Huber v. Williams

Citation170 N.E. 195,338 Ill. 313
Decision Date21 February 1930
Docket NumberNo. 19810.,19810.
PartiesHUBER v. WILLIAMS et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Bill by Lois E. Huber against Mary E. Williams and others, and James E. McCreight, executor of the estate of James M. Poe, deceased. The executor's objections to the report of a master in chancery, after being overruled, stood as exceptions before the chancellor. The exceptions were sustained, and, from a decree in favor of defendants, complainant appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Mercer County; Nels A. Larson, judge.

Lee E. Mannon and Walter L. Mannon, both of Aledo, for appellant.

Virgil C. Lutrell and James A. Mllen, both of Aledo, for appellee.

DE YOUNG, J.

Lois E. Huber filed an amended bill in the circuit court of Mercer county for the reformation of a deed, the confirmation in herself of the title to the lots alleged to have been conveyed by the deed, and for the construction of the residuary section of the last will of James M. Poe, deceased. The heirs, legatees, and devisees of the decedent and James E. McCreight, the executor of his will, were made defendants The executor filed an answer denying the material allegations of the bill, and a cross-bill charging the nondelivery of the deed. The complainant answered the cross-bill. The defaults of the other parties were entered, and the cause was referred to a master in chancery, who, after hearing the evidence, made a report recommending a decree in conformity with the prayer of the amended bill. The executor's objections to the master's report were overruled and stood as exceptions before the chancellor. The exceptions were sustained, and the court by its decree declared that the deed had never been delivered, that it was null and void, and should be canceled of record. From that decree, the complainant prosecutes this appeal.

James M. Poe, a widower, about 70 years of age, owned lots 14, 15, and 16, in block 18, in Sheppard and Ford's addition to the village of Viola, in Mercer county. The lots were improved by a house in which he resided. Lois E. Huber, the appellant, was a school teacher. On September 23, 1926, Poe executed a deed by which he purported to convey to the appellant lots 16 and 17 in block 18 of the same subdivision. He did not own lot 17. The consideration for the deed was recited to be, first, $1, the receipt of which was acknowledged; second, the payment by the grantee to the grantor of $10 per month, without interest, until the money paid aggregated $600, with the proviso that, in the event of the grantor's death prior to the payment of the maximum fixed, the obligation to pay the installments thereafter accruing should be canceled; and, third, the financial and other assistance which the grantee had theretofore rendered the grantor. The grantor reserved possession of the premises for such period as he should personally occupy them, and he agreed to pay all the taxes and to maintain the insurance upon the premises during the same period. The deed also contained the recital that it was a voluntary conveyance on the part of the grantor, and that it was not sought, but only consented to, by the grantee. Poe executed a will simultaneously with the deed. By this will be bequeathed and devised his estate, save certain specific legacies, to the appellant. Five days later, on September 28, 1926, Poe executed another will drawn at his request by a justice of the peace. He revoked the former one, and, after the bequest of certain legacies, devised and bequeathed by this will, as construed by the circuit court, the residue of his estate to Charles W. Poe and the appellant in equal parts. Poe died on November 8, 1926. His last will was admitted to record by the county court of Mercer county, and letters testamentary thereon were issued to James E. McCreight, the appellee. Since both parties acquiesce in the circuit court's construction of the residuary section of this will, no further attention need be given to it.

Of the two lots described in the deed, Poe owned only one; namely, lot 16. Appellant seeks to establish the delivery of the deed, and asks its reformation so that the description will include lots 14 and 15. She testified, in substance, as follows: Poe and the appellant were not related, but he had been a friend of her parents for a number of years, and often called at their home in the city of Rock Island. She had sold him books while she was a student in college, and had been well acquainted with him since the year 1919. In the summer of 1926, he visited appellant's brother at her father's farm. Prior to September of that year, she had lent Poe sums of money amounting to $40. On September 23, 1926, he called at her home, and, stating that he needed money, asked her to purchase his house and lots in Viola. She told him she did not desire the property, but, if he could raise money by no other means, she would take it. On that day she accompanied him to the office of Andrew L. Chezem, an attorney in Davenport, Iowa, who represented her family. After introducing Poe to Attorney Chezem, she departed, to do some shopping. The attorney drew the deed and a will, and, upon her return, read them to Poe and herself. She understood the conditions of the deed, but left the attorney's office with Poe without indicating whether she would assent to them. On October 2, 1926, she gave Poe $20, for which he signed an instrument written by her acknowledging the receipt of the money ‘as a loan or to be applied on contract when accepted.’ Twenty-eight days later she remitted $10 to Poe by a money order, which was ‘to be applied on the deed,’ if she accepted it. She neither saw nor heard of the deed from the time it was executed until after Poe's death, and, so far as she knew, he might have taken the deed from the attorney's office. After Poe's death, she thought she would not receive any money, so she sought Attorney Chezem's advice by a letter. He answered that she should record the deed. She remitted $10 in payment of the services rendered by him in drawing the deed and will, and requested him to mail the deed to her at Harvey, in Cook county, where she was teaching school. Chezem complied with her request, and she caused the deed to be filed for record on May 11, 1927.

Andrew L. Chezem, the attorney, testified that on September 23, 1926, the appellant and Poe came to his office; that Poe said he wanted to convey all his property in Viola to the appellant in consideration of certain payments to be made by her during his lifetime, not exceeding, however, $600 in the aggregate; that he also requested the witness to draw his will, in which the appellant should be the residuary legatee and devisee; that he drew both instruments as directed, and Poe executed them; that appellant expressed her satisfaction with the deed but was reluctant to accept the residue of Poe's estate under his will; that the witness asked $15 for his services, whereupon Poe told him he had no money, and that the appellant would pay him; that she refused to defray the charge, and told the witness to put the papers in his desk; that he answered he would hold them if she did not pay him; and that in the spring of 1927, after Poe's death, she remitted $10 in payment of his services, and he sent the deed and will to her.

The appellee, James E. McCreight, testified that he had been acquainted with Poe about 15 years; that, before he qualified as executor, Chezem and the appellant called at the Viola State Bank, where Chezem told him that the witness had been nominated executor of Poe's will, that the estate was small, and since he (Chezem) represented the appellant, it would save expense if the executor too would retain him; that the witness told Chezem he might not qualify as executor, but, if he did, he preferred to have an attorney of his acquaintance represent him; that on the same occasion the appellant stated that Poe had asked her to purchase the property, but that she did not have any money, and refused to do so; that afterwards, about the time he qualified as executor, he met Chezem in the courthouse at Aledo, where the latter delivered to him certain papers pertaining to the decedent's personal estate, and, exhibiting the deed in question, remarked: ‘This deed isn't any good, and if you will shoot square with us in this deal we will not use it; otherwise we will record the deed’; that on the same occasion Chezem further remarked that the deed was ineffective, because it had never been delivered, and the appellant had not complied with its provisions. The witness further testified that Poe occupied the property at the time of his death, that appellant had never had possession of it and that he (the executor) had leased it to tenants.

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13 cases
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    • July 14, 1992
    ... ... Bell directly raises squarely the problem of delivery of the deed. Proper delivery of a deed is essential to its validity. Huber v. Williams, 338 Ill. 313, 318, 170 N.E. 195 (1930) ("The delivery of a deed is an essential part of its execution and is indispensable to render it ... ...
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