Huddleston v. Huddleston

• Decision Date: 08 November 2000
• Docket Number: P-1226
• Citation: 747 N.E.2d 195,51 Mass. App. Ct. 563
• Parties: (Mass.App.Ct. 2001) JUDITH S. HUDDLESTON vs. JAMES I. HUDDLESTON. 98-
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

747 N.E.2d 195 (Mass.App.Ct. 2001)

JUDITH S. HUDDLESTON vs. JAMES I. HUDDLESTON.

98-P-1226

Appeals Court of Massachusetts

November 8, 2000.

May 14, 2001.

County: Essex.

Present: Porada, Lenk, & Duffly, JJ.

Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Separation agreement, Modification of judgment.

Complaint for divorce filed in the Essex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on June 22, 1978.

A complaint for modification, filed on July 11, 1995, was heard by John C. Stevens III, J.

Elizabeth A. Zeldin for Judith S. Huddleston.

Richard A. Gould for James I. Huddleston.

DUFFLY, J.

Judith Huddleston (Judith) appeals from a modification judgment entered by the Probate and Family Court terminating alimony payments paid to her by James Huddleston (James) upon his reaching the age of sixty-five, terminating James's obligation to carry life insurance on his life, and eliminating a cost of living adjustment. We agree that in light of language in the parties' merged separation agreement reflecting a contrary intent, and the absence of circumstances otherwise warranting the modification, these orders should not have been made.

Background facts and proceedings. "Bearing in mind the weight to be accorded the exercise of the probate judge's sound discretion, we review the record in its entirety." Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 371 (1981). This record includes findings issued by other probate judges in connection with prior modification judgments that provide facts about the parties' circumstances. Some of these findings were incorporated by the probate judge in the findings relative to the instant case, and we refer to other findings as we deem appropriate to our discussion of the issues before us.

James, who had previously been married, and Judith, who had not, were married on February 14, 1970. They had three children who, at the time of the 1978 divorce, were seven, four, and three years old. Following the divorce, James, a self-employed orthopedic surgeon, remarried and moved to Florida.¹ Judith, the primary, and then sole, custodial parent of the parties' three children, has not remarried.

The judgment of divorce nisi that entered on August 23, 1978, incorporated and merged the parties' separation agreement² and was found to be fair and reasonable by a Probate Court judge. The agreement not only detailed the amounts of support to be paid by James to Judith but also set forth the terms and conditions of annual cost of living increases (based on the consumer price index or James's income, whichever was less); the specific circumstances warranting increases beyond the annual cost of living adjustments, or a downward adjustment; the amounts by which support would be reduced upon the happening of anticipated events; and the duration of support.

The agreement provided that support would be paid "during the joint lives of the parties" and will cease upon Judith's remarriage. James was initially obligated to pay the monthly sum of $2,500³ as undifferentiated alimony and child support.⁴ Other provisions obligated James to pay college and medical costs of the children. He was to maintain a $200,000 life insurance policy on his life.⁵ Under the agreement, the children were to reside primarily with Judith, subject to scheduled visits with James.

During the ensuing years, Judith sought, and twice obtained, modifications to the judgment. First, in December 25, 1985, Judith was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children; payments of undifferentiated alimony and child support were increased to $5,375 per month; and James was ordered to pay the costs of the parties' daughter's attendance at the Landmark School.⁶

The 1985 findings supporting an increase reflect that James's income from his professional corporation immediately following the divorce far exceeded the $80,000 in annual earnings that he anticipated he would earn as a result of his "reduced pace." There were significant increases in income earned by James in each year following the divorce, from $155,850 in 1980 to $352,240 in 1984. In 1984, support payments to Judith represented only 12 percent of James's income, whereas the initial support obligation represented some 40 percent⁷ of his assumed $80,000 in annual income.

On January 18, 1991, pursuant to Judith's complaint, a modification judgment entered increasing support to $7,000 per month. The judgment further provided that future cost of living increases would henceforth be based solely on increases in the consumer price index, without reference to James's income. As set forth in the January, 1991, findings, there had been no cost of living increase included in any support paid by James since the December, 1985, judgment. James's income had increased to $432,737 in 1986, $441,297 in 1987, and $434,397 in 1988. Although the practice grossed more in 1989 and 1990 than in any year since 1984, James paid himself less in salary during those years. James's wife Dorothy had become employed by James's professional practice in 1988 and was compensated at the rate of $65,000 per year, an amount considered reasonable in view of her services. James continued to make contributions to his pension and profit sharing plans in the amount of $30,000 annually, a practice begun in 1984. As of January, 1990, the plans had a value of $1,002,174.

The January, 1991, findings also note that Judith had made no serious efforts to become employed since December, 1985; that she listed her occupation as "apprentice designer," but earned no income from this endeavor; and that she engaged in a pattern of deficit spending that, in the view of the probate judge, obligated Judith "to find a way to attempt to meet her financial commitments by supplementing the support paid to her by James." The judge found that "Judith has not actively sought employment because she has been involved in her children's education and activities." There were no findings reflecting Judith's education, work experience, or capacity for remunerative employment.

Apparently as a result of provisions in the parties' agreement, the $7,000 in monthly support being paid by James as a consequence of the January, 1991, modification judgment was reduced when the youngest child was emancipated and, as of February, 1997, James's alimony payment was $3,385.34 per month.

Judith filed the within complaint for modification on July 11, 1995, requesting an increase in alimony, as well as security for the payments. As subsequently amended, Judith's complaint also sought to have her named as beneficiary of a $50,000 life insurance policy on James's life,⁸ and attorney's fees. James filed a counterclaim seeking to reduce support payments and to eliminate the cost of living adjustment, but on October 14, 1997, his counterclaim was dismissed by agreement of the parties.

On February 9, 1998, following a trial, a modification judgment entered that ordered James to "continue to pay to Judith, $3,385.34 per month as alimony payable on the first day of each month until the death of either party, until Judith remarries or until James attains age 65, whichever first occurs." The judgment vacated the "requirement for further adjustments based upon the consumer price index" and the change of circumstances provisions of Article IIA (7) (see note 10, infra) of the agreement, and ordered that, except as provided by the modification judgment, there would be no further adjustments in the amount of alimony. The judgment terminated James's obligation to provide life insurance and ordered that $120,000 be set aside by James and held in escrow as security for his alimony obligation, but provided that the escrowed funds could "be drawn on solely for the purposes of paying the alimony obligation as set forth" in the judgment.

On appeal, Judith's claims fall generally into three categories. She first claims that the issue of alimony reduction was not before the court because James dismissed his counterclaim; second, even if properly before him, the probate judge abused his discretion when he ordered that alimony would terminate upon James attaining age 65, in light of the parties' expressed contrary intention that support continue during the parties' lifetimes, until Judith's remarriage; and third, the findings do not support a durational limitation on the alimony obligation.

We agree that the parties' agreement clearly articulates the parameters that the parties intended would be applicable to a modification of James's support obligation, and that the trial judge should have considered the parties' intent along with relevant changes in their circumstances when deciding the issue. We therefore do not reach the question whether, in the circumstances of this case, the probate judge properly exercised his broad discretion to entertain claims not specifically set forth in pleadings before the court. See, e.g., Graham v. Quincy Food Serv. Employees Assn., 407 Mass. 601, 615 (1990) (full argument of claim by both parties at trial constitutes implied consent to the court's consideration of it).

Discussion. "The judge reported his findings, and we have a transcript of all the evidence. Accordingly, 'the appeal brings before us all questions of law, fact, and discretion.'" Bercume v. Bercume, 428 Mass. 635, 644 n.20 (1999), quoting from Krokyn v. Krokyn, 378 Mass. 206, 208 (1979). We review the findings to determine whether the judge gave appropriate consideration to the parties' intentions as expressed in their written agreement, Bercume v. Bercume, supra at 644, and to any changes in their circumstances since the last modification judgment. Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 368 (1981); Harris v. Harris, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 932 (1986).

The probate judge's findings focus on Judith's failure to budget wisely and to look for work. Regarding her spending habits, the judge took note of the fact that Judith, who had purchased the parties' twelve-room Marblehead home by paying James...