Hubbard v. United States

• Decision Date: 11 February 2013
• Docket Number: 1:10-cv-63,1:08-cr-76-01
• Parties: TRAMMEL HUBBARD, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

TRAMMEL HUBBARD, Petitioner,

v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

1:10-cv-63

1:08-cr-76-01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT CHATTANOOGA

Dated: February 11, 2013

Judge Curtis L. Collier

MEMORANDUM

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of pro se petitioner¹ Trammel Hubbard ("Hubbard" or "Petitioner") to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Court File 20, Petition). Pursuant to the Court's Order, the United States filed a response to Petitioner's motion (Court File No. 24, Government's Response).

The underlying criminal case in this Court was United States of America v. Trammel Hubbard, Criminal Docket No. 1:08-cr-76, filed on June 24, 2008. The motion, together with the files and record in this case, conclusively show Petitioner is entitled to no relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the following reasons, the Court has determined an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary, see United States v. Todaro, 982 F.2d 1025, 1030 (6th Cir. 1993), and Petitioner's § 2255 motion² will be DENIED for lack of merit (Court File 20).

I. PETITIONER'S MOTION

On March 19, 2010, Petitioner filed his motion to vacate. The motion is dated March 15, 2010. In the motion he raises five grounds: Ground 1, Involuntary guilty plea; Ground 2, Denial of psychological evaluation; Ground 3, Ineffective assistance of counsel; Ground 4, Unconstitutionally vague indictment; and Ground 5, Excessive sentencing disparity. He also requests that the Court appoint counsel to represent him, that he be afforded a hearing on his motion, that he be allowed to amend and modify his motion to assert other grounds, and that his sentence and conviction be set aside.

II. FACTS

Petitioner's case started with his indictment by the grand jury on June 24, 2008 (Court File No. 1, Indictment). The indictment contained only one count and charged Petitioner with "knowingly, intentionally and without authority possess[ing] with intent to distribute five (5) grams or more of a mixture and substance containing cocaine base ("crack"), a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Petitioner appeared before United States Magistrate Judge William B. Mitchell Carter on September 24, 2008, for his initial appearance and arraignment. Magistrate Judge Carter appointed Federal Public Defender Anthony Martinez to represent Petitioner. Mr. Martinez is an experienced attorney who has represented a large number of criminal defendants in this court. He is a highly skilled andcompetent attorney.

On November 13, 2008, Petitioner appeared before the undersigned and entered a guilty plea to the one count (Court File No. 14, Plea Hr'g Mins.; Court File No. 21, Plea Hr'g Tr.). His guilty plea was the result of a written plea agreement he had entered into with the Government (Court File No. 15, Plea Agreement). As is the Court's habit, the Court complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. At the beginning of the hearing, the Court had Petitioner sworn. The Court inquired of Petitioner whether he was satisfied with his attorney and the representation he had received. Petitioner advised the Court he was satisfied with his attorney and the representation. Then the Court inquired of Petitioner's mental status and was assured by counsel that Petitioner was competent to enter a guilty plea. The Court detected nothing about Petitioner, his demeanor, his answers, or his responses that raised any questions in the Court's mind as to Petitioner's competence to enter a guilty plea. The Court then went over the elements of the charge and asked Petitioner whether he understood what the charges were. Petitioner was advised of the maximum punishment he was facing by the Assistant U.S. Attorney. The plea agreement Petitioner had entered into with the Government was introduced into evidence (id.). Paragraph 4 of the plea agreement contained the factual basis for Petitioner's guilty plea. It provides as follows:

4. In support of the defendant's guilty plea, the defendant agrees and stipulates to the following facts which satisfy these elements. These are the facts submitted for the defendant's guilty plea. They do not necessarily constitute all the facts in the case. Other facts may be relevant to sentencing. Both the defendant and the United States retain the right to present additional facts to the Court to ensure a fair and appropriate sentence in this case.

a) On March 21, 2008, Chattanooga Police Officer Todd Royval saw a vehicle on East 28th Street in Chattanooga, Tennessee, that matched the description of a vehicle sought in another investigation. As Officer Royval watched, the vehicle ran a stop sign. Officer Royval attempted to stop the vehicle, but it continued several blocks withoutstopping.

b) When the vehicle attempted to turn on grass, it slid into a building. The driver, Trammel Hubbard, ran off on foot. Officer Royval was able to catch Hubbard after a short chase, and saw him throw a baggie to the ground. The officer recovered a baggie containing crack cocaine a few feet from where the defendant was stopped. A second officer, searching the abandoned vehicle, found a set of digital scales with white powdery residue on it inside the center console of the vehicle. The vehicle Hubbard was driving was a rental car. Hubbard had $750 in cash on his person.

c) The substance in the baggie was analyzed and proved to be greater than five grams of cocaine base. The rough weight of the cocaine base was 41.5 grams. This is a distribution amount of cocaine base. The defendant admits that he possessed the cocaine base with the intent to distribute it. The scales, the rental car, and the large amount of money are all indicia of drug distribution.

d) The above-described events took place in the Eastern District of Tennessee.

(Court File No. 15). Petitioner acknowledged the factual basis was true and correct. He was advised by the Court of the rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty. He was advised that his sentencing would be determined by the Court and the Court would consult the United States Sentencing Guidelines. When asked by the Court if he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty, he swore under oath that he was guilty of the charge.

Following the acceptance of Petitioner's guilty plea, the Court ordered that a Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") be prepared. The report used the 2008 version of the Sentencing Guidelines. The PSR determined that Petitioner was responsible for 32.8 grams of crack cocaine, which resulted in a base offense level of 26 (PSR ¶¶ 9, 14). He received a two-level increase for reckless endangerment and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. This brought Petitioner's total offense level to 25 (id. ¶¶ 18, 20-21). Petitioner qualified as a career offenderunder the Guidelines, however, so this increased his offense level to 31 (id. ¶¶ 23-25).

Petitioner had an extensive criminal record. It began when he was twelve years old (id. ¶¶ 28-50). His prior convictions include crimes ranging from traffic license violations to aggravated robbery (id.). Of primary concern was that Petitioner had been convicted of five prior drug offenses since turning eighteen (id.). When Petitioner committed the present offense, he was on probation for both a drug trafficking offense and aggravated assault (id. ¶ 52). Totaling all of the criminal history points resulting from his long criminal history, Defendant had 15 criminal history points. This would have placed him in Criminal History Category VI even if he did not qualify as a career offender (id. ¶¶ 33, 49). At an offense level of 31 and a criminal history category VI, Petitioner's advisory Guidelines range was 188 to 235 months (id. ¶ 48). Due to the quantity of crack cocaine, Petitioner also faced a five-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (id. ¶ 48).

The Court adopted the PSR's calculations as accurate, without objection, and on March 5, 2009, imposed a within-Guidelines range sentence of 220 months' imprisonment (Court File No. 19, Judgment). Petitioner's judgment was entered on March 17, 2009 (id.). Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code, provides that a prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, correct, or set aside a sentence, on the grounds:

the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that thesentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2255. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Petitioner has the burden of establishing any claim asserted in the Petition. See Bowers v. Battles, 568 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1977); Mayes v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (E.D. Tenn. 2000); United States v. Abbott, 975 F. Supp. 703, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

Where a constitutional error is alleged, in order to obtain relief under § 2255, the record must reflect a Constitutional error of such magnitude it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1721-22, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1999). To merit relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a petitioner must demonstrate: "(1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid." Short v. United States, 471 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2003)). "To prevail under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a defendant must show a 'fundamental defect' in the proceedings...