to certain complaints from the public about the operation of substance abuse recovery houses in Suffolk County and a purported negative impact on the community. However, because this law facially discriminates against a group of disabled individuals (namely, individuals recovering from substance abuse) and subjects them to burdens on housing that do not apply to others, this law is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Fair Housing Act?€”a standard that the County does not come close to meeting based upon the undisputed facts in this case. Although the County invokes some legitimate public safety interests?€”such as preventing crime, overcrowding, and excessive littering?€”in an attempt to justify the legislation, the County has put forth woefully insufficient evidence, even when such evidence is construed most favorably to the County, to show that any of these legitimate government interests are furthered by actual provisions of S.C.C. ? 450. In addition, there is no evidence that these restrictions will benefit the protected class of disabled persons. In fact, not only is there no evidence to demonstrate that these restrictions will benefit the disabled or further the legitimate interests of the community, but there is evidence (including from Suffolk County's own Department of Health official) that these restrictions may even undermine those interests in some cases by hindering the continuing recovery of former substance abusers. For example, the highest ranking official regarding alcohol and substance abuse issues in the Suffolk County Department of Health testified, among other things, that (1) he was not consulted by the legislature in connection with the local law; (2) not all of the challenged provisions are necessary for all persons recovering from substance abuse; and (3) the presence of a 24/7 site manager could potentially be counterproductive to the recovery of substance abusers by discouraging independent and normal living. In short, the County has failed to put forth any studies or other evidence to demonstrate how these restrictions further any legitimate governmental interest in theory and in practice, rather than being based on sweeping generalizations, anecdotal stories from a few members of the public, and stereotypes?€”none of which provide a legally sufficient basis to support a facially discriminatory law. Moreover, even assuming Suffolk County proffered evidence that demonstrated that a legitimate government interest was furthered by each of these provisions, it is abundantly clear based upon the uncontroverted evidence in the record that these sweeping restrictions are not the least discriminatory means of furthering these purported interests?€”which the Fair Housing Act also requires in this situation. Instead, to a substantial extent, these onerous restrictions make no attempt to allow a fact-specific determination of any issues with a particular substance abuse home depending on its size and needs, in conjunction with the legitimate interests of the surrounding community and the government. Accordingly, the uncontroverted evidence in the record (even construed most favorably to defendant under the summary judgment standard) demonstrates that the challenged provisions of S.C.C. ? 450 unlawfully discriminate under the Fair Housing Act and are facially invalid under, and are therefore preempted by, the Act.
The Court, therefore, grants both motions for summary judgment insofar as they request a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the relevant provisions of S.C.C. ? 450. Insofar as the Reynolds plaintiffs seek additional declaratory or injunctive relief, the Court denies that part of their motion for summary judgment.
The Court has taken the facts set forth below from the parties' depositions, affidavits, exhibits, and Rule 56.1 statements of facts. Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court shall construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party?€”here, the defendants. See Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005). Unless otherwise noted, where a party's Rule 56.1 statement or deposition is cited, that fact is undisputed or the opposing party has pointed to no evidence in the record to contradict it.
Oxford House is the umbrella organization of a network of self-run, self-help, self-supportive recovery houses for people recovering from alcoholism and/or substance abuse. (Oxford House Pl.'s 56.1 ? 41.) The first Oxford House residence was established in 1975 in Maryland and, since then, more than 1,300 Oxford House residences have been established in the United States, Australia, and Canada. (Id. ?? 42-43.) Since its inception, Oxford House has relied upon three basic principles: (1) all Oxford House residences must be democratically run; (2) all Oxford House residences must be financially self-supported; and (3) the group at an Oxford House residence must expel any resident who uses alcohol or drugs in or out of the residence. (Id. ? 45.)2 Oxford House monitors its residences to ensure that they adhere to general Oxford House principles. (Id. ? 59.) Oxford House is not "affiliated" with any treatment centers.3 (Id. ? 32.)
In 1991, Oxford House established a residence in East Farmingdale, New York using $4,000 from a fund provided by New York State. (Id. ? 56.) The funds were used to pay the landlord one month rent and a security deposit. (Id. ? 57.) Because Oxford House was satisfied that the East Farmingdale residence could adhere to the organization's basic principles, the residence was awarded a charter by Oxford House. (Id. ? 58.)
The Reynolds plaintiffs are individuals who have participated in "affiliated" substance abuse recovery programs in Suffolk County, including Homeworks and out-patient substance abuse treatment services from the Lake Grove Treatment Center.
On April 29, 2003, the Suffolk County Legislature approved Local Law No. 19-2003.4 The stated purpose of the law was:
to foster communication and cooperation between government agencies, local governments, and local communities by establishment of clearly...
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