Huber v. Huber, 23407

• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia
• Writing for the Court: DAVIS
• Citation: 200 W.Va. 446,490 S.E.2d 48
• Parties: Letitia Danette HUBER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. James Patrick HUBER, Defendant Below, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 23407,23407
• Decision Date: 11 June 1997

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490 S.E.2d 48 200 W.Va. 446 Letitia Danette HUBER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant,
v.
James Patrick HUBER, Defendant Below, Appellee. No. 23407. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. Submitted May 6, 1997.
Decided June 11, 1997.

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[200 W.Va. 448] Syllabus by the Court

1. "In reviewing challenges to findings made by a family law master that also were adopted by a circuit court, a three-pronged standard of review is applied. Under these circumstances, a final equitable distribution order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory interpretations are subject to a de novo review."

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[200 W.Va. 449] Syl. Pt. 1, Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W.Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995):

2. "To the extent that its purpose is to compensate an individual for pain, suffering, disability, disfigurement, or other debilitation of the mind or body, a personal injury award constitutes the separate nonmarital property of an injured spouse." Syl. Pt. 1, Hardy v. Hardy, 186 W.Va. 496, 413 S.E.2d 151 (1991).

3. "A loss of consortium claim is the separate nonmarital property of the uninjured spouse." Syl. Pt. 4, Hardy v. Hardy, 186 W.Va. 496, 413 S.E.2d 151 (1991).

4. In a divorce proceeding a noninjured spouse who claims money from a tort settlement or verdict award as loss of consortium, must prove the same by a preponderance of the evidence. The injured spouse who claims money for noneconomic loss and post-divorce economic loss must prove the same by a preponderance of evidence. If either or both parties carry their burdens of proof, the money proven under such burdens shall be deemed separate property. To the extent that the parties do not provide sufficient evidence to make a reasonable allocation of all of the tort settlement or verdict award under their respective burdens, such balance shall be classified as marital property and divided accordingly.

John C. Skinner, Jr., Deborah B. Hillyard, Nichols & Skinner, L.C., Charles Town, for Appellant.

Paul E. Lane, Martinsburg, for Appellee.

DAVIS, Justice.

This is an appeal by Letitia Danette Huber, plaintiff/appellant, (hereinafter referred to as Ms. Huber) from a final order of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. The final order adopted the recommendations of the family law master as to property distribution in the divorce action. Pursuant to the circuit court's order Ms. Huber was awarded 10% of the defendant/appellee's (hereinafter referred to as Mr. Huber) personal injury settlement for loss of consortium. Additionally, Ms. Huber was awarded $7,000 as her equitable distribution of lost wages stemming from Mr. Huber's personal injury award. On appeal Ms. Huber contends that Mr. Huber failed to carry his burden of proof in establishing what, if any, portion of the settlement proceeds was nonmarital. Therefore, Ms. Huber argues that the circuit court should have deemed the entire settlement amount of approximately $475,000 as marital property.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mr. and Ms. Huber were granted a divorce, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, by circuit court order dated September 23, 1991. The final divorce decree bifurcated certain property issues that were to be later resolved. On July 25, 1994, the family law master held a hearing to resolve the outstanding property issues. The property issue discussed herein relates solely to Mr. Huber's personal injury settlement.

Mr. Huber was seriously injured in an automobile accident on June 20, 1988. The parties were married and living together at the time of the accident. The accident left Mr. Huber in a coma for an unspecified period of time. It appears from the record that Mr. Huber was unable to return to his employment until approximately five months after the accident. Mr. Huber testified that as a result of the accident he was left with metal plates in parts of his body. Additionally, Mr. Huber lost use in 30% of his left arm. Mr. Huber retained counsel to represent him in his personal injury lawsuit against the responsible third party. Ultimately, Mr. Huber was able to settle his claim with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier without filing a civil action. The settlement resulted in a structured payout of approximately $475,000. Mr. Huber initially received a lump sum of $96,000. The remaining settlement balance is payable over a period of thirty years. The testimony revealed that from the initial lump sum payment, Mr. Huber gave to Ms. Huber the sum of $30,000.

During the family law master hearing, Ms. Huber argued that the personal injury settlement should be treated as marital property and therefore equally divided. The family law master ruled that the settlement money

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[200 W.Va. 450] was not marital property. The family law master recommended that Ms. Huber receive 10% of the settlement proceeds for her loss of consortium claim. Without any findings of fact or conclusions of law to support her recommendation, the family law master awarded to Ms. Huber the sum of $7,000 as one-half of Mr. Huber's lost wages. ¹ After various other calculations and deductions which were unsupported by any findings of fact and conclusions of law, the family law master determined that Mr. Huber owed to Ms. Huber the additional sum of $9,500. The circuit court adopted the family law master's findings and conclusions by order entered October 13, 1995. This appeal followed.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our analysis begins by setting forth the standard by which this Court reviews challenges to a circuit court's equitable distribution order. We set out that standard succinctly in syllabus point 1 of Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W.Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995):

In reviewing challenges to findings made by a family law master that also were adopted by a circuit court, a three-pronged standard of review is applied. Under these circumstances, a final equitable distribution order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory interpretations are subject to a de novo review.

See also Syl. Pt. 2, Hillberry v. Hillberry, 195 W.Va. 600, 466 S.E.2d 451 (1995). It was noted by this Court in syllabus point 1 of Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995) that "[a] circuit court should review findings of fact made by a family law master only under a clearly erroneous standard, and it should review the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion standard." We explained in syllabus point 3 of Stephen L.H., that "[u]nder the clearly erroneous standard, if the findings of fact and the inferences drawn by a family law master are supported by substantial evidence, such findings and inferences may not be overturned even if a circuit court may be inclined to make different findings or draw contrary inferences."

III.

DISCUSSION

Distribution of Personal Injury Award

The sole question before this Court is whether Mr. Huber's personal injury settlement was properly classified as nonmarital property. We indicated in syllabus point 1 of Signorelli v. Signorelli, 189 W.Va. 710, 434 S.E.2d 382 (1993) that:

' "Equitable distribution under W.Va.Code, 48-2-1, et seq., is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties' property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets. The third step is to divide the marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in W.Va.Code, 48-2-32." Syllabus Point 1, Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990).' Syllabus Point 2, Wood v. Wood, 184 W.Va. 744, 403 S.E.2d 761 (1991).

Our review of the instant proceeding requires only that we analyze the first step of Signorelli, i.e., classification of property. In classifying property as separate or marital, the legislature has indicated a preference for classifying property as marital. In syllabus point 2 of Kapfer v. Kapfer, 187 W.Va. 396, 419 S.E.2d 464 (1992) we said that " 'W.Va.Code, 48-2-1(e)(1) (1986), defining all property acquired during the marriage as marital property except for certain limited categories of property which are considered

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[200 W.Va. 451] separate or nonmarital, expresses a marked preference for characterizing the property of the parties to a divorce action as marital property.' Syllabus Point 3, Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990)." See Syl. Pt. 1, Koontz v. Koontz, 183 W.Va. 477, 396 S.E.2d 439 (1990).

In spite of the legislative preference for classifying property as marital, this Court has found some exceptions...