Hubbard v. Messer

Decision Date20 November 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-1701-FT.,02-1701-FT.
PartiesNeil S. HUBBARD, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Shaun MESSER, d/b/a Degree Systems, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs by Erwin H. Steiner and Steiner & Wright, LLC, Eau Claire, and oral argument by Erwin H. Steiner.

For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Christopher R. Bloom, Joel L. Aberg and Weld, Riley, Prenn & Ricci, S.C., Eau Claire, and oral argument by Joel L. Aberg.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy G. Costello, Timothy C. Kamin and Krukowski & Costello, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Raymond J. Pollen, Amy J. Doyle, Crivello, Carlson & Mentkowski, Milwaukee, on behalf of Wisconsin Municipal Mutual Insurance Company and Wisconsin Counties Association, John J. Prentice and Prentice & Phillips LLP, Milwaukee, on behalf of Wisconsin Counties Association.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Aaron N. Halstead, Kathleen Meter Lounsbury and Shneidman, Hawks & Ehlke, S.C., Madison, on behalf of District Council 40, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and Carol Gonzales.

¶ 1. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.

This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing a judgment of the Circuit Court for Eau Claire County, Paul J. Lenz, Judge.1 The circuit court granted summary judgment to Neil S. Hubbard, the employee, concluding that because certain wages were due and unpaid on the deadline set by Wis. Stat. § 109.03(1) (2001-02),2 Shaun Messer d/b/a Degree Systems, the employer, owed the employee a civil penalty (referred to in the statutes as increased wages) of 70% of the amount of wages due and unpaid pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 109.11(2), which governs wage claim actions.

¶ 2. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the matter to the circuit court with directions to enter summary judgment for the employer, dismissing the employee's claims with prejudice. The court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. § 109.11(2)(b) imposes civil penalties not if wages are due and unpaid after the employer is delinquent for more than 31 days as provided in § 109.03(1), but rather if, at the time a circuit court action commences, the wages are due to an employee and remain unpaid.3 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that if an employer belatedly pays wages in full before commencement of a circuit court action, the employee does not have an action for civil penalties.

¶ 3. At issue in the present case is whether the phrase "wages due and unpaid" in Wis. Stat. § 109.11(2)(b), the civil penalties provision, refers to wages due and unpaid by the statutory deadline for the payment of wages or to wages due and unpaid when a circuit court action commences.

¶ 4. For the reasons set forth, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 109.11(2)(b) does not impose civil penalties when wages due an employee have been fully paid at the time a circuit court action is commenced.

¶ 5. The facts are not in dispute and are set forth in the decision of the court of appeals. It is sufficient for purposes of this review to note that in 1999 the employer failed to pay wages to the employee and the employee filed a complaint with the Department of Workforce Development (DWD). When the employer did not pay the amount computed by the DWD, the DWD referred the case to the district attorney.4 The district attorney and the employee's private counsel advised the employer that the employee would enforce his rights through a small claims court action. After additional delay, the employer issued two checks, the second one in July 2000, totaling $3,873.91 in satisfaction of the full amounts calculated by the DWD as owing to the employee. The employee cashed both checks and does not claim any wages have not been paid.

¶ 6. On September 14, 2001, the employee commenced a circuit court action seeking a 100% civil penalty under Wis. Stat. § 109.11(2)(b) of $3,873.91. The employer moved for summary judgment, arguing that all wages had been paid fourteen months prior to commencement of the action and that therefore the employee had no cause of action for the civil penalties as a matter of law. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the employee, awarding civil penalties of 70% of the wages due and unpaid at the statutory deadline for the payment of wages. The court of appeals reversed the judgment, holding that civil penalties are available only if wages were unpaid at the commencement of a circuit court action. We granted review to resolve this question of law.

[1]

¶ 7. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court applies the standards set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) in the same manner as the circuit court. Summary judgment is proper and will be upheld on review when no issues of material fact exist and only a question of law is presented.5

[2, 3]

¶ 8. The question of law presented in this summary judgment is the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 109.11(2)(b): Does the statute refer to "wages due and unpaid" at the statutory deadline for payment of wages, or does the statute refer to "wages due and unpaid" at the time a circuit court action commences? This court determines questions of law independently of the circuit court and court of appeals, but benefiting from the analyses of these courts.6

¶ 9. Our goal in interpreting a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the legislature.7 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. Each word should be looked at so as not to render any portion of the statute superfluous.8 But "courts must not look at a single, isolated sentence or portion of a sentence" instead of the relevant language of the entire statute.9 Furthermore, a statutory provision must be read in the context of the whole statute to avoid an unreasonable or absurd interpretation. Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read together and harmonized when possible.10 A cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is to favor an interpretation that will fulfill the purpose of a statue over an interpretation that defeats the manifest objective of an act.11 Thus a court must ascertain the legislative intent from the language of the statute in relation to its context, history, scope, and objective intended to be accomplished, including the consequences of alternative interpretations.12

¶ 10. We begin with the language of the statute. Wisconsin Stat. § 109.03(5) grants employees a right of action against employers for all unpaid wages due to the employee. Wisconsin Stat. § 109.11(2)(b) provides that in a wage claim action a circuit court may order the employer to pay to the employee "in addition to the amount of wages due and unpaid to an employee... increased wages of not more than 100% of the amount of those wages due and unpaid." Section 109.11(2)(b) reads in full as follows:

In a wage claim action that is commenced after the department has completed its investigation under s. 109.09(1) and its attempts to settle and compromise the wage claim under sub. (1), a circuit court may order the employer to pay to the employee, in addition to the amount of wages due and unpaid to an employee and in addition to or in lieu of the criminal penalties specified in sub. (3), increased wages of not more than 100% of the amount of those wages due and unpaid.

Wis. Stat. § 109.11(2)(b) (emphasis added).

[4-11]

¶ 11. Wisconsin Stat. § 109.11(2)(b) does not explicitly define the phrase "wages due and unpaid," nor does it state the time at which wages are to be determined as due and unpaid. ¶ 12. In seeking to fill this void, the employer forwards three textual arguments supporting his view that the phrase "wages due and unpaid" refers to wages due and unpaid when a circuit court action commences.

¶ 13. First, the employer argues that because Wis. Stat. § 109.11(2)(b) begins with the words "in a wage claim action," the legislature intended that the civil penalty apply only to the facts as they exist "in a wage claim action." When wages have been paid before a claim action is commenced, he argues, they are no longer due and unpaid in the wage claim action.

¶ 14. Second, the employer argues that if the legislature intended to make civil penalties available for all wages that were due at the time prescribed by chapter 109, it would not have included the word "unpaid" in Wis. Stat. § 109.11(2)(b). He argues that the use of the word "unpaid" in the phrase "wages due and unpaid" indicates that an action to assess civil penalties may commence only as to those wages that have not yet been paid, and that if the penalty provision covered all wages that were paid untimely, then the word "unpaid" would be made superfluous.

¶ 15. Third, Wis. Stat. § 109.11(2)(b) reads that a circuit court may order the employer to pay to the employee, "in addition to the amount of wages due and unpaid ... increased wages of not more than 100% of the amount of wages due and unpaid." The employer argues that the words "in addition to" mean that only if an employee commences an action to collect wages that are due and unpaid may a circuit court award civil penalties against an employer. He argues that the words "in addition" mean that a circuit court must first award the unpaid wages to which an employee is entitled and then award, if the circuit court deems such penalty wages appropriate, an additional percentage (up to 100%) of the wages due and unpaid. Thus, he argues, the legislature did not create a cause of action for the civil penalties distinct and independent from the underlying cause of action for unpaid wages.

¶ 16. Although these arguments have merit, we conclude that the employer's interpretation does not necessarily rule out the possibility that the phrase "wages due and unpaid" means those wages...

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