Hubbard v. SEIU Local 2015

• Citation: 552 F.Supp.3d 955
• Decision Date: 05 August 2021
• Docket Number: 2:20-CV-00670-KJM-EFB
• Parties: Tanishia HUBBARD, individual, Plaintiff, v. SEIU LOCAL 2015, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

552 F.Supp.3d 955

Tanishia HUBBARD, individual, Plaintiff,

v.SEIU LOCAL 2015, et al., Defendants,

No. 2:20-CV-00670-KJM-EFB

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed August 5, 2021

Filed August 6, 2021

Mariah Rose Gondeiro, Tyler and Bursch, Murrieta, CA, Shella Sadovnik, Rebekah Millard, Freedom Foundation, Olympia, WA, for Plaintiff.

Scott A. Kronland, Amanda Christine Lynch, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant Service Employees International Union Local 2015.

Anthony Paul O'Brien, Attorney General's Office for the State of California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants Betty T. Yee, Xavier Becerra.

ORDER

Kimberly Mueller, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Tanishia Hubbard, an In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) provider, brings this § 1983 action against SEIU Local 2015, California State Controller Betty T. Yee and Attorney General of California Rob Bonta,¹ alleging violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association. Plaintiff alleges she never authorized union dues deductions and the State Controller deducted dues from her wages without her consent. The State defendants and SEIU Local 2015 filed motions to dismiss. The motions are granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Hubbard is an in-home care provider caring for her son; she is enrolled in California's Medicaid (Medi-Cal) Program, In Home Supportive Services (IHSS), since approximately 2012. Compl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 1. She lives in a county in which IHSS providers are represented by SEIU Local 2015 under a collective bargaining agreement. See id. ¶ 14. California law authorizes its State Controller to "make any deductions from the wages of [IHSS] personnel ..., who," like Hubbard, "are employees of a public authority," if the deductions are "agreed to by that public authority in collective bargaining with the designated representative of the [IHSS] personnel." Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 12301.6(i)(2) ; Compl. ¶ 17. In administering these IHSS supportive service programs, the State Controller must "[m]ake, cancel, or change a deduction or reduction at the request of the ... organization authorized to receive the deduction or reduction." Cal. Gov't Code § 1153(a). The State Controller must also "[o]btain a certification from any ... employee organization ... requesting a deduction ... that they have and will maintain an authorization, signed by the individual from whose salary or wages the deduction or reduction is to be made." Id. § 1153(b). "An employee organization that certifies that it has and will maintain individual employee authorizations shall not be required to provide a copy of an individual authorization to the Controller unless a dispute arises about the existence or terms of the authorization." Id.

Plaintiff alleges she never joined SEIU and never authorized dues deductions. Id. ¶ 20. Despite not authorizing SEIU Local 2015 to deduct dues from her wages, plaintiff alleges the union directed the State Controller to deduct money from her paycheck. Id. ¶¶ 2, 21–22. She sent a letter to SEIU in January 2019 attempting to stop the deductions. Id. ¶ 23. A month later SEIU responded to her letter noting the "next period" when she could cancel her dues authorization was "10/20/2019-11/3/219." See SEIU Letter at 2, ECF No. 1-1. Hubbard alleges she "had no means to test the truthfulness of the letter" because SEIU did not include a copy of her purported membership card in its communications. Compl. ¶ 26. In June 2019, she sent SEIU another written request to revoke her dues deductions. See id. ¶ 28. SEIU responded confirming "effective 3/25/2019" her status with the union had been converted to "non-member" and her dues deductions "will stop within thirty (30) days" after her "anniversary date of 10/20/2019-11/3/2019" "on which [she] signed [her] membership card." See Second SEIU Letter at 4, ECF No. 1-1. SEIU still did not include a copy of her membership card. See Compl. ¶ 30. On December 2019, SEIU mailed Hubbard a copy of her online membership card. Membership Card at 6, ECF No. 1-1 (showing signature date of November 4, 2018). Based on a careful review of that membership card, Hubbard alleges she did not fill out the online membership application. Compl. ¶ 34.

SEIU eventually cancelled plaintiffs’ membership and directed the State Controller to stop union dues deductions. Id. ¶ 32. On October 1, 2019, the State Controller ceased dues deductions from Hubbard's wages. See Csekey Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 13.

Soon after the State stopped deducting union dues and fees from her earnings, plaintiff brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of her First Amendment right to refrain from subsidizing the union's speech through dues absent her written consent, as provided in Janus v. AFSCME , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018). Compl. ¶ 38. Plaintiff asserts this § 1983 action against SEIU Local 2015, California State Controller Betty T. Yee and Attorney General of California Rob Bonta, alleging violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association, see id. ¶¶ 36–51, and six state law claims against SEIU: (1) Fraudulent concealment for allegedly concealing that plaintiff did not properly authorize dues deductions, see id. ¶¶ 52–59, (2) Fraud by representing to plaintiff that she filled out a membership card, see id. ¶¶ 62–68, (3) Negligent misrepresentation by negligently misrepresenting to plaintiff that she filled out a membership card, id. ¶¶ 69–75, (4) Unjust enrichment for withholding dues from plaintiff's wages and benefiting from those dues, id. ¶¶ 76–79, (5) Conversion by "ordering the State Controller to deduct dues" from plaintiff's wages "based upon an unauthorized membership card," id. ¶¶ 80–83, and (6) Intentional infliction of emotional distress by wrongfully withholding dues from plaintiff's wages, id. ¶¶ 84–86. Plaintiff seeks both prospective and retrospective relief. Id. at 12 (Prayer for Relief).

State defendants and SEIU Local 2015 have filed separate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). State Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (AG MTD), ECF No. 9; SEIU Mot. to Dismiss (SEIU MTD), ECF No. 11. Plaintiff opposes the motions, which are fully briefed. See Opp'n AG MTD, ECF No. 17; Opp'n SEIU MTD, ECF No. 18; AG Reply, ECF No. 26; SEIU Reply, ECF No. 23. On October 28, 2020, the court submitted the motions without a hearing. See Minutes, ECF No. 25. The motions overlap substantially, so the court addresses them together here.

II. STANDING

State defendants first argue plaintiff lacks standing for prospective relief because she has not suffered a concrete "injury in fact." See AG MTD at 15. First, they note plaintiff is no longer a union member and union dues are not being deducted from her paycheck. See id. Second, plaintiff's injury from past dues deductions is traceable to her membership agreement with SEIU Local and not California Welfare & Institutions Code section 12301.6(i)(2). Id. Third, a favorable decision in this case will not provide plaintiff any relief because, defendants argue, she is no longer paying any union dues. See id. For these same reasons, SEIU Local 2015 argues plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. See SEIU Mem. P & A at 23, ECF No. 12.

To establish standing, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing three elements: (1) she suffered an injury in fact, (2) the defendants caused that injury, and (3) it is likely the injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). An injury in fact is the "invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete and particularized" and "actual and imminent," not "conjectural or hypothetical." Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, LLC , 847 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir.2017) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) ). Given that defendants voluntarily ceased the challenged conduct before her lawsuit was filed, plaintiff must show "there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive." United States v. W. T. Grant Co. , 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953).

Here, the challenged dues deductions stopped before plaintiff filed this lawsuit, and she has not alleged or otherwise shown that any future violations are more than just a possibility. SEIU, by contrast, has presented the declaration of its Member Services Director, Tom Csekey, explaining the union membership department has been instructed to "flag [Hubbard's] name in its database" so that any future membership and dues authorization in her name will be brought to Mr. Csekey's attention for "review and confirmation before any action is taken to process." Csekey Decl. ¶ 9.

Contrary to plaintiff's argument in opposition, see Opp'n SEIU MTD at 21, the court may consider Csekey's declaration as evidence in determining whether plaintiff has standing. Defendants’ motions present a factual challenge; that is, they challenge the truth of the complaint's allegation that Hubbard has presented the court with an "actual" controversy. See Compl. ¶ 6; see Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer , 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). "In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Id. And contrary to plaintiff's argument, no unresolved jurisdictional question is so intertwined with the merits such that the court must consider the standard described in Bell v. Hood , 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) and Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enterprises , 711 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1983). The factual question here, whether defendants were effecting dues deductions at the time plaintiff filed her...