Hubbard v. Hubbard
Citation | 603 P.2d 747,1979 OK 154 |
Decision Date | 13 November 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 49660,49660 |
Parties | A. Delores HUBBARD, Appellee, v. R. O. HUBBARD, Appellant. |
Court | Supreme Court of Oklahoma |
Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County; Carmon Harris, trial judge.
This case involves an appeal from the issuance of a decree of divorce by the court below. Appellant attacks the trial court's ruling as to the grounds for divorce, the division of property, awarding of alimony, and granting of continuance on the issue of attorney fees. Finding merit to some of Appellant's propositions, and none to others, we affirm the decision of the trial court in part, reverse it in part, and remand the cause with instructions.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Sandra Johnson and Loyd Benefield, Benefield, Shelton & Tyree, Oklahoma City, for appellee.
Kent F. Frates, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
This case involves an appeal from the actions of a trial court in a divorce proceeding. Appellant, Dr. R. O. Hubbard, has appealed from various findings and orders rendered in a divorce action brought in Oklahoma County by his wife, Delores Hubbard. Appellant husband presents five questions for review by this Court. Appellant contends:
1. The trial court erred in granting plaintiff a divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty, when all the acts offered in support of this ground had been "condoned."
2. The opinion testimony offered by a supposed "expert witness" as to the Appellant husband's future earning capacity was wrongly admitted into evidence to the prejudice of the defendant.
3. The trial court's division of property and award of alimony in lieu of property was inequitable.
4. Any alimony awarded in the decree should have been alimony for support and maintenance, and as set in the trial court's decree, designating such alimony as alimony in lieu of property division was inequitable and excessive.
5. The trial court erred when overruling defendant's demurrer and motion to dismiss, both addressed to plaintiff's request for attorney fees.
We will address the issues in the order presented. Accordingly, we will first decide whether the trial court erred in granting the divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty.
Although he denies any acts of cruelty took place, Dr. Hubbard argues that the alleged acts of cruelty upon which Ms. Hubbard relies do not constitute grounds for divorce, as all those alleged acts had been condoned. In Every v. Every, Okl., 293 P.2d 612, 614, 615 (1956), this Court stated:
(Emphasis added)
In Estee v. Estee, 34 Okl. 305, 125 P. 455 (1912), this Court held that when, after mistreatment of a wife has been condoned by her, the husband is guilty of similar misconduct, the condoned offense is revived. In so holding, we stated:
In the case before us, although the testimony was somewhat conflicting, there was evidence in the record demonstrating that Appellant husband, after a reconciliation, had again mistreated his wife. It is clear that the effect of this conduct would have been to revive the past indiscretions, which were condoned. Additionally, the record contains evidence showing that Ms. Hubbard's decision to continue living with her husband, for a short period after the last misconduct occurred, was not based upon her having forgiven her husband's past conduct, but was based upon her intent to aid her husband financially, as her husband had recently been informed that his residency contract was not being renewed. Her decision to remain for a short period thus enabled the parties to save the expense of a second home or apartment. As the record contained evidence of acts that constitute cruelty, and evidence showing that any of the acts of cruelty, which may have been condoned, were revived by continued mistreatment, we cannot say that the trial court erred in granting the divorce on the basis of cruelty.
We next consider whether the trial court erred in admitting certain opinion testimony, which was admitted for the purpose of showing Dr. Hubbard's future income. In an attempt to establish the future income of Dr. Hubbard, the testimony of Dr. Turner Bynum was offered. Dr. Bynum is an Oklahoma City medical doctor who specializes as an internist. In testifying as to the average income of a general practitioner in Oklahoma City, Dr. Bynum relied in part upon information obtained from articles in publications dealing with medical economics. Dr. Hubbard's lawyer objected to such testimony on the basis that Dr. Bynum was not an expert in the field of medical economics. Objection to the testimony was also made on the grounds that the mere regurgitation of data from publications was a violation of the hearsay rule. Dr. Bynum, although not an expert in the field of medical economics was, because of his experience and background, certainly qualified to state his opinion as to the average income of general practitioners in Oklahoma City. He was also qualified to state his knowledge of what income could be expected from emergency room duty. The trial court did not err in admitting his testimony.
We next address Appellant's third and fourth propositions which assert error in the trial court's award to Ms. Hubbard of $100,000 in lieu of property division. Inasmuch as the propositions contain overlapping issues, we will consider them together. Appellant contends that the award is excessive and that any award should have been made for support and maintenance rather than property division as it was based on future earnings.
The trial court stated the following in making the award:
Appellant complains that the trial court's award improperly considered his future earnings as jointly acquired property. He contends that his future earnings and his medical license are not "property" which can be divided upon divorce.
Appellant relies on the recent Colorado Supreme Court decision of In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), where, by a sharply divided vote (4-3), that Court held an educational degree was not "property" capable of division in marriage dissolution proceedings. In Graham the wife had worked and contributed 70% Of the family income while her husband attended school and acquired an MBA degree. The divorce occurred after Mr. Graham's graduation but before he had begun his professional career and the parties had not accumulated any marital property, as that term is traditionally used. Testimony before the trial court showed that the degree had increased Mr. Graham's earning capacity by more than $80,000.00. The trial court determined that Mr. Graham's education was jointly-owned marital property in which Mrs. Graham had a property interest and awarded her the sum of $33,134.00.
Reversing that judgment, the...
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