Huck v. Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 16 October 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 30952,30952 |
| Citation | 361 S.W.2d 332 |
| Parties | Joseph F. HUCK, Jr., and Division of Employment Security, a Public Quasi Corporation of the State of Missouri, (Plaintiffs) Respondents, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Missouri, and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, a Corporation of the State of Pennsylvania, (Defendants) Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Harry L. C. Weier, Dearing, Richeson & Weier, Hillsboro, for Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
Lloyd G. Poole, Jefferson City, for Industrial Commission of Missouri.
George Schwartz, Jefferson City, for Division of Employment Security.
Leo J. Rozier, Perryville, for Joseph F. Huck, Jr.
Joseph F. Huck, Jr., plaintiff-respondent, brought this action for a judicial review of the findings and decision of the Industrial Commission. The Commission had held that Huck was ineligible for the unemployment compensation which he had claimed. The Circuit Court reversed the Commission, holding Huck eligible for unemployment compensation. The employer and the Commission then appealed from the judgment of the Circuit Court.
The facts of the matter are that Huck was an employee of the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company. He had been in their employ for about eight years. He was a glass inspector and had seniority rights. His average wage for the year 1958 was $3.85 an hour. He was paid from October 1, 1957 to October 1, 1958, $7,400. He was a member of a union known as Local No. 63 of the Glass, Ceramic and Silica Sand Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC. His union was recognized by the employer as the bargaining representative for the production workers of the factory. On October 6, 1958 a strike was called, and there was a complete stoppage of work.
Huck concedes that he is not entitled to any unemployment compensation by reason of the work stoppage which arose out of the labor dispute (Section 288.040, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.). He claims, however, that he comes under an exception contained in that section which, after first treating of the ineligibility of an employee because of a work stoppage, proceeds as follows:
'* * * in the event he secures other employment from which he is separated during the existence of the labor dispute, he must have obtained bona fide employment as a permanent employee for at least the major part of each of two weeks in such subsequent employment to terminate his ineligibility.'
His claim was first denied by a deputy of the Division of Employment Security, who stated as his reasons:
'Claimant is ineligible because his grade and class of workers participated in the stoppage of work due to the labor dispute which began on 10-6-58.
'Although the claimant secured work subsequently to the labor dispute he has not secured permanent work and has not removed the ineligibility.'
Huck then appealed to the Appeals Tribunal from the ruling of the deputy.
A hearing was had before a referee of the Appeals Tribunal, and this appeal covered the claim of Huck and three others with whom we are not here concerned. The appeal was heard while the strike was still in progress. The testimony as it related to Huck was substantially as follows. He stated that after the strike which idled the glass factory began, he went to Union Local 520 of the Operating Engineers. This union had no connection with the union to which he belonged. It was composed of operators of heavy equipment such as graders, earth movers, and like machines used in construction work. It also had members who operated air compressors. In this filed Huck had prior experience. He had operated a large Ingersoll Air Compressor. Although he was not a member of the Operating Engineers Union, he could work on a permit for which he paid $2.00 a week. He stated that he was listed as a permanent employee with the Engineers Union. Through the union he obtained two different jobs of one day's duration, and on October 14, 1958 he was sent by the union to Hartman-Walsh Painting Company. This company is a Missouri corporation, but the work it was doing was in East St. Louis, Illinois. He worked for this concern from October 14, 1958 to December 8, 1959, at which time the East St. Louis job terminated, and he was no longer employed by them.
He had no work after that, although he kept in touch with the Engineers Union. He stated that he was eligible for an apprentice program that the Engineers Union had, but he did not know how many years' experience he would be required to have before he could become a member of the union. He stated that he wanted to be a member and intended to seek permanent employment in construction work.
He had never given up his membership in the glass workers union, and there was no evidence that he had surrendered his seniority rights or other accumulated benefits with the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company. He had not resigned as an employee of the company, and when asked if he would return to work at the termination of the strike, he said that he did not know. Upon the foregoing evidence the appeals referee found that any ineligibility which might have resulted for the claimant because of the labor dispute at the employer's factory had been terminated by the claimant's obtaining bona fide employment as a permanent employee with another company for the major part of more than two weeks.
The employer appealed this decision to the Commission, and the Commission upon review held:
'The evidence supports the conclusion arrived at by the Deputy that claimant is ineligible for benefits because of a stoppage of work on account of a labor dispute.'
The claimant Huck then brought this action for a judicial review of the decision of the Industrial Commission,...
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