Huckabee v. State

Decision Date09 February 1909
Citation48 So. 796,159 Ala. 45
PartiesHUCKABEE v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dallas County; S. L. Brewer, Judge.

Sam Huckabee was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed.

Arthur M. Pitts, for appellant.

Alexander M. Garber, Atty. Gen., for the State.

MAYFIELD J.

The indictment in this case was as follows: "The State of Alabama, Dallas County. Circuit Court, Fall Term, 1908. The grand jury of said county charges that, before the finding of this indictment, Sam Huckabee unlawfully and with malice aforethought killed Arthur Coleman by cutting him with a knife, against the peace and dignity of the state of Alabama. [Signed] J. F. Thompson, Solicitor for 4th Circuit."

The evidence was in conflict as to whether the deceased was cut with a knife or by a barbed wire. He had several wounds inflicted upon him during the altercation with the defendant. One was a pistol shot wound on his right leg; and he had an incised wound on the back of his neck, and a slight contusion on his right cheek, which closed his eye, and was bloody and spitting blood after the fight and before his death. It was shown that a running fight had occurred between defendant and deceased, which lasted several minutes; each retreating at times and pursuing the other at times. The deceased had a pistol, and defendant a knife. Deceased shot at defendant several times during the fight. The defendant finally closed in on deceased, grappled with him, and wrested the pistol from him. The pistol was fired one or more times during this struggle, and deceased fell or was thrown by defendant against a wire fence--some witnesses saying it was of barbed wire; others, that it was not.

The deceased was shown to be a bleeder; that is, a person that bleeds freely from a slight wound, or upon whom such a wound produces hemorrhages difficult to check. It was shown that deceased bled much and for a long time from these wounds, and for a long while freely spat up blood. One of the surgeons examined by the state testified that he could not say that the wound on deceased's neck caused his death; that deceased died about two weeks after he examined him; that deceased being a bleeder, his blood would not coagulate as it would naturally, and that to such a person any wound, no matter how slight, is dangerous; that a slight operation on such a person often causes death; that the wound on deceased's neck, which was alleged to be a knife wound was doing well while he attended him; that the wound on his cheek was not a knife wound, but that it became swollen and gave him much trouble; that deceased died from loss of blood and probably from erysipelous inflammation. The other surgeon examined by the state testified that he saw deceased the night of the injury, in March; that deceased had a wound on the back of his neck, about three inches long and one-fourth of an inch deep, clean cut; that deceased was a bleeder; that all wounds on a bleeder are considered dangerous; that such a wound as described would accelerate death; that he saw deceased no more after that night.

The defendant requested the court to give the following charge which was in writing: "The court charges the jury that unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, from the evidence in this case, that the deceased, Arthur Coleman, died from the effects of a wound inflicted by a knife upon him by defendant, you must acquit the defendant." The court refused this charge, and in this we think there was error. The charge was a proper one, when applied to the facts in this case. There are cases in which it might be refused, because abstract, or where the cause of the death or the deodands are not disputed, or are admitted; but here the cause of the death and the deodands were disputed questions. The indictment charged singly and specifically that defendant killed deceased by cutting him with a knife. He could not be convicted under that indictment, if he killed deceased by any other means, and could not be convicted unless he inflicted the wound which caused, contributed to, or accelerated his death, and he must have inflicted that wound with a knife; and the jury must believe these facts beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant could be properly convicted under said...

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28 cases
  • Stokley v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • December 7, 1950
    ...they may not have believed that there was any preconcert or community of purpose between defendant and Pete Singley. Huckabee v. State, 159 Ala. 45, 48 So. 796; Talley v. State, 174 Ala. 101, 57 So. 445; Daughdrill v. State, 113 Ala. 7, 21 So. 378; Henderson v. State, 11 Ala.App. 37, 65 So.......
  • Mitchell v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • March 21, 1997
    ...not be supported by proof that he shot him with a pistol or threw him against a barbed wire fence.' " (quoting Huckabee v. State, 159 Ala. 45, 48-49, 48 So. 796, 797-98 (1909)(emphasis in Pace Here the indictment charged that the death of Demarcus King was caused by shooting him with a pist......
  • Boyle v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • March 29, 2013
    ...the means by which an offense is committed, it must be substantially, though not literally, proven as alleged.” Huckabee v. State, 159 Ala. 45, 48 So. 796, 797–98 (1909).Many courts have observed that a hand may be a blunt-force instrument. See Cunningham v. Conway, 717 F.Supp.2d 339, 348 (......
  • Thompson v. State, 8 Div. 392
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • April 12, 1988
    ...though not literally, proven as alleged. Phillips v. State, 68 Ala. 469; Jones v. State, 137 Ala. 12, 34 So. 681; Huckabee v. State, 159 Ala. 45, 48 So. 796." Matthews v. State, 51 Ala.App. 417, 286 So.2d 91, 93 (Ala.Cr.App.1973). The trial court's charge covered the correct principles of "......
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