Hsbc Bank U.S. v. Navin, 32124.

• Decision Date: 28 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 32124.,32124.
• Citation: 129 Conn.App. 707,22 A.3d 647
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: HSBC BANK USA, N.A.v.Jeffrey NAVIN et al.

129 Conn.App. 707
22 A.3d 647

HSBC BANK USA, N.A.
v.
Jeffrey NAVIN et al.

No. 32124.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 21, 2011.Decided June 28, 2011.

[22 A.3d 648]

Kenneth R. Davis, for the appellant (named defendant).Aileen Reilly Wilson, with whom, on the brief, was Marc S. Edrich, Avon, for the appellee (plaintiff).LAVINE, BEACH and ROBINSON, Js.PER CURIAM.

[129 Conn.App. 708] The defendant Jeffrey Navin ¹ appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by [129 Conn.App. 709] the trial court following the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, HSBC Bank USA, N.A. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred by granting summary judgment because (1) the plaintiff was not the owner of the promissory note and mortgage at the time that it commenced the foreclosure action and thus lacked standing, (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff possessed the assignment of the promissory note and mortgage at the time that it commenced the foreclosure action and (3) the plaintiff was not the holder or owner of the promissory note and mortgage at the time it commenced the action. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On October 5, 2005, the defendant executed a promissory note in the principal amount of $1,313,000 to American Brokers Conduit. As security for the note, the defendant conveyed by way of mortgage deed his interest in real property located at 7 Hart Landing in Guilford to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. The defendant's mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff ² on October 5, 2005, and the assignment was recorded in the Guilford land records on June 14, 2007. The plaintiff became the holder of the note prior to the commencement of the present foreclosure action.

The defendant failed to make his mortgage payments and thus the balance then due on his promissory note was accelerated. The plaintiff commenced the present foreclosure action by service of the summons and complaint on June 13, 2007.³ On August 25, 2009, the plaintiff [129 Conn.App. 710] filed a motion for summary judgment seeking

[22 A.3d 649]

judgment as to liability. The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff lacked standing to institute the foreclosure action because it was not the owner of the promissory note and mortgage at the time the action was commenced.⁴ The court granted the motion for summary judgment on November 13, 2009, and judgment of strict foreclosure was rendered on February 22, 2010. This appeal followed.

We first address the defendant's claim that the plaintiff lacked standing to commence this foreclosure action because the claim presents a question as to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. See New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 511, 518, 970 A.2d 583 (2009) (“[t]he issue of standing implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and therefore presents a threshold issue for our determination”). The defendant specifically argues that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring this foreclosure action because it did not rightfully own the promissory note and mortgage until after it commenced the action. We conclude that the plaintiff did have standing to initiate this suit.

“It is well established that [a] party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.... Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. [129 Conn.App. 711] One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.... [T]he court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear.... Where a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.... Our review of the question of [a] plaintiff's standing is plenary.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Megin v. New Milford, 125 Conn.App. 35, 37, 6 A.3d 1176 (2010).

The defendant's standing argument is controlled by this court's decision in Chase Home Finance, LLC v....