Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. Partnership, 971060
| Decision Date | 27 February 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 971060,971060 |
| Citation | 497 S.E.2d 335,255 Va. 335 |
| Parties | Brenda HUBBARD v. HENRICO LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, t/a Henrico Arms Apartments. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Eric G. Reeves (Hunton & Williams, on brief), Richmond, for appellant.
Thomas J. Dillon, III (Chandra D. Lantz; Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, on brief), Richmond, for appellee.
Present: All the justices.
In this appeal, we decide whether a tenant in an unlawful detainer action who pays the overdue rent and related charges before the first court return date automatically invokes the rights afforded by Code § 55-243 to retain possession of the leased premises.
Brenda Hubbard leased an apartment from Henrico Limited Partnership t/a Henrico Arms Apartments (Henrico Arms) under the terms of a written lease that required her to make monthly rent payments to Henrico Arms. In February, April, and June 1996, Hubbard failed to make the required rent payments. On each of these occasions, Henrico Arms sent Hubbard a written notice, pursuant to Code § 55-225, stating that she must pay the overdue rent and related charges within five days or surrender possession of the leased premises. When Hubbard failed to pay the amounts specified within five days of each written notice, Henrico Arms filed a summons for unlawful detainer on each occasion, seeking payment of past due rent, costs, and possession of the leased premises.
Prior to the return date on each of the unlawful detainer summonses, Hubbard paid to Henrico Arms all overdue amounts. Henrico Arms accepted each payment with reservation, pursuant to Code § 55-248.34, to preserve its right to seek possession of the premises. After accepting the rent with reservation, but prior to trial, Henrico Arms dismissed each unlawful detainer summons as "paid."
In September 1996, when Hubbard again failed to make the required rent payment, Henrico Arms sent Hubbard a written notice stating that she must pay the overdue rent and related charges within five days or surrender possession of the apartment. After Hubbard failed to pay the amount specified within five days, Henrico Arms filed a summons for unlawful detainer in the general district court, seeking payment of rent, costs, fees, and possession of the premises. Although Hubbard paid the entire amount due to Henrico Arms prior to the return date, and Henrico Arms accepted the payment with reservation, Henrico Arms did not dismiss the action.
At trial, Hubbard notified the general district court that she had paid all amounts due and sought to invoke her rights under Code § 55-243, which provides, in relevant part:
A. If any party having right or claim to such lands shall ... before the first court return date in an action of unlawful detainer seeking possession of a residential dwelling based upon a default in rent, pay or tender to the party entitled to such rent ... all the rent and arrears, along with any reasonable attorney's fees and late charges contracted for in a written rental agreement, interest and costs, all further proceedings in the ... unlawful detainer shall cease....
B. In cases of unlawful detainer, the tenant may invoke the rights granted by this section no more than one time during any twelve-month period of continuous residency in the rental dwelling unit.
Hubbard informed the court that she had not exercised these rights within the preceding twelve-month period. Henrico Arms argued that Hubbard had invoked the rights on the earlier occasions when she paid the amounts due prior to the first court return dates. The general district court agreed with Henrico Arms and entered judgment in its favor for possession of the leased premises.
Hubbard appealed the judgment to the circuit court. After a trial de novo, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Henrico Arms for possession of the premises, ruling that Hubbard had invoked her rights under Code § 55-243 within the preceding twelve-month period and, therefore, was prevented from asserting those rights in the current action.
On appeal to this Court, Hubbard contends that the trial court erred in awarding possession of the premises to Henrico Arms because she had not invoked her statutory rights in any of the earlier unlawful detainer actions. Hubbard asserts that a tenant can only invoke these statutory rights by manifesting an intent to do so through "some words or conduct," after paying all overdue rent and related charges. Hubbard also argues that Henrico Arms should not be permitted to rely on the annual limitation in Code § 55-243(B) because Henrico Arms failed to inform Hubbard on any of those earlier occasions that she was exercising her rights under the statute.
In response, Henrico Arms contends that under the express terms of Code § 55-243, once a tenant pays accrued rent, attorney's fees, late charges, interest, and costs, the unlawful detainer proceeding "shall cease." Thus, Henrico Arms asserts that when a tenant pays all overdue rent and related charges before the first court return date on the unlawful detainer summons, the tenant has invoked the rights provided by the statute and the unlawful detainer action terminates by operation of law. Henrico Arms also argues that the statute does not require a landlord expressly to acknowledge that a tenant has invoked these statutory rights at the time the rights are exercised. We agree with Henrico Arms.
We repeatedly have stated the principles of statutory construction that apply when a statute, such as Code § 55-243, is clear and unambiguous. In such circumstances, a court may look only to the words of the statute to determine its meaning. Harrison & Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assocs., 253 Va. 364, 368, 484 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1997); Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). The intention of the legislature must be determined from those words, unless a literal construction would result in a manifest absurdity. Abbott v. Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997); Barr v....
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