Hubert v. Wetzel

• Decision Date: 04 October 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 18-354
• Parties: JAMES HUBERT, Plaintiff, v. JOHN WETZEL, JAY LANE, CAPT. TIFT, SGT. RICHTER, and GRAFT, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

JAMES HUBERT, Plaintiff, v. JOHN WETZEL, JAY LANE, CAPT. TIFT,SGT. RICHTER, and GRAFT, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-354

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

October 4, 2018

Chief Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

Re: ECF No. 5

OPINION AND ORDER

KELLY, Chief Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff James Hubert ("Plaintiff") is an inmate currently confined at the State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, Pennsylvania ("SCI - Coal Township"). Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged violation of his rights arising under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Pennsylvania Civil Service Act, and various provisions of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Code of Ethics, arising out of the circumstances and conditions of his confinement at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette ("SCI - Fayette") during the period January 21, 2016 through November 20, 2016.

Presently before the Court is a partial "Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim" filed on behalf of all Defendants, ECF No. 5. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.¹

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, Pennsylvania. Upon the filing of a "First Amended Civil Complaint" ("Amended Complaint"), and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq., Defendants removed the action to this Court, asserting original jurisdiction in federal court over Plaintiff's federal claims.² Plaintiff's Amended Complaint names as Defendants John Wetzel, Secretary - Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"); Jay Lane, Superintendent at SCI - Fayette; Captain Tift; Sgt. Richter and Correctional Officer Graft.

Plaintiff's claims arise out of his status as a convicted sex-offender. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Richter and Graft communicated his criminal background to inmates in Plaintiff's general population and restricted housing units, placing him at serious risk of violence and injury, and defaming him. ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 17-19. Plaintiff broadly alleges that Defendants subsequently retaliated against him after he complained about Richter and Graft's conduct by way of grievances and verbal reports to various prison personnel. Id. ¶ 22, 27-31. In particular,"Defendants" issued "defamatory" misconducts that resulted in Plaintiff's repeated confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU"). Id. ¶ 39. Although not alleged in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff, in his brief in opposition to the pending motion, speculates that Defendant Tift is the source of Richter and Graft's information regarding his status as a sex offender, and alleges that Tift failed to act to protect Plaintiff after being made aware of Richter and Graft's publication of Plaintiff's status. ECF No. 9 at 5. Plaintiff also names as Defendants Secretary Wetzel ("Wetzel") and Superintendent Lane ("Lane") in their supervisory capacities. Both are alleged to have created or maintained a dangerous prison facility, with insufficient staff and inadequate separation of dangerous inmates.

Plaintiff also complains that his grievances and complaints to personnel were not timely investigated and he did not receive written responses or a remedy. Plaintiff contends that this treatment was intended to frustrate any required exhaustion of administrative remedies, and to deny him his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by delaying a remedy or redress. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in his good name and reputation by sharing his criminal background with other inmates. ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 33-42.

Based upon the alleged actions of the various Defendants, Plaintiff brings the following claims:

• Count I against all Defendants for the violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Pennsylvania Civil Service Act, and DOC Ethics Code regulations for "deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's health and safety";• Count II against Defendants Lane, Tift, Richter and Graft for the violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect Plaintiff from "a known and credible substantial risk of serious physical injury";

• Count III against all Defendants alleging a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress;

• Count IV against Defendants Lane, Tift, Richter and Graft alleging state law claims of negligence and recklessness outside the course and scope of duties as state employees;

• Count V against Wetzel and Lane for supervisory liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for acquiescing to Plaintiff's mistreatment and for establishing a maintaining a policy or procedure whereby such treatment was enabled.

ECF No. 1-1 at 13-16. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief in the form of a declaration that his rights were violated by each of the Defendants. Id. at 17.

Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement/failure to protect claim (Counts I and II). ECF No. 6 at 5. That said, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's remaining claims on the following grounds:

(1) the Eleventh Amendment bars all claims against any Defendant in his official capacity;

(2) the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), bars Plaintiff's recovery of compensatory damages for the alleged violation of Plaintiff's federal rights in light of the absence of any allegation of physical injury;(3) Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to establish the personal involvement and supervisory liability of Defendants Wetzel, Lane or Tift;

(4) Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim against any Defendant;

(5) Plaintiff cannot maintain a substantive Fourteenth Amendment claim by operation of the "explicit source rule" and has failed to state a cognizable procedural due process claim; and,

(6) Plaintiff fails to state any claim arising under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Pennsylvania Civil Service Act, and the DOC Code of Ethics.

ECF No. 6. Plaintiff has filed a brief in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss titled "Objections to the Defendants' Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings." ECF No. 9. Upon review of the Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's objections thereto, and for the reasons forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (specifically applying Twombly analysis beyond the context of the Sherman Act).

A court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). See also McTernan v. City of York, Penn., 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."). A plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). Although the United States Supreme Court does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.

In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, Civ. No. 07-528, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D. Del. Feb. 19, 2008) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n. 3).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases:

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, we must take the following three steps:

First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)).

"The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of a complaint, not to resolve disputed facts or decide the merits of the case." Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 197 F. Supp. 2d 42, 53 (D. Del. 2002) (cit...