Hubbard v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zon. Adj.

Decision Date08 December 1976
Docket NumberNo. 8635.,8635.
Citation366 A.2d 427
PartiesHarriet B. HUBBARD, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENT, Respondent.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Harriet B. Hubbard, pro se.

Leo N. Gorman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., with whom John R. Risher, Jr., Corp. Counsel, Louis P. Robbins, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief for respondent.

Before KERN, GALLAGHER and NEBEKER, Associate Judges.

NEBEKER, Associate Judge:

Petitioner, Harriet Hubbard, pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, §§ 1-1510 and 11-722, challenges an order of the District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment (hereafter the Board) granting the application (BZA Case No. 11265) of Regional Addiction Prevention, Inc. (hereafter "RAP") for a special exception to operate a halfway house or social service center in the Northwest section of the District of Columbia. The application was filed on November 2, 1972, and was scheduled for public hearing on February 21, 1973. When the case was called no one representing the applicant was present. The chairman of the Board thereupon dismissed the case with prejudice. A written order to this effect, dated March 29, 1973, was entered in the record and mailed to the applicant. On April 12, 1973, the Board received a timely motion for rehearing, purported to grant the motion on April 24, and scheduled the rehearing for June 20, 1973. The vote granting reconsideration was, according to Board minutes, three in favor, one absent, and one abstention. This court, sua sponte, raised the question whether this grant was valid in light of Board Rule 5.45 requiring at least 4 (four) affirmative votes to grant rehearing. The Board now concedes the invalidity of its grant of rehearing, but asks us to remand to permit the Board to vote again on the rehearing motion on the theory that it is still pending. We vacate the order on review, but decline to follow the remand recommendation. Instead, we hold that the Board's action after the purported grant of rehearing was invalid, and that the motion must be treated as denied, thus to require a one-year waiting period before reapplication can be made. See Board Rule 5.6.

Much time has elapsed since review was sought in this court. It is important to note the cause of that delay since the Board now proposes a remand procedure arguably giving the appearance that it intends to pro forma rectify this error without due regard to the merits of the case or to its own rules.

On July 9, 1974, petitioner filed a petition for review in this court. Because petitioner had also filed a motion for rehearing with the Board, the court delayed resolution of the petition for review until the Board acted on the motion for rehearing. The Board denied the motion on August 27, 1974. After the record was filed in this court and the petitioner had filed her brief, the Board filed a motion to remand the record to permit it to make additional findings of fact since it then viewed the original findings as defective. The motion was granted and on December 15, 1975, a revised order, together with findings dated December 12, 1975, was filed with the court as a supplemental record. Because approval of the revised order was not reflected in the official minutes of the Board, the record was again remanded at its request so that the revised order could be formally considered at a public meeting of the Board. At a public meeting on March 23, 1976, the revised order was approved by the Board by a vote of 4 (four) to 1 (one). A supplemental record reflecting the Board's action of March 23, 1976, was filed with the court on April 8, 1976, and this case was argued shortly thereafter.

At no time did the Board address the question of its action on the rehearing motion until its confession of error, prompted by our sua sponte order.1 In its response to the order, the Board does not object to...

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3 cases
  • Wieck v. District of Columbia, Bd. of Zoning, 10639.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 1 Febrero 1978
    ...involved. The applicable standard of review is set out in D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1510. See § 11-722; Hubbard v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 366 A.2d 427 (1976). Thus, this court has the (3) to hold unlawful and set aside any action or findings and conclusions foun......
  • Gladden v. DIST. OF COLUMBIA ZONING ADJ., 93-AA-1609.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 5 Junio 1995
    ...all these facilities in one Ward subsection. Petitioners in support of this argument point to Hubbard v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 366 A.2d 427 (D.C.1976). There, this court, in dicta, commented that no one section of a community should have to bear a disproportionate......
  • Spevak v. Dist. of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 13 Agosto 1979
    ...that this rule is mandatory, giving discretion to the Board only within one specific exception. Cf. Hubbard v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 366 A.2d 427 (1976). Thus we must decide whether that exception — "new pertinent evidence" — was present The facts underl......

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