Hubbard v. Murray

Decision Date13 September 1939
CourtVirginia Supreme Court
PartiesHUBBARD et al. v. MURRAY et al.

Error to Circuit Court, Roanoke County; T. L. Keister, Judge.

Action by Walter J. Murray, administrator of the estate of George R. Murray, deceased, and others against C. A. Hubbard and others for death of George R. Murray, resulting from collision between an automobile and a truck. To review a judgment for the administrator, defendants C. A. Hubbard and Charlie Wiseman bring error.

Reversed, and final judgment for defendants C. A. Hubbard and Charlie Wiseman.

Argued before HOLT, HUDGINS, GREGORY, BROWNING, EGGLESTON, and SPRATLEY, JJ.

Fred B. Gentry and Harvey B. Apper-son, both of Roanoke, for plaintiffs in error.

Kime & Hoback, of Salem, and Horace M. Fox, of Roanoke, for defendants in error.

EGGLESTON, Justice.

This litigation arises out of an automobile accident which occurred just south of the corporate limits of the city of Roanoke, about 8:15 A. M. on February 26, 1938.

A short distance south of where the accident happened U. S. Highway No. 220 coming from Martinsville unites with State Highway No. 119 coming from the town of Starkey, in Roanoke county. The uniting roads form an inverted "Y", with the stem pointing northwardly toward Roanoke, the eastern fork coming from Martinsville and the western fork coming from Starkey.

As is usual in such cases the evidence is highly conflicting, and under well-settled principles the facts will be stated in conformity with the jury's verdict.

On the morning in question a passenger bus owned by C. A. Hubbard and driven by Charlie Wiseman was bound from Star-key to Roanoke. It proceeded along Highway No. 119 to its intersection with Highway No. 220. After crossing over the intersection the bus proceeded northwardly along the combined roads toward the city and came to a stop on the eastern side of the road opposite a filling station called "Uncle Tom's Barbecue", located on the western side of the highway, for the purpose of discharging a passenger. At this point the paved road is eighteen feet wide. For some distance along the eastern side of the road, both north and south of where the bus stopped, there is a smooth shoulder approximately eight feet wide, with a slight slope leading toward a shallow ditch. The bus came to a stop with its left wheels on the concrete and its right wheels on the shoulder. The passenger alighted and the bus proceeded to move forward. Before it had gained full momentum and before it had gotten entirely on the pavement, its left rear was sideswiped by the overhanging portion of the body of a heavily laden truck proceeding in the same direction. The truck was owned by Carroll J. Price and John C. Glenn and was being driven by John Lewis Dillon.

Almost immediately after the collision the bus came to a stop on the eastern side of the highway, headed north.

After sideswiping the bus the truck ricocheted across the road to its left, collided head on with a Buick passenger car driven by George R. Murray, which was proceeding southwardly, and finally came to a stop on the western side of the road in front of the gasoline pumps of the Uncle Tom's Barbecue filling station. The passenger car was practically demolished, the truck was badly damaged, and Murray was killed as a result of the collision.

Murray's administrator sued the owners and drivers of both the bus and the truck, claiming that the collision was proximately due to the concurring negligence of the operators of the two vehicles.

The administrator contended that the driver of the bus was negligent in stopping partly on the traveled portion of the high, way, thus partly blocking the road contrary to the statute, instead of stopping further to the right on the shoulder.

The acts of negligence charged against the truck driver were, that he was proceeding at an excessive rate of speed; that he failed to keep a proper lookout for the bus; that he did not have his truck equipped with proper brakes; that he failed to apply his brakes; and that he was driving after he had become exhausted by reason of a long and uninterrupted journey without sufficient rest and sleep.

There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the administrator against all of the defendants in the sum of $10,000.

No petition for a writ of error was filed on behalf of the owners and operator of the truck, and hence the judgment against them has become final.

The owner and operator of the bus have obtained a writ of error to review the judgment of the lower court. Their principal assignments of error are (1) that the driver of the bus was not guilty of any negligence, and (2) that his negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of the collision, but that the negligence of the truck driver was the sole proximate cause.

Murray's administrator and the owners and driver of the truck take the position before us that it was a jury question as to whether the bus driver was guilty of negligence and whether such proximately contributed to the collision.

Section 2154(133) of Michie's Code of 1936, as amended by Acts of 1938, page 331, c. 205, provides that no bus shall stop on the traveled portion of any highway outside of cities except where it can not with safety leave the traveled portion of the highway. "This provision is for the safety and convenience both of passengers and of the public generally." Roanoke Railway & Electric Co. v. Whitner, Va., 3 S.E.2d 169, 170, decided June 12, 1939.

The violation of a statute, while negligence per se, will not support a recovery for damages unless such violation proximately caused or contributed to the injury complained of. Kinsey V. Brugh, 157 Va. 407, 411, 161 S.E. 41; Harris v. Howerton, 169 Va. 647, 660, 194 S.E. 692; Pratt v. Miles, 166 Va. 478, 481, 186 S.E. 27; Braswell v. Virginia Electric & Power Co, 162 Va. 27, 40, 173 S.E. 365.

In the instant case even if it be assumed for the purpose of argument that the bus was stopped on the highway in violation of the statute, we think that such was the remote cause and that the negligence of the driver of the truck was the sole proximate cause of the collision here involved.

This accident happened in broad daylight on a clear day. The truck driver lived in Roanoke and was quite familiar with the road. As the truck neared the point of collision the road on which it was proceeding swung to the right on an 8-degree 45-minute curve. The undisputed testimony is that as the truck came around this curve the driver had a clear and unobstructed view for four hundred feet of the bus standing on the highway. The bus is twenty-three feet long, eight feet high, seven and one-half feet wide, and is painted yellow. It was, of course, plainly visible to the truck driver had he but looked ahead.

His story is that as he approached the scene of the collision he was proceeding at about twenty-five miles per hour; that he first saw the bus when it was about two hundred feet ahead of him; that he realized that it was blocking his path; that he had ample distance within which to have stopped had his brakes functioned properly, but that when he "pumped" on his foot brakes for some unknown reason they failed to hold; that he was then confronted with the situation where, in order to avoid a collision, he had to go either to the right or to the left of the bus; that he was prevented from going to the right because the passenger who had just alighted from the bus blocked his path; that he cut his truck sharply to the left in the...

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49 cases
  • Smith v. Penn Line Service, Inc.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • January 19, 1960
    ...have occurred even if he had seen the parked vehicle within a reasonable time before the accident.' In the case of Hubbard v. Murray, 173 Va. 448, 3 S.E.2d 397, 401, it is held that where the defendant's bus violated a statute by stopping partially in the highway and was 'sideswiped' by the......
  • Schieszler v. Ferrum College, 7:02-CV-131.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
    • July 15, 2002
    ...facts alleged are susceptible of only one inference. Poliquin v. Daniels, 254 Va. 51, 486 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1997); Hubbard v. Murray, 173 Va. 448, 3 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1939). In Virginia, an injury is proximately caused by a defendant's negligence if the injury is the natural and probable cons......
  • Russo v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • February 19, 1999
    ...undisputed facts are susceptible of only one inference. Poliquin v. Daniels, 254 Va. 51, 486 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1997); Hubbard v. Murray, 173 Va. 448, 3 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1939). In Virginia, an injury is proximately caused by a defendant's negligence if the injury is the natural and probable c......
  • General Electric Company v. Moretz, 7878.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • September 16, 1959
    ...act of the second actor, and the latter's negligence is regarded as the sole proximate cause of the accident. Thus, in Hubbard v. Murray, 173 Va. 448, 3 S.E.2d 397, a bus which had been carelessly parked on the highway in violation of the statute was struck in the rear, in broad daylight, b......
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