Hubbell v. Canady

• Decision Date: 31 January 1871
• Citation: 1871 WL 7946,58 Ill. 425
• Parties: SAMSON HUBBELL et al.v.WILLIAM A. CANADY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

58 Ill. 425

1871 WL 7946 (Ill.)

SAMSON HUBBELL et al.

v.WILLIAM A. CANADY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1871.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. JAMES STEELE, Judge, presiding.

Mr. R. N. BISHOP, for the plaintiffs in error.

Mr. E. S. TERRY, Mr. O. L. DAVIS, and Mr. J. B. MANN, for the defendant in error. Mr. JUSTICE SHELDON delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a bill in equity, filed by the defendant in error on the 4th day of September, 1867, against the plaintiffs in error, to set aside a sale on execution against him of the west half of lot number 3 in an addition to the town of Ridge Farm, as being his homestead. On the 19th day of August, 1858, the execution was levied on the premises, which were sold to the plaintiffs in error, and the sheriff's deed made to them February 15th, 1860.

The whole lot 3 was 60 by 120 feet. The dwelling house of the debtor was mostly on the east half of the lot; about 4 feet of it, and 7 feet of the smoke house were on the west half, as also the garden, fruit trees and well. There was a store house 20 by 45 feet on the west half, which set back 6 or 8 feet from the end, which was in the occupancy of a tenant. The whole lot did not exceed in value $1000.

In July, 1867, the plaintiffs in error, in an action of forcible detainer against one Darnall, the tenant of Canady occupying the store house, recovered the possession of the store house, and Darnall has ever since held it as their tenant.

The points made by the plaintiffs in error are, that the store house was not part of the homestead; that Canady is bound by the judgment recovered against his tenant, and that the delay in filing the bill shows such laches as will prevent the court from entertaining it.

Reinbach v. Walter, 27 Ill. 393, is cited in support of the position that this store house was not a part of the homestead. That was a case of two lots not exceeding, together, $1000 in value; the homestead law was held not to apply, but the court said, if it did, they should be inclined to hold that the store and warehouse, and the grounds used for the business done in them, did not constitute a part of the homestead.

But here is only one lot of ground, 60 by 120 feet. The homestead exemption, as given by the statute, embraces “the lot of ground and the buildings thereon, occupied as a residence, and owned by the debtor, being a householder, and having a family, to the value of $1000.”

The whole lot of ground is covered by the exemption, not some part of it, and the lot included all the buildings upon it.

We are not to regard the intention of the legislature as being only to save a mere shelter for the debtor and his family, but that it was the purpose to give him the full enjoyment of the whole lot of ground exempted, to be used in whatever way he might think best for the occupancy and support of his family, whether in the way of cultivating it, or by the erection and use of buildings upon it, either for the carrying on of his own business, or for deriving income in the way of rent.

We can not accede to that narrow construction of the statute which would take away this store house, as not being a part of the homestead.

As to the effect of the recovery of possession of the store house by judgment against Darnall, whether the rule laid down in Oetgen v. Ross et al. 47 Ill. 142, that judgment against the tenant...