Huck v. Whirlpool Corp.
| Decision Date | 27 September 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. EV 79-203-C.,EV 79-203-C. |
| Parties | Doris HUCK, Plaintiff, v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
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Charles L. Berger, Evansville, Ind., for plaintiff.
Jeffrey R. Kinney, Evansville, Ind., Jeremy P. Sherman, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.
This matter is before the Court upon Complaint of the Plaintiff, Doris Huck, filed with the Court on December 21, 1979, alleging that she has been unlawfully discharged from her employment with the Defendant, Whirlpool Corporation, on the basis of her sex. The parties have fully briefed the Court on the matters herein.
Plaintiff initiated her case through filing on February 16, 1978, a Complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The plaintiff also filed a complaint on April 21, 1978 with the Evansville Human Relations Commission (hereinafter "EHRC") pursuant to Article III of the Municipal Code of the City of Evansville, Indiana of 1962, as amended. At all relevant times, the EHRC was a "state or local authority" duly designated under Section 706(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). The EHRC is designated to investigate, conciliate, conduct evidentiary proceedings and grant relief, where appropriate, pursuant to charges of unlawful employment discrimination, including gender discrimination. The EHRC investigated the alleged charge of gender discrimination and the Executive Director of the EHRC determined that a hearing should be held based upon plaintiff's charge. The parties were afforded discovery opportunities prior to the hearing.
A formal hearing on plaintiff's gender discrimination charge was held before the Evansville Human Relations Commission, on June 7th and 8th, 1979, in the City Building, Evansville, Indiana. Each party was represented by counsel and was given a full and fair opportunity to present evidence as well as to cross examine witnesses.
On July 25, 1979, the EHRC issued its Recommended Order and Decision which was adverse to the plaintiff. On October 16, 1979, the EEOC terminated its processing of plaintiff's charge and with it issued her a Notice of a Right to Sue.
The plaintiff filed the instant action with this Court on December 21, 1979. The Complaint was filed by the plaintiff within the proper time after receiving her Notice of a Right to Sue. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on February 11, 1980 which was denied on June 3, 1981. The Court set the entire matter for hearing on June 26, 1981 after both parties stipulated to the use of the transcript of the prior EHRC hearing.
The plaintiff originally cited several causes for relief in her complaint, namely 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. During oral argument on June 26, 1981, plaintiff's counsel indicated that he was pursuing only the Title VII aspect of this case and not pursuing the claims of violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Amendments. The issues involved in this matter concern only Title 42 of the U.S.C. § 2000e, and the case has progressed accordingly. Pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the Court enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in memorandum form.
Doris Huck was employed by Whirlpool on January 9, 1978 (Evansville Human Relations Commission Hearing Record of June 7th and 8th, 1979, hereinafter designated "H.R." at p. 21) as a probationary employee to work on one of the production lines. She, like all new employees, was to successfully work a standard forty-five (45) days probationary period (H.R. 49), after which she would acquire seniority rights. She was initially assigned the job of installing return bends into condensers (H.R. 22) under the supervision of Ken Winchester. Extra employees were working in this area (H.R. 23, 237). K. Winchester's initial impression of plaintiff's production performance was unsatisfactory. (H.R. 239). She received no verbal or written complaints at this juncture, however. (H.R. 22).
As an excess employee Mrs. Huck was assigned to an area of need when the position opened. (H.R. 307). On January 12, 1978, Mrs. Huck was assigned to leak testing coils on the hand solder line under the supervision of Kenny Gibson. (H.R. 22-23). The job consisted of placing valves on coil inlets and outlets and punching a button which caused the coil to be submerged in water for leak checks. (H.R. 24). Mrs. Huck had problems properly placing the valves securely on the coils for the water check tank. Supervisor Gibson informed Mrs. Huck that she was falling behind on this job and he subsequently removed her from leak testing upon her request (H.R. 24) before the end of her shift on January 12, 1978. She was reassigned on the hand solder line the following day to painting inlet tubes with a catalytic type paint and capping these tubes with rubber caps. (H.R. 24). A male probationer, Mr. Coomer, was switched from painting to the leak test job and performed adequately at each job. (H.R. 39, 238-9). In a couple of days, Mrs. Huck was also assigned the task of hammering "return bends" into the top of condensers at the beginning of the line. (H.R. 25). In the opinion of Supervisor Gibson, Mrs. Huck had problems with the painting job. Mr. Gibson informed Mrs. Huck on different occasions that she was (1) not keeping up with a minimally acceptable rate of production and (2) not performing the painting task properly. (H.R. 243). Mrs. Huck continued the painting, capping and hammering tasks until she was released. (H.R. 26).
Mrs. Huck also had problems with bent fins on the condensers, which meant the unit had to be "recombed." Mrs. Huck did not feel she was responsible for the bent fins since she received units with that problem. (H.R. 27). Mrs. Huck did have to recomb fins on occasion and stack them on the skid. (H.R. 240). Various problems such as these existed prior to Mrs. Huck's employment, resulting in the line not keeping the proper production rate. (H.R. 26). Since the production rate was a continuing problem, Mrs. Huck felt she did not contribute to the existing problems and thus the reasons for her dismissal were pretexual.
The plaintiff in a Title VII case possesses the ultimate burden of persuasion and the intermediate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To prevail on a charge of gender discrimination in employment, a preponderance of plaintiff's evidence must demonstrate that the employer intended to discriminate against plaintiff on account of her sex. Meier v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 416 F.Supp. 748 (S.D.Ind. 1975); aff'd 539 F.2d 713 (7th Cir.1976); Frockt v. Olin Corporation, 344 F.Supp. 369 (S.D.Ind.1972).
Plaintiff chose to proceed under a disparate treatment theory1 in which plaintiff's initial burden is to show actions "taken by the employer from which one can infer, if, such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act'." Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-76, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2948-49, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); accord, International Board of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 and n. 13, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 and n. 13, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Disparate treatment occurs when an employer treats some individual less favorably than others based upon race, religion, sex or national origin. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, succinctly delineates the criteria for a prima facie case of discrimination based upon a disparate treatment theory which can be made applicable to discharge cases as well as hiring cases. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253-254, nn. 6 and 7, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-1094, nn. 6 and 7; Flowers v. Crouch-Walker, 552 F.2d 1277, 1281 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1977); Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 892, 895 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848, 97 S.Ct. 135, 50 L.Ed.2d 121 (1976). The plaintiff must prove differences in treatment and discriminatory motive.
Upon plaintiff establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that plaintiff was rejected for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. Defendant must sufficiently justify the reasons for releasing the plaintiff thereby serving to (1) meet plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting legitimate reasons, and (2) provide a frame-work for plaintiff to have an opportunity to demonstrate pretext. If the defendant carried its burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's proffered reason was not the true reason for release and that the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination. Plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuading the court may be accomplished through Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095.
Plaintiff, Doris Huck, established a prima facie case of gender discrimination through establishing the following:
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Indiana Dept. of Correction v. Indiana Civil Rights Com'n
...Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 215; Huck v. Whirlpool Corp. (S.D.Ind.1982), 550 F.Supp. 968, 972. The analysis first suggested in McDonnell Douglas is designed to assist the litigants, trier of fact, and, we might ......