Huck v. Ken's House LLC
| Decision Date | 12 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20210122-CA |
| Citation | 511 P.3d 1220 |
| Parties | Rainer HUCK, Appellant, v. KEN'S HOUSE LLC, Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
W. Matthew Schiffgen, Attorney for Appellant
Eric P. Lee and Matthew J. Pugh, Attorneys for Appellee
Opinion
¶1 This case involves a dispute between neighbors over ownership of a narrow strip of land along the border between their respective properties. Ken's House LLC (Ken's House) is the record owner of the strip of land; Rainer Huck claims to have acquired the strip through operation of the legal doctrine known as boundary by acquiescence. After a bench trial, the trial court sided with Ken's House and rejected Huck's claims of quiet title and trespass. Huck now appeals, and we affirm.
¶2 In April 2012, Huck bought a parcel of real property (the Huck Property) located on one of the "avenues" in the Avenues neighborhood of Salt Lake City. On the parcel was an existing building containing several apartments. From approximately 1972 to 2012, the Huck Property was controlled—through various business entities—by one family. When Huck's predecessors in interest acquired the Huck Property, a portion of the property's western boundary was marked by a fence—described as a "pigwire fence"—running in a north-south direction. The fence was located approximately nine feet to the west of the apartment building. The wire fence did not run the entire length of the property, however; the southwestern corner of the Huck Property was covered in overgrown trees and brush, and no fence existed in this area. Over the years, the fence fell into a state of disrepair, with its wire being described as "trampled down" to the point where there remained only mere "remnants" of a fence.
¶3 The Huck Property sits next to a corner lot, and the property's western boundary abuts three separate parcels that front one of the perpendicular "streets" in the Avenues neighborhood. In 2016, Ken's House acquired the corner lot (the Ken's House Property), which abuts the southwestern portion of the Huck Property. Shortly after acquiring the property, Ken's House set about making renovations, including construction of a detached two-car garage.
¶4 As part of those renovations, Ken's House commissioned a survey, which indicated that the actual boundary between the Huck Property and its neighbors to the west was approximately two-and-a-half feet farther east than where the fence remnants were located. Part of the new garage was to be built within the two-and-a-half-foot wide strip of land—along the Ken's House–Huck property boundary—located between the surveyed property line and the line indicated by the fence remnants (the Disputed Strip). Prior to beginning construction of the garage, Ken's House received permission from city planners for the garage to be built within seven-and-a-half feet of the apartment building on the Huck Property, which was an exception to the city's otherwise-applicable ten-foot setback requirement. As part of the approval process, a public meeting was held to discuss, among other things, the proposed setback variance, and notice of that meeting was sent to residents of the neighborhood. Huck did not attend this meeting, and he did not lodge any objection—on any basis, whether oral or written—to Ken's House receiving a variance to the setback requirement, including any objection on the basis that he owned the Disputed Strip.2 After receiving approval for the variance, Ken's House completed construction of the garage, in the location it anticipated, near the end of 2018.
¶5 Huck subsequently sued Ken's House, seeking to quiet title, in his favor, to the Disputed Strip through operation of boundary by acquiescence; he also asserted that the contractors building the garage had trespassed on his land during construction. The case proceeded to a two-day bench trial.
¶6 At trial, Huck called various witnesses, including an individual (Property Manager) who had helped manage and maintain the apartment building prior to (and, in a limited capacity, after) Huck's purchase of the Huck Property. Property Manager testified that, when he first began working on the Huck Property in 1972, the wire fence was already in place, and he offered his belief that the land east of the fence, including the Disputed Strip, was part of the Huck Property. Property Manager also testified that, although the fence had certainly been "trampled down" over the years, Huck's predecessors had never attempted to remove the fence, and that some "T-posts" from the fence had remained in place until Ken's House removed them during construction of the garage. Property Manager testified that he had used the area west of the apartment complex—but not necessarily the Disputed Strip—for various maintenance-related tasks, including installing air conditioning units, repairing electrical conduits, and trimming the weeds that grew in that area. There was some discussion of Property Manager storing ladders near the old fence, but he ultimately acknowledged that those items were actually stored well to the north of the Ken's House Property, and therefore not within the Disputed Strip. Property Manager testified of no other use of the Disputed Strip.
¶7 Huck also called a member of the family (Predecessor) that controlled the Huck Property prior to Huck's acquisition. Predecessor testified that, during the times she visited the Huck Property (approximately four times a year), she remembered seeing "remnants of fencing" along the western portion of the property, and that although the fence was "inline" and obviously there, it had been trampled and beat down toward the ground and was in a state of disrepair. Predecessor additionally testified that the area west of the apartment complex never had any sort of "manicured lawn" or sprinkler lines.
¶8 Huck himself also took the stand, testifying that when he bought the Huck Property in 2012, the wire fence was intact, and that he understood that fence to represent the boundary between the Huck Property and the Ken's House Property. Huck also testified that his tenants sometimes used the area west of the apartment building to walk their pets, and that he used the area—but not necessarily the Disputed Strip—to access the side of the apartment building for maintenance-related tasks. Huck acknowledged, however, that "the main use" of the area west of the apartment building was for safety and maintenance and to comply with the city's ten-foot setback requirement.
¶9 Ken's House then called various witnesses, including the contractor (Contractor) who had been in charge of building the garage. Contractor testified that, when he first began construction of the garage, he did not consider the remnants of the fence to mark the boundary between the Huck Property and the Ken's House Property. Contractor also testified that, during the construction of the garage, he and his team "absolutely tried to limit any use of" the Huck Property and that the equipment used in the construction would have been placed only on the Ken's House Property. When asked if the machinery used during construction of the garage ever had to operate on the Huck Property, Contractor responded, "Absolutely not."
¶10 After considering the evidence presented, as well as written closing arguments submitted by the parties, the trial court issued a written ruling, concluding that "Huck ha[d] failed to meet the first three elements of a boundary by acquiescence."3 Regarding the "occupation" element, the court found that "there was not clear and convincing evidence that the entire boundary area was ... occupied" because, "[w]hile there was some testimony regarding accessing the building for maintenance, accessing window air conditioners, etc., it was not clearly established that the disputed land ... was utilized." The court also concluded that "there was no clear evidence that any such use was sufficient to provide notice to the property owners on the west." As for Huck's trespass claim, the court found that "[a]bsent a finding that [Huck] own[ed] the disputed land, the [trespass] claim [could not] proceed." The court accordingly entered judgment in favor of Ken's House.
¶11 Huck now appeals, challenging the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions in two respects. First, he asserts that the court erred in determining that Huck failed to prove the first three elements of boundary by acquiescence. Second, he asserts that the court erred in determining that he failed to prove trespass. "We will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are clearly erroneous." RHN Corp. v. Veibell , 2004 UT 60, ¶ 22, 96 P.3d 935 (quotation simplified). "To qualify as clearly erroneous a trial court's findings must be either against the clear weight of the evidence or must induce a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Jacob v. Bate , 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 13, 358 P.3d 346 (quotation simplified). "But a finding is not clearly erroneous if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding." Id. And we review the trial court's conclusions of law "for correctness, according the trial court no particular deference." RHN Corp. , 2004 UT 60, ¶ 22, 96 P.3d 935 (quotation simplified).
¶12 Huck first contends that the trial court erred by determining that he had not satisfied the first three elements of boundary by acquiescence. To prove boundary by acquiescence, a claimant must demonstrate the following four elements:
(1) a visible line marked by monuments, fences, buildings, or natural features treated as a boundary; (2) the claimant's occupation of his or her property up to the visible line such that it would give a reasonable landowner notice that the claimant...
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