Huddleston v. University of Vermont, 97-262.

• Decision Date: 04 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-262.,97-262.
• Citation: 719 A.2d 415
• Parties: James I. HUDDLESTON, III v. UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT and State Agricultural College.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

719 A.2d 415

James I. HUDDLESTON, III v. UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT and State Agricultural College.

No. 97-262.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

September 4, 1998.

Frank H. Langrock of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jeffrey J. Nolan of Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.

Present AMESTOY, C.J., and DOOLEY, MORSE, JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ.

JOHNSON, Justice.

Defendant University of Vermont and State Agricultural College (UVM) appeals a superior court decision reversing and remanding UVM's denial of plaintiff's application for in-state residency status with the attendant benefit of reduced tuition. Plaintiff James Huddleston (student) is a medical student at the UVM College of Medicine. UVM denied student's application for in-state status because he failed to prove that he satisfied the residency requirements by clear and convincing evidence. Student appealed this decision to the superior court pursuant to V.R.C.P. 75. The superior court held that, since the preponderance of the evidence standard is generally appropriate in administrative adjudications in Vermont, it applies in UVM's residency determinations. The court remanded the issue for UVM to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether student is eligible for in-state status. UVM now appeals, arguing that it is not an administrative agency and possesses the implicit authority to set the standard of proof required at residency determinations for reduced in-state tuition. We agree and reverse.

Student was born and raised in Massachusetts, and graduated from Yale University with a B.S. degree in May of 1994. Student moved to Vermont on June 1, 1994, and subsequently found employment at UVM in Burlington. On June 15, 1994, student started the application process for admission to medical school, and applied to twenty-three medical schools, at that time indicating his father's Florida residence as his permanent address. In September 1994, student submitted an application to the UVM College of Medicine, indicating his permanent address as Burlington, Vermont. In the Spring of 1995, student registered to vote in Vermont, obtained a Vermont driver's license, and registered his car in Vermont. Student also filed his 1994 and 1995 income taxes in the state of Vermont.

In April of 1995, student was accepted by UVM as an out-of-state student to begin his studies in the Fall of 1995. In July of 1995, before starting classes, student applied for in-state tuition status. Student's application was denied, and student subsequently appealed. After a hearing, student's application was again denied. Student appealed to the Residency Appellate Officer, who held that student did not qualify as an in-state student as defined in UVM's residency regulations because he failed to establish the necessary intent to make Vermont his permanent residence. Upon reconsideration, the Residency Appellate Officer again denied student's application for in-state tuition status. Student then submitted another application for in-state tuition status for the semester starting in the Spring of 1996. A hearing was held and his application was denied. In April of 1996, student filed a complaint under V.R.C.P. 75 in Chittenden Superior Court.

In this Rule 75 appeal of governmental action, the Chittenden Superior Court was confined to reviewing only substantial questions of law. See Molesworth v. University of Vt., 147 Vt. 4, 6, 508 A.2d 722, 723 (1986). The court held that, although there was evidence to justify the residency officer's denial of in-state status, the trustees were not authorized to adopt a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof because this power was not explicitly granted by the Legislature. The court held that, because a preponderance of the evidence standard is generally appropriate in administrative adjudications in Vermont, that standard applies to UVM's residency determinations. The court also concluded that there was competent evidence in the record to support the denial of in-state status, and that UVM's more complex definition of domicile did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court remanded the issue to UVM for determination of student's in-state status application under the proper standard of proof. Defendant UVM now appeals the superior court order and decision, arguing that UVM is not an administrative agency and that it possesses the implicit authority to set the standard of proof required at residency determinations.

I.

We first determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. As we have previously recognized, "a final judgment is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction unless the narrow circumstances authorizing an interlocutory appeal are present." Hospitality Inns v. South Burlington R.I., 149 Vt. 653, 656, 547 A.2d 1355, 1358 (1988). A decree or judgment is final if "it makes a final disposition of the subject matter before the Court." Woodard v. Porter Hospital, Inc., 125 Vt. 264, 265, 214 A.2d 67, 69 (1965). The superior court's order does not resolve the controversy between the parties. It is not a final judgment, and a proper appeal lies only pursuant to V.R.A.P. 5.

This appeal does not meet the requirements of V.R.A.P. 5 because it was taken without agreement of the parties or permission of the trial court. Nevertheless, we have previously suspended the application of V.R.A.P. 5 where dismissal of the appeal would most likely result in another appeal after final judgment, the merits of the questions of law were fully briefed and argued before the Court, and the Court has spent valuable time preparing for the case. See Castle v. Sherburne Corp., 141 Vt. 157, 165, 446 A.2d 350, 354 (1982). All of these factors are present in the instant case. Reversal of the trial court's decision requiring UVM to evaluate student's application under a preponderance of the evidence standard will obviate the need for inevitable additional appeals and will avoid a rehearing of student's claims by UVM under an erroneous standard of proof. Thus, in the limited circumstances of this case and in light of our decision to reverse the trial court's decision, we suspend the rules and reach the merits. See V.R.A.P. 2.

II.

We now turn to the merits of UVM's appeal. The issue for our review is whether the trustees of UVM have the authority to adopt a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof in deciding eligibility for reduced in-state tuition. The trial court held that, in the absence of a specific statute authorizing UVM to set a higher burden of proof, administrative adjudications of residency should be subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 3 V.S.A. §§ 801-849. The APA does not specify a burden of proof, but we have held that the usual standard of proof in state administrative adjudications is a preponderance of the evidence. See 3 V.S.A. §§ 801-849; In re Muzzy, 141 Vt. 463, 472, 449 A.2d 970, 974 (1982).

In opposition to the trial court's decision, UVM claims that it is not an administrative agency subject to the APA, citing Sprague v. University of Vermont, 661 F.Supp. 1132 (D.Vt.1987), and that, as a result, our cases supplying a burden of proof in state administrative adjudications are inapposite. UVM also argues that it has plenary authority to manage and control its internal affairs, and has specific authority to define and decide residency determinations within the limits of the statute. See 16 V.S.A. § 2822.

We agree with UVM that it has the specific authority under § 2822 to define and decide residency determinations, and that the delegation is sufficiently broad to encompass the adoption of regulations and procedures that include a burden of proof. Nothing in the APA or our previous interpretations of the burden of proof applicable to certain agencies conducting administrative adjudications alters this conclusion.¹

The Legislature has delegated to UVM the specific authority to implement the legislative policy of securing greater educational opportunities through reduced tuition charges for Vermont residents. This policy, found at 16 V.S.A. § 2282, provides for reduced tuition at UVM and the State Agricultural College, and requires the trustees of UVM to define eligibility for reduced tuition charges to effectuate the purposes of the section. In defining eligibility, UVM must include, but is not limited to, the following requirements:

(1) reasonable durational domicile requirements;

(2) provision that a residence established for the purpose of attending an education institution by either the person seeking reduced tuition or another shall not by itself constitute residence for the purposes of this section; [and]

(3) requirement of such other indicia of permanent residence as said trustees shall deem proper.

Id. § 2282(c). The policy stated in subsection 2, that mere residence for the purpose of attending a Vermont institution is not sufficient to prove in-state status, is echoed in a companion statute, § 2282a. These statutes confer upon the UVM trustees the "authority... to distinguish between in-state and out-of-state residents for tuition purposes and to establish certain guidelines for deciding eligibility for reduced tuition charges." Molesworth, 147 Vt. at 6, 508 A.2d at 723.

It is true, as student argues, that the legislative grant of authority does not mention that UVM must use a particular standard of proof to determine residency status, but it does not follow that UVM is without authority to adopt one. A fair reading of the statute supports the conclusion that UVM was required to do more than adopt a regulation defining domicile. The policy statements evince that the Legislature contemplated that UVM would take action to "effectuate the purposes of this subsection." Id. § 2282(c). The statute required UVM to adopt regulations and procedures that were not specifically enumerated in the statute. Otherwise, the policy could not be...