Hubble v. Bi-State Dev. Illinois-Missouri

• Decision Date: 06 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 5-07-0661.,5-07-0661.
• Parties: Brian T. HUBBLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF the ILLINOIS-MISSOURI METROPOLITAN DISTRICT, d/b/a Metro and Bi-State, a/k/a Bi-State Development Agency, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

915 N.E.2d 64

Brian T. HUBBLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF the ILLINOIS-MISSOURI METROPOLITAN DISTRICT, d/b/a Metro and Bi-State, a/k/a Bi-State Development Agency, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5-07-0661.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

August 6, 2009.

Rehearing Denied September 11, 2009.

Donald L. O'Keefe, Rabbitt, Pitzer & Snodgrass, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.

Bruce N. Cook, Cook, Ysursa, Bartholomew, Brauer & Shevlin, Ltd., Belleville, IL, for Appellee.

Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill.2d R. 308). The defendant, Bi-State Development Agency of the Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan District, doing business as Metro or Bi-State, also known as Bi-State Development Agency (Bi-State), filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by the plaintiff, Brian T. Hubble. The circuit court denied Bi-State's motion to dismiss and then certified the following question of law for our review: "Whether Bi-State Development Agency is a local public entity as defined by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/8-101, and is therefore subject to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Act." For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question in the negative.

BACKGROUND

The St. Louis metropolitan area encompasses counties on both the Illinois side and the Missouri side of the Mississippi River, and Illinois and Missouri share a common interest in the development of mass transportation in this area. In 1949, the two states entered into an interstate compact agreement to establish an agency responsible for operating public mass transportation facilities in the city of St. Louis and in three Missouri counties and three Illinois counties along the Illinois/Missouri border near St. Louis. The compact identified this area as the "Bi-State Metropolitan Development District" (the District). 45 ILCS 100/1 (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 70.370 (West 2004). The defendant, Bi-State, is the agency established pursuant to the compact. "Bi-State's entrance into the public transportation business in the St. Louis metropolitan district was necessitated by the deteriorating condition of mass transportation similarly experienced by major urban areas throughout the country." Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District, 433 F.2d 131, 136 (8th Cir.1970). One of the services Bi-State provides is public bus transportation throughout the District.

Helen Wilson was a bus driver for Bi-State, and on September 13, 2005, while driving a Bi-State bus, she collided with a vehicle driven by the plaintiff, Brian T. Hubble. On March 1, 2007, Hubble filed a lawsuit against Bi-State, alleging that Wilson's negligence caused the vehicle accident and that Bi-State was vicariously liable for Wilson's negligence. Bi-State filed a motion to dismiss Hubble's complaint pursuant to section 2-619(5) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(5) (West 2006)), on the grounds that Hubble had filed his complaint outside the time limit under the applicable statute of limitations. The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Bi-State's motion to dismiss, and on July 26, 2007, the court denied the motion. Bi-State requested the circuit court to make the findings necessary for an immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill.2d R. 308). The circuit court initially denied Bi-State's request to file an interlocutory appeal, but on October 26, 2007, the Illinois Supreme Court entered a supervisory order that directed the circuit court to grant Bi-State's motion for an interlocutory appeal and to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal. The circuit court, therefore, certified the question concerning the proper statute of limitations for immediate interlocutory appeal. On November 28, 2007, Bi-State filed a petition for leave to appeal, and we granted Bi-State's petition.

Illinois has a two-year general statute of limitations for personal injury actions. 735 ILCS 5/13-204 (West 2006). The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2006)), however, contains a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims against local public entities. 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2006). Hubble timely filed his complaint against Bi-State if the two-year general statute of limitations applies to his personal injury claim, but he did not file his complaint in time if the one-year statute of limitations in the Tort Immunity Act applies. Bi-State's interlocutory appeal requires us to determine whether the statute of limitations contained within the Tort Immunity Act applies to Hubble's claim, and the resolution of that issue requires us to determine whether the legislature intended to include interstate compact agencies such as Bi-State within the definition of a "local public entity" in the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1-206 (West 2006)).

We hold that the legislature did not intend to include interstate compact agencies within the Tort Immunity Act's definition of a "local public entity." Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations contained within the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 2006)) does not apply to Hubble's claim.

DISCUSSION

The question of whether Bi-State is a "local public entity" under the Tort Immunity Act presents an issue of statutory construction that is guided by well-established legal principles. Statutory construction issues involve questions of law that are reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Andernovics, 197 Ill.2d 500, 507, 259 Ill.Dec. 721, 759 N.E.2d 501, 505 (2001). The primary objective of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill.2d 76, 81, 196 Ill.Dec. 655, 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1994). "The words and phrases contained within the language of a statute should not be considered in isolation but must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions and the statute as a whole." People v. Spurlock, 388 Ill.App.3d 365, 371, 328 Ill.Dec. 214, 903 N.E.2d 874, 880 (2009). "If possible, we must give effect to every word, clause, and sentence and must not construe a statute in a way that renders any part inoperative, superfluous, or insignificant." Spurlock, 388 Ill.App.3d at 371, 328 Ill.Dec. 214, 903 N.E.2d at 880. "In addition to the statutory language, the courts may consider the purpose behind the law and the evils sought to be remedied, as well as the consequences that would result from construing the law one way or the other." Spurlock, 388 Ill.App.3d at 371, 328 Ill.Dec. 214, 903 N.E.2d at 880. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutory language at issue.

Section 8-101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act provides as follows: "No civil action * * * may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued." 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2006). Section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act defines a "local public entity" as follows:

"`Local public entity' includes a county, township, municipality, municipal corporation, school district, school board, educational service region, regional board of school trustees, trustees of schools of townships, treasurers of schools of townships, community college district, community college board, forest preserve district, park district, fire protection district, sanitary district, museum district, emergency telephone system board, and all other local governmental bodies. `Local public entity' also includes library systems and any intergovernmental agency or similar entity formed pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Illinois or the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act as well as any not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business. It does not include the State or any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission, university[,] or similar agency of the State." 745 ILCS 10/1-206 (West 2006).

Preliminarily, we note that the legislature used the term "local entity" in section 8-101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act but used the term "local public entity" in the remainder of the act. The legislature's use of the term "local entity," rather than "local public entity," in section 8-101(a) appears to be a scrivener's error. In order to construe the statute to effectuate the intent of the legislature, we may alter, supply, or modify words and correct obvious mistakes. People v. Garrison, 82 Ill.2d 444, 455, 45 Ill.Dec. 132, 412 N.E.2d 483, 489 (1980). It is clear that the legislature intended for section 8-101(a) to apply to actions against a "local public entity" as that term is defined in section 1-206, and we construe the statute accordingly. 745 ILCS 10/1-206, 8-101(a) (West 2006).

Section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act contains a list of various governmental entities included within the definition of a "local public entity," but the list does not specifically include agencies created by interstate compacts. 745 ILCS 10/1-206 (West 2006). The supreme court has "observed that the term `local public entity,' as used in the Tort Immunity Act, is `broadly defined.'" Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill.2d 497, 512, 272 Ill. Dec. 312, 787 N.E.2d 127, 136 (2003) (quoting Boyles v. Greater Peoria Mass Transit District, 113 Ill.2d 545, 553, 101 Ill.Dec. 847, 499 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1986)). "`Illinois courts have long recognized that various public entities, although not expressly identified in the statute, are within the definition of "local public entity."'" Carver, 203 Ill.2d at...