Hubbard v. Parker, 23

Decision Date15 July 1993
Docket NumberNo. 92-3560,No. 23,A,23,92-3560
Citation994 F.2d 529
Parties83 Ed. Law Rep. 954 Jon HUBBARD, Appellant, v. John PARKER, in his capacity as President of the School Board of Palestine-Wheatley School Districtand individually; Charles McGowan, in his capacity as Board Member of the School Board of Palestine-Wheatley School District; Allen Massey, in his capacity as Board Member of the School Board of Palestine-Wheatley School District; Vicki Hawk, in her capacity as Board Member of the School Board of Palestine-Wheatley School District; Palestine-Wheatley School District, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Wiley A. Branton, Little Rock, AR, argued, for appellant.

Pamela S. Osment, Conway, AR, argued, for appellees.

Before WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge, and KOPF, * District Judge.

ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellant, a school teacher, coach and athletic director for the Palestine-Wheatley School District No. 23 for the school year 1990-91, appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees, the school district and the school board members, in both their official and individual capacities. The district court rejected appellant's claims that he was deprived of a liberty or property interest without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, when he was constructively discharged, and that he was denied his right to a hearing under the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act. After careful consideration of the record, briefs and arguments of the parties, we affirm.

During the 1990-91 school year, the school board received complaints that appellant had, among other things, allegedly abused sick leave, inflated mileage claims, failed to properly care for the sports equipment, mismanaged funds for referees, and had left school early without arranging adequate student supervision. On January 14, 1991, the Board held a public meeting, during which a motion was approved to call for appellant's resignation for failure to "fulfill[ ] his contract and other documented reasons." The Board's action was reported in the local newspaper the following day. At the Board's request, the appellant attended a Board hearing on January 24, 1991, at which he requested that the allegations against him be put in writing before he was required to respond. The Board took no further action at that time and appellant completed his one-year contract for the school term and was paid a $28,000 salary according to his contract.

On February 26, 1991, prior to the end of the school year, however, the appellant filed the present lawsuit, claiming that he was deprived of his liberty or property interests in his continued employment without due process of law, based upon the public call for his resignation. The complaint further asserted state law claims based upon the Arkansas Fair Teacher Dismissal Act, Ark.Code Ann. §§ 6-17-1501 to 1510, breach of contract and state law tort theories of defamation of character and invasion of privacy.

On April 26, 1991, the superintendent of the school district notified appellant that his contract would not be extended because of "severe economic pressure." On May 23, 1991, appellant's attorney requested a hearing regarding the nonrenewal. Under the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, a teacher who receives notice of nonrenewal is entitled to a hearing within ten days after the request for such hearing is made. Ark.Code Ann. § 6-17-1509 (1987). On June 4, 1991, the tenth day after the request for the hearing had been made, appellant was offered a new contract for the 1991-92 school year. The second-year contract, however, did not include the athletic director or football coach duties, allegedly due to a lack of funding, and accordingly, the contract offered a reduced salary of $20,575. Apparently, this second-year contract offer was later supplemented with an offer to the appellant to serve as the baseball coach for the 1991-92 school year. However, it is not clear from the record what further compensation was offered or intended for this additional duty. Rather than accept the second-year contract, however, the appellant voluntarily resigned by letter dated July 1, 1991, notifying the Board that he had accepted employment at another school district, with an annual salary of $27,000. Appellant then filed an amended complaint to include the additional claim of constructive discharge.

Before the scheduled trial to the court was to begin, the district court held a telephone conference on September 30, 1992, with counsel for both parties. During the course of the telephone conference, the court advised the parties that it had serious questions whether, as a matter of law, the appellant could proceed with his claims. A second telephone conference was then held on October 2, 1992, during which the court announced to the parties that it was sua sponte granting partial summary judgment and dismissing appellant's federal claims, as well as his state law claim based upon the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal...

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13 cases
  • Madewell v. Downs
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • August 29, 1995
    ...notice to the parties of its intent to consider matters outside the complaint. Angel, 12 F.3d at 788 (citing Hubbard v. Parker, 994 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir.1993). Constructive notice that the court will consider matters outside of the complaint is sufficient. Id. A district court's failure t......
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    ...all of her evidence.'") (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Hubbard v. Parker, 994 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir.1993). Although the court may grant summary judgment sua sponte, it is improper for a court to do so where the issue on which s......
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    ...that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.’ ” (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548)); Hubbard v. Parker, 994 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir.1993)). Certainly, it would be futile to consider the merits of this claim against Baldor, if the claim is time-barred. i. Argum......
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