Huawei Techs. USA, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n

Decision Date18 June 2021
Docket NumberNo. 19-60896,19-60896
Parties HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES USA, INCORPORATED; Huawei Technologies Company, Limited, Petitioners, v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION; United States of America, Respondents.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Michael A. Carvin, Glen D. Nager, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Matthew Joel Dunne, Counsel, Ashley Boizelle, Deputy General Counsel, Jacob Matthew Lewis, Associate General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, Office of General Counsel, Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Scott M. Noveck, Counsel, Richard Kiser Welch, Esq., Deputy Associate General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, Office of General Counsel - Litigation Division, Washington, DC, for Respondent Federal Communications Commission.

Dennis Fan, Sharon Swingle, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Section, Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent United States of America.

Before Elrod, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:

An FCC rule bars using government subsidies to buy equipment from companies designated security risks to communications networks. See Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC Programs, 85 Fed. Reg. 230-01 (Jan. 3, 2020). We consider a challenge to that rule by Huawei Technologies Company and its American affiliate, Huawei Technologies USA.

INTRODUCTION

The federal government annually distributes billions of dollars to promote telephone and Internet service across our nation. These subsidies, called "universal service funds," are administered by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"). Last year, that agency issued a rule barring recipients from using the funds to buy equipment or services from companies designated "national security risks" to communications networks and supply chains. Under the rule, the FCC designated Huawei, a Chinese telecom provider, and its American affiliate as national security risks. The companies now level myriad challenges, both statutory and constitutional, to the rule and to their designation.

Their most troubling challenge is that the rule illegally arrogates to the FCC the power to make judgments about national security that lie outside the agency's authority and expertise. That claim gives us pause. The FCC deals with national communications, not foreign relations. It is not the Department of Defense, or the National Security Agency, or the President. If we were convinced that the FCC is here acting as "a sort of junior-varsity [State Department]," Mistretta v. United States , 488 U.S. 361, 427, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), we would set the rule aside.

But no such skullduggery is afoot. Assessing security risks to telecom networks falls in the FCC's wheelhouse. And the agency's judgments about national security receive robust input from other expert agencies and officials. We are therefore persuaded that, in crafting the rule, the agency reasonably acted within the broad authority Congress gave it to regulate communications. Additionally, having carefully considered the companies’ other challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Constitution, we find those unavailing as well.

We therefore deny the petition for review.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background .................... ––––

Procedural History ............. ––––

Standard of Review .............––––

Discussion ....................––––

I. Ripeness....................––––
II. Statutory Authority ............ ––––
A. Lack of Express Prohibition in Act ......... ––––
B. Chevron Analysis .........––––
1. "Public Interest" Provisions.........––––
2. "Quality Services" Provision ......... ––––
C. Additional Arguments ......... ––––
1. Lack of National Security Expertise ......... ––––
2. Conflict with Presidential Authority .........––––
3. Secure Networks Act ......... ––––
III. Substantive Challenges....................––––
A. Adequacy of Notice .........––––
B. Arbitrary and Capricious Review .........––––
1. Consideration of Relevant Evidence and Arguments .........––––
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis ......... ––––
3. Rejection of Risk-Based Approach .........––––
C. Vagueness......... ––––
D. Due Process......... ––––
IV. Conclusion ..........––––
BACKGROUND

Huawei Technologies Company ("Huawei") is a global provider of telecommunications equipment and services established and headquartered in China. It supplies smart device, cloud, and 5G broadband cellular technology to commercial entities and consumers. Huawei-USA launched in 2001 and maintains its U.S. headquarters in Plano, Texas.

As early as 2011, Huawei began attracting the U.S. government's attention as a potential security risk to American telecommunications networks.1 In October 2012, the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ("HPSCI") published a report finding, "Huawei ... cannot be trusted to be free of foreign state influence and thus pose[s] a security threat to the United States and to our systems." HPSCI Report , at vi–vii. The HPSCI admonished U.S. government systems operators and contractors to exclude Huawei equipment and encouraged private entities to reconsider Huawei-associated security risks and "seek other vendors." Id. at vi.

In late 2017, members of Congress expressed apprehension about "Chinese espionage" and "Huawei's role in [it]" to then-Chairman of the FCC, Ajit Pai.2 Pai's reply conveyed "share[d] ... concerns about the security threat that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies pose to our communications networks."3 He promised "to take proactive steps" to "ensure the integrity of the communications supply chain ... in the near future." Id.

Around this time, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ("2018 NDAA"), which barred the Defense Department from procuring telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei.4 The 2019 NDAA went further, prohibiting all executive agencies from obtaining Huawei equipment, contracting with entities that use it, or using loan or grant funds to obtain it.5 Sharing these concerns, then-President Donald Trump issued executive orders addressing the issue in 2019 and 2020.6

Against this backdrop, the FCC issued an April 2018 notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM"), "In the Matter of Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC Programs."7 The notice concerned "universal service funds" (or "USF funds"), a pool of money the FCC dispenses to certain providers to promote "universal service." See 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) ; see also Alenco Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC , 201 F.3d 608, 617 (5th Cir. 2000).8 USF funds foster affordable telephone and internet access in high-cost areas, subsidize rates for rural health care facilities, and support services for schools and libraries.9 The NPRM sought comment on a proposed rule that would prohibit using USF funds "to purchase equipment or services from any communications equipment or service providers identified as posing a national security risk to communications networks or the communications supply chain." 33 FCC Rcd. at 4058. The NPRM also solicited comment on "how to identify companies" that pose such threats and proposed several approaches.10 Id. at 4064. Comment was also sought on other steps the FCC could take, waivers for USF applicants, costs and benefits, and sources of legal authority for the rule. Id. at 4068–70. The NPRM drew extensive comments, including from Huawei.11

Ultimately, the FCC released a final rule (the "USF Rule") barring use of USF funds to buy equipment or services provided by a company "posing a national security threat to the integrity of communications networks or the communications supply chain." 47 C.F.R. § 54.9(a). The USF Rule also adopted a process for designating covered companies that involves an initial designation by the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau ("Bureau"), a comment period, and a final designation. Id. § 54.9(b).12

In the cases of Huawei and ZTE Corporation, another Chinese telecommunications company, the FCC found the rulemaking record, as well as additional classified information, sufficient to initially designate both companies.13 Thus, in the Report and Order ("USF Order") accompanying the USF Rule, the Commission announced Huawei's and ZTE's initial designations and directed the Bureau to "implement the next [designation] steps." 34 FCC Rcd. at 11440, 11449. The FCC also used the USF Order to explain its legal authority to adopt the rule, describe the designation standard, justify the rule's scope, provide a cost-benefit analysis, and otherwise respond to commenters.

First, as to its legal authority, the FCC explained that 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) permits it "to specify what a USF recipient may or must do with [universal service] funds."14 Id. at 11434 (citation omitted). The FCC drew additional authority from various provisions in Title 47 empowering the agency to use USF funds to promote the public's interest in quality services and network security. Id. at 11434–37.15

The FCC also stated it would consider "all available evidence to determine whether an entity poses a national security threat." Id. at 11438. Such evidence might include findings by the Commission, Congress, the President, or other executive agencies that an entity "poses a national security threat" or "other available evidence, ... open source or classified," supporting such an assessment. Ibid. The FCC said it would "seek to harmonize its determinations" with those of other Executive Branch agencies and Congress "[w]here appropriate." Id. at 11438–39.

Addressing the rule's scope, the FCC explained the rule applies to "any and all equipment or services, including software, produced or provided by a covered company." Id. at...

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