Hubbard v. Com.

• Decision Date: 16 January 1967
• Citation: 152 S.E.2d 250,207 Va. 673
• Parties: , 54 Lab.Cas. P 9038 Lillie Echols HUBBARD v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia (four cases).
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 250

152 S.E.2d 250

207 Va. 673, 54 Lab.Cas. P 9038

Lillie Echols HUBBARD v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia (four cases).

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 16, 1967.

S. W. Tucker, Richmond, Ruth L. Harvey, Danville (J. L. Williams, Danville, Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, III, Conrad K. Harper, New York City, on brief), for plaintiff in error.

M. Harris Parker, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen., on brief), for defendant in error.

Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and SPRATLEY, BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO and GORDON, JJ.

EGGLESTON, Chief Justice.

It was charged in separate warrants that on July 12, 1963, Lillie Echols Hubbard,

(1) Trespassed on the premises of Dan River Mills, Incorporated, in the city of Danville, 'after having been forbidden to do so by a person lawfully in charge thereof or by signs posted on said premises,' in violation of Code, § 18.1--173;

(2) Engaged in 'picketing in such a manner as to obstruct or interfere with the free ingress or egress to and from the premises of Dan River Mills,' in violation of Code, § 40--64;

(3) '(D)id unlawfully induce Patricia Ann Johns, juvenile, age 16, to commit a misdemeanor', in violation of Code, § 18.1--14;

(4) '(D)id unlawfully induce Barbara Ann Terry, juvenile, age 15, to commit a misdemeanor,' in violation of § 18.1--14.

Having been convicted in lower courts the defendant appealed to the Corporation Court of Danville where, by consent, the charges were consolidated and tried by the court without a jury. She was convicted on each charge and ordered to pay a fine. The cases are now before us on writs of error to the several judgments. The assignments of error in each case challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment of conviction.

The evidence, which comes from witnesses for the Commonwealth since there was none on behalf of the defendant, may be summarized thus:

On July 12, 1963, at about 3:50 P.M., Julius Adams, with Lillie Echols Hubbard, aged 34, Patricia Ann Johns, aged 16, and Barbara Ann Terry, aged 15, as passengers, drove a car to the vicinity of Gate No. 5 of Dan River Mills, a large industrial plant in the city of Danville. Upon reaching the vicinity of the gate the three passengers jumped out of the car, and over the protestations of a watchman stationed there, ran onto the premises and lay down in front of the gate. Hubbard carried a sign which read 'DAN RIVER MILLS HAS FEDERAL CONTRACTS--NEGROES WANT BETTER JOBS.' One of the young girls carried a sign which read 'I AM TOO YOUNG TO VOTE--WHAT'S YOUR EXCUSE?'

At the gate there was a conspicuously posted sign which read 'PRIVATE PROPERTY--DAN RIVER EMPLOYEES ONLY--NO TRESPASSING.' The three young women were not employees of Dan River Mills. They lay down in such a manner as to prevent all traffic, both pedestrian and vehicular, from passing through this gate, which was one of four main entrances to and exits from the plant. A captain of the police force arrived on the scene and told them that they were trespassing and would be arrested unless they left. They refused to do so for a period of about twenty minutes. While the gate was thus being obstructed the first shift of workers at the plant was ending and the second shift was beginning. Approximately 2500 employees were forced to use other exits from the plant. Because of their conduct the three young women were placed under arrest. They had to be carried bodily to the police vehicle. Warrants against Hubbard, which are the basis of these prosecutions, were sworn out and served on her.

Code, § 18.1--173 (Repl. Vol. 1960), ¹ forbids any person without authority to go or remain upon the lands or premises of another after having been forbidden to do so. Clearly, the conduct of the defendant Hubbard constituted a violation of this statute. She and her companions willfully and purposely went upon and remained on the premises of Dan River Mills after having been forbidden to do so by a sign conspicuously posted at the scene and the warning of the watchman stationed there. Moreover, they remained there after having been warned by the police that in so doing they were trespassing. See Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369.

The lower court convicted the defendant of illegal picketing in violation of Code, § 40--64 (Repl. Vol. 1953). ² It will be observed that the second paragraph of this statute prohibits picketing 'in such manner as to obstruct or interfere with free ingress or egress to and from any premises.'

While picketing is usually employed in labor disputes it is frequently employed in other situations. When so employed in the latter situations it is subject to lawful regulation and restraint. Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985; Annotation: Nonlabor Picketing or Boycott, 93 A.L.R.2d 1284, 1290 Ff.

Code, § 40--64, has heretofore been considered by us in cases arising from labor disputes, ³ but its provisions are sufficiently broad to apply to the situation with which we are here concerned. There is no claim to the contrary. The only contention made before us is that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of the defendant of the violation of this statute. Contrary to that contention, we hold that it is amply sufficient.

The uncontradicted evidence shows that the defendant, along with her companions, lay down in front of one of the main entrances to and exits from this large industrial plant in such a manner as to block completely the use of the gate by both pedestrian and vehicular traffic in the operation of the plant. Clearly, such conduct on the part of the defendant was in violation of the statute (§ 40--64).

In separate warrants it was charged that the defendant, in violation of Code, § 18.1--14 (Repl. Vol. 1960), 'did unlawfully induce' Patricia Ann Johns and Barbara Ann Terry, juveniles, 'to commit a misdemeanor.' The lower court found the defendant guilty on each charge and that finding is challenged on this appeal for lack of sufficient evidence. The material portion of the statute is found in the margin. ⁴

The prohibition in the statute is against any person 'who shall cause or encourage' any child under the age of eighteen years to commit a misdemeanor. While the charge in each warrant, that the defendant did unlawfully 'induce' the juvenile to commit a misdemeanor, does not follow the exact words of the statute, the language used, coupled with reference to the statute, was sufficient to put the defendant on notice that she was charged with the violation of this statute as written.

Again, although the warrants do not allege the particular misdemeanor which the defendant caused or encouraged the juveniles to commit, it seems to have been assumed in the trial below and on this appeal that the reference is to trespass, a misdemeanor under Code, § 18.1--173, and illegal picketing, a misdemeanor under § 40--64.

In Bibbs v. Commonwealth, 129 Va. 768, 771, 106 S.E. 363, we held that it is not an essential element of the offense under § 18.1--14 that the accused should have 'caused' the juvenile to commit the misdemeanor. It is sufficient if he 'encouraged' such commission. This is so because the prohibition in the statute is in the disjunctive against any person who shall 'cause or encourage' the commission of a misdemeanor.

Viewed in the light of this holding, we think the evidence in the present case is sufficient to sustain the finding that the defendant encouraged the juvenile in each instance to commit misdemeanors. The defendant, accompanied by these girls, ignoring the posted sign forbidding...