Hubbard v. State
Decision Date | 01 August 2000 |
Citation | 31 S.W.3d 25 |
Parties | (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) . Lloyd Hubbard, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent. WD57484 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District Handdown Date: 0 |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Clay County, Hon. Michael J. Maloney
Counsel for Appellant: Rebecca L. Kurz
Counsel for Respondent: Barbara K. Chesser and Susan K. Glass
Opinion Summary: Lloyd Hubbard appeals from the motion court's order denying his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. He pled guilty to assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree and armed criminal action.
AFFIRMED.
Majority Opinion holds:
In Point I, Hubbard attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support the motion court's finding that he was competent to plead guilty. First he contends that in determining his competency to plead, the court should not have relied on the testimony of the State's expert witness, Dr. Suthikant. This Court disagrees. As to the court's reliance on Dr. Suthikant's testimony, the record reflects that the motion court, as well as the plea court, which were the same, found Dr. Suthikant's testimony to be credible and never wavered from its reliance on it in finding the appellant competent to proceed. Hubbard contends that it did in that after the competency hearing it agreed with Dr. Suthikant that Hubbard was not suffering from a mental disease or defect and was a malingerer, and after the motion hearing, it found to the contrary. From this, he contends that because the court had rejected Dr. Suthikant's findings, it necessarily had accepted evidence to the contrary, such that, other than the court's personal observations, which according to him were not sufficient on which to base a finding of competency, the court lacked the required evidence on which to base a finding of competency. The record does not support such a contention. Hubbard next claims in Point I that the motion court placed undue emphasis on its own personal observations of his demeanor at the plea and sentencing proceedings. This Court disagrees. While a defendant's demeanor may not be dispositive of his or her competency to stand trial, the court is free to consider demeanor when determining competency and give it the weight it determines is warranted. Having reviewed Dr. Suthikant's report and testimony, when coupled with the motion and pleas courts' observations, this Court is not firmly convinced that the motion court's finding of competency was in error.
In Point II, Hubbard claims that the court erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He claims that if his counsel had investigated his mental health status more thoroughly and presented such evidence to the trial court prior to the time he entered his guilty pleas, the court would have found that he was incompetent to plead guilty. The motion court's finding that Hubbard was competent to proceed was not clearly erroneous, which disposes of the prejudice prong on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, even if he could satisfy the performance prong test by showing that his counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exercise in similar circumstances, Hubbard was not prejudiced.
Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED.
Lloyd Hubbard appeals from the motion court's order denying his Rule 24.0351 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. The appellant pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, in the Circuit Court of Clay County, before the Honorable Michael J. Maloney, to assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree, section 565.081,2 and armed criminal action, section 571.015. As a result of his convictions, he was sentenced, as a persistent offender, section 558.016, to consecutive terms of imprisonment of twenty years, to be served consecutive to a prison sentence he was serving on an unrelated charge.
The appellant raises two points on appeal. In Point I, he claims that the motion court erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion because its finding that he was competent to plead guilty, and thus, his pleas were voluntary, was clearly erroneous in that: (1) "the court's competency determination was based on incorrect and unreliable testimony provided by the state's expert"; and (2) "the court placed undue emphasis on Hubbard's demeanor at the plea and sentencing proceedings." In Point II, he claims that the motion court erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion because he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that his plea counsel failed to adequately investigate and determine his competency to plead guilty and allowed him to plead guilty, although he doubted his competency to do so.
We affirm.
On April 24, 1996, an indictment was returned by a Clay County grand jury charging the appellant with three counts of assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree, section 565.081, and three counts of armed criminal action, section 571.015. On July 18, 1996, the appellant's defense counsel, Bert Godding, filed a motion for a psychiatric examination of the appellant, pursuant to sections 552.020 and 552.030, which was granted on July 31, 1996.
On September 13, 1996, Dr. Deja Suthikant of the Missouri Department of Mental Health met with the appellant for approximately one hour and forty minutes at the St. Joseph State Hospital for purposes of evaluating him. In his report to the court following the examination, he diagnosed the appellant with antisocial personality disorder, depressive disorder not otherwise specified, and polysubstance abuse, but concluded that "none of these mental disorders fall within the meaning of mental illness as described in Chapter 552 and Chapter 630, RSMo." He also found that the appellant had a seizure disorder and was malingering. He concluded that the appellant had the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and assist in his own defense. On September 18, 1996, the appellant's counsel submitted to Dr. Suthikant a completed questionnaire provided by him, as well as release forms for the appellant's medical records at St. Joseph State Hospital, Truman Medical Center, Children's Mercy Hospital, and Fulton Diagnostic Center. Dr. Suthikant's report of the appellant's psychiatric examination was filed with the court on September 25, 1996.
On October 11, 1996, the appellant's counsel filed an "Objection to Findings Made Pursuant to Mental Examination and Motion for Re-Examination" alleging that Dr. Suthikant's "mental examination was completed without any records from the hospitalizations defendant had at Truman Medical Center, Children's Mercy Hospital, Fulton Diagnostic Center, and St. Joseph State Hospital." He requested that a second psychiatric examination be performed by the "Department of Mental Health . . . and/or a private psychiatrist." On October 24, 1996, the trial court entered an "Order for Completion of Mental Examination," ordering that "the Department of Mental Health's designee or Dr. Suthikant review and examine defendant's hospitalization records and file a completed report as to the findings."
On or about January 3, 1997, Dr. Suthikant sent a letter to the court indicating that he had reviewed the appellant's records from Children's Mercy Hospital and St. Joseph State Hospital. He reported that, based on these records, He concluded again that the appellant
On January 15, 1997, the trial court, the Honorable Michael J. Maloney, held a competency hearing. At the hearing, Dr. Suthikant was the only witness called. He testified that the appellant, in his opinion, was not suffering from a mental disease or defect that prevented him from understanding the nature of the proceedings against him. He further testified that after his initial examination of the appellant and report, he reviewed the appellant's records and that his review of the records did not change his diagnosis. He testified that the appellant told him that he was epileptic and taking Haldol, Dilantin, and Phenobarbital, which are medications used to treat epilepsy and psychosis. He also testified that he believed the appellant was malingering and that he did not do any psychological testing on the appellant because "it would be wasting the time and money of the state," in that the appellant would not cooperate. He testified that the appellant was uncooperative in that he did not answer many of the questions and, at times, he would say that he did not know the answer to a question, but if the question were asked again, he would provide some information. The appellant did not present any evidence at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the appellant did not have "a mental disorder that falls within the meaning of mental illness described in Chapters 552 and 630 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri." The court further found that the appellant had "the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense." The appellant's counsel then made an oral motion requesting that a second psychiatric examination of the appellant be done at a time when he was not taking medication, which was denied by the court.
On March 24, 1997, the appellant's...
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