Huddleston v. Dwyer

Decision Date15 May 1944
Docket NumberNo. 628,628
Citation88 L.Ed. 1246,64 S.Ct. 1015,322 U.S. 232
PartiesHUDDLESTON et al. v. DWYER et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. William E. Davis, of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioners.

Mr. William L. Curtis, of Fort Smith, Ark., for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Respondents are owners of defaulted paving bonds issued by the City of Poteau in LeFlore County, Oklahoma, the bonds being secured by assessments for benefits, payable in ten annual installments, upon the property in two improvement districts established by the city, including certain lots owned by the county, and others belonging to the city, which it later conveyed to the county. Respondents brought suit in 1937 in the District Court for Eastern Oklahoma, against the county, its Board of Commissioners and other officers of the county and city, alleging diversity of citizenship, and seeking a judgment fixing the county's liability under state law for the assessments and asking mandamus to compel a tax levy by the county officials for the payment of the overdue assessments, and other relief.

The District Court dismissed the complaint. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to determine the amounts due on the respective assessments against the lots in question, and in the event of failure to provide funds for the payment of the judgment, then to entertain jurisdiction in an ancillary proceeding in mandamus to compel the necessary tax levies. Dwyer v. LeFlore County, 97 F.2d 823. The District Court entered judgment accordingly, retaining jurisdiction for such action as might be necessary to effectuate the judgment.

No funds having been provided for payment of the overdue assessments, respondents brought the present proceeding in the District Court for mandamus, to compel petitioners, County Commissioners and other county officers, to make the tax levies necessary for payment of the amounts adjudged to be due. The District Court gave judgment for mandamus, in effect directing petitioners, beginning with the fiscal year 1942-3, to make ten annual levies in connection with the county general fund levies, sufficient to pay successively the ten assessment instalments which became due and payable in the years 1925 to 1934 inclusive, with interest at 12% from the due date of the annual instalments until August 13, 1937, the date when the complaint was filed, and thereafter with interest at the rate of 6% per annum upon the aggregate of such instalments and interest already accrued.

One of the defenses to the petition for mandamus in the District Court was that under Oklahoma law a county is without authority to levy and collect a tax in one year to pay improvement assessments which became due in an earlier year. This defense was urged on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals which overruled it and affirmed the judgment of the District Court, 10 Cir., 137 F.2d 383, after an examination of the Oklahoma authorities, including Independent School District No. 39 v. Exchange National Co., 164 Okl. 176, 23 P.2d 210, 95 A.L.R. 685; First National Bank in Wichita v. Board of Education, 174 Okl. 164, 49 P.2d 1077; Board of Education v. Johnston, 189 Okl. 172, 115 P.2d 132, and Wilson v. City of Hollis, decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court on October 6, 1942 and not officially reported. The Court of Appeals found none of these cases to be precisely in point but concluded that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma had consistently and pointedly avoided the announcement of the rule contended for. It accordingly held that the District Court had correctly directed tax levies to provide for payment, from the general tax fund, of the overdue instalments of the improvement assessments, with interest as prescribed.

Petitioners filed a timely petition for rehearing which was denied on September 1, 1943. On December 17, 1943, petitioners moved for leave to file a second petition for rehearing which the Circuit Court of Appeals denied. In their second petition, petitioners brought to the attention of the court and relied upon an opinion of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Wilson v. City of Hollis, of October 23, 1943, 142 P.2d 633, which had superseded its earlier opinion on which the Circuit Court of Appeals had relied in its opinion in this case. Petitioners contended that by its later opinion the Supreme Court of Oklahoma had determined that Oklahoma law did not authorize the levy of a general fund tax to pay assessment instalments which fell due in prior years, but that such instalments could be paid only from a sinking fund levy, and that no statutory penalties or additional interest for delinquency could be collected.

In its second opinion the Supreme Court of Oklahoma reexamined in detail the mode of enforcing past due installments of improvement assessments against the property of municipalities and counties in Oklahoma. It differentiated between the liability of municipally owned and privately owned property located within improvement districts, and it appears to have held, with respect to the former, that under the applicable provisions of the Oklahoma statutes mandamus to enforce the levy of a general fund tax will lie only in the year in which the assessment installment falls due, that money from the general fund cannot be applied to the payment of obligations of a prior fiscal year, and that 'no delinquency that will carry with it additional interest or penalty can accrue against public property'. It said that judgment could be rendered against a county or...

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