Hudelson v. Delta Intern. Machinery Corp.
| Decision Date | 22 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 30829.,30829. |
| Citation | 142 Idaho 244,127 P.3d 147 |
| Parties | Jonathon L. HUDELSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DELTA INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY CORPORATION, a Minnesota corporation; Brambilla Lease Systems, Inc., a Minnesota corporation; John R. Phibbs, an individual; XYZ Business Entities 1 through 10; and John or Jane Does 1 through 10, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKlveen & Jones, Boise, for appellants. Warren E. Jones argued.
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis Chtd, Twin Falls, for respondent. Benjamin J. Cluff argued.
This is an appeal from the district judge's order granting a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of the Defendants. The Defendants also challenge various evidentiary rulings by the district judge in the event we affirm the grant of a new trial. We affirm the district judge in all respects.
This case arose from a traffic accident that occurred on June 15, 2000, at the intersection of Harrison Street and 3600 North Road near Twin Falls. On a map, the intersection would appear as an inverted T, with 3600 North Road running east and west and Harrison Street intersecting it from the north. There is a stop sign requiring vehicles traveling south on Harrison Street to stop before entering 3600 North Road.
At the time of the accident, John Phibbs was an employee of Delta International Machinery Corporation and was driving a rented Plymouth Voyager van in the course and scope of his employment. He had as passengers in the van Bud and Angela Anderson, who owned real property located at the northeast corner of the intersection. Their property included a shop, which was accessed from Harrison Street, and a residence, which was accessed from 3600 North Road by a circular driveway.
Mr. Phibbs had driven from the Andersons' shop onto Harrison Street and traveled south to the stop sign, where he waited for an eastbound, slow-moving vehicle to pass. Once the vehicle passed, he turned east onto 3600 North Road, and then continued to turn into the circular driveway in front of the Andersons' house. At the same time, the Plaintiff had just left his girlfriend's house and was traveling eastbound on 3600 North Road in a Geo Tracker. As the Plaintiff attempted to pass the van, the van crossed the centerline, and the vehicles collided. The Plaintiff was seriously injured.
The Plaintiff filed this action against Mr. Phibbs, his employer Delta International Machinery Corporation, and the van's owner Brambilla Lease Systems, Inc. (Defendants). The primary issues regarding liability were: (1) whether the Plaintiff was exceeding the speed limit, (2) how far the Plaintiff was from the intersection when Mr. Phibbs turned onto 3600 North Road, and (3) whether Mr. Phibbs had signaled his turn into the circular driveway. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the Plaintiff 66.7% the cause of the accident and Mr. Phibbs 33.3% the cause of the accident. The district judge granted the Plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and the Defendants appealed.
A. Did the district judge abuse his discretion in granting a new trial?
B. Did the district judge abuse his discretion in excluding from evidence a witness's statement that she believed Mr. Phibbs had pulled out safely onto 3600 North Road?
C. Did the district judge abuse his discretion in denying the Defendants' request to have the jury view the scene of the accident?
D. Did the district judge abuse his discretion in refusing to permit the Defendants to offer the Plaintiff's driving record into evidence?
E. Did the district judge abuse his discretion in refusing to permit the Defendants to offer evidence that the Plaintiff had an argument with his girlfriend prior to the accident?
F. Did the district judge err in holding that the Plaintiff was not negligent per se for passing in an intersection in violation of Idaho Code § 49-635(1)(b)?
G. Did the district judge err in holding that former Idaho Code § 49-673(6) is constitutional?
H. Did the district judge abuse his discretion in refusing to permit Mr. Phibbs, Mrs. Anderson, and Mr. Anderson to give their opinions as to the speed of the Plaintiff's vehicle?
I. Did the district judge err in failing to award the Defendants court costs?
A. Did the District Judge Abuse his Discretion in Granting a New Trial?
The district judge granted the new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict. I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6). A trial judge may grant a new trial on that ground if, after making his or her own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the judge determines that the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence. Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 97 P.3d 428 (2004). The judge is not required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's determination, but may grant a new trial even if there is substantial evidence supporting the verdict. Id. The judge must also conclude that a different result would follow a retrial. Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 788 P.2d 188 (1990).
When reviewing a trial judge's grant of a new trial on appeal, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard. Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 97 P.3d 428 (2004). A trial judge has wide discretion to grant or deny a request for a new trial, and we will not overturn the judge's decision absent a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. Although we will review the evidence, we primarily focus upon the process used by the trial judge in reaching his or her decision, not upon the result of that decision. Id. The trial judge is in a far better position than we to weigh the demeanor, credibility and testimony of witnesses and the persuasiveness of all the evidence. Id. Therefore, we do not weigh the evidence. Our inquiry is: (1) whether the trial judge correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial judge acted within the outer boundaries of his or her discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific available choices; and (3) whether the trial judge reached his or her decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
In this case, the trial judge correctly perceived that the decision to grant or deny the motion for a new trial was one of discretion. His decision was based primarily upon his assessment of the credibility of the witnesses regarding three issues.
One issue regarding liability was the speed at which the Plaintiff was driving at the time of the collision. There were two cars following the Plaintiff's vehicle. The car immediately behind his was being driven by Nicole Victor and the other was being driven by Laura Caudill, the Plaintiff's girlfriend. They both testified that the Plaintiff's car was traveling at the speed limit of 45 mph. The Defendants presented evidence from an accident reconstructionist who expressed his opinion that the Plaintiff's car was traveling at 71 mph at the time of the collision. The Plaintiff presented opinion testimony from two experts who disagreed with the Defendants' expert regarding the speed of the Plaintiff's vehicle. They put the speed of the Geo at about 45 mph.
Another issue was how far the Plaintiff was from the intersection when Mr. Phibbs turned onto 3600 North Road. Mr. Anderson was sitting in the middle of the van's middle seat. Both he and Mr. Phibbs testified that prior to pulling out from the stop sign, they saw a vehicle coming from the west that was approximately one-fourth of a mile away. Mrs. Anderson, who was sitting in the front passenger seat of the van, testified that when the van stopped at the stop sign, she looked both ways and did not see any vehicle coming from the west. The Plaintiff testified that the van pulled out in front of him and he tried to pass it to avoid hitting it. Nicole Victor, who was driving immediately behind the Plaintiff, testified that she had to brake to avoid colliding with the van. This issue is related to the speed of the Plaintiff's vehicle because it would have to have been traveling at about 70 mph to cover the quarter-mile distance during the period of time that Mr. Phibbs was negotiating his turn.
The third issue was whether Mr. Phibbs had signaled his turn into the circular driveway. Mr. Phibbs and Mr. Anderson both testified that Mr. Phibbs had turned on his left blinker before turning onto 3600 North Road. The dispute was whether the blinker remained on throughout his turn, including when he crossed the centerline to enter the Anderson's driveway. Mr. Phibbs and the Andersons testified that Mr. Phibbs made one continuous turn, in which circumstance the van's blinker would have remained on throughout the turn. The Plaintiff offered evidence of their prior statements that indicated Mr. Phibbs made two turns instead of one continuous turn. The Plaintiff testified that the van's turn signal was not on when he swerved to avoid the van.
The district judge explained his assessment of the testimony and concluded that the witnesses whose testimony favored the Plaintiff were more credible than those favoring the Defendants. The district judge also pointed to other factors, such as that Mr. Phibbs did not look in his rearview mirror prior to crossing the centerline to turn into the Andersons' driveway.
After thoroughly explaining his evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses, the district judge concluded that the testimony favoring the Plaintiff was more credible than that favoring the Defendants and that a different result would likely occur in a new trial.
The Defendants quibble with the judge's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses, arguing that they impeached some of the witnesses the judge found credible. The testimony of Mr. Phibbs and the Andersons was also...
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...weight of the evidence" and (b) the judge "conclude[s] that a different result would follow a retrial." Hudelson v. Delta Intl. Mach. Corp., 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005) (citation omitted). We review a trial court's decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. In orde......
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...choices; and (3) whether the trial judge reached his or her decision by an exercise of reason. Hudelson v. Delta Int'l Machinery Corp., 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005). Pizzuto has not argued that the district court abused its discretion in this F. Did the District Court Deny P......
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...choices; and (3) whether the trial judge reached his or her decision by an exercise of reason. Hudelson v. Delta Int'l Machinery Corp., 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005). Pizzuto has not argued that the district court abused its discretion in this F. Did the District Court Deny P......
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...in accord with the clear weight of the evidence and that a different result would follow a retrial. Hudelson v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005). The standard we apply when reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for a new trial is as follows: Whe......
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§ 12.02 HABIT AND CHARACTER DISTINGUISHED
...evidence). See also Lewan, The Rationale of Habit Evidence, 16 Syracuse L. Rev. 39 (1964).[2] Hudelson v. Delta Intern. Machinery Corp., 127 P.3d 147, 153 (Idaho 2005).[3] See Jones v. Southern Pac. R., 962 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Habit evidence is superior to character evidence bec......
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§ 12.02 Habit and Character Distinguished
...evidence). See also Lewan, The Rationale of Habit Evidence, 16 Syracuse L. Rev. 39 (1964).[2] Hudelson v. Delta Intern. Machinery Corp., 127 P.3d 147, 153 (Idaho 2005).[3] See Jones v. Southern Pac. R., 962 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Habit evidence is superior to character evidence bec......
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§ 26.06 Jury Views
...as to the layout of the jail. The trial judge was on the scene and balanced these concerns."); Hudelson v. Delta Intern. Machinery Corp. 127 P.3d 147, 153 (Idaho 2005) ("[T]here were numerous photographs, diagrams, and measurements of the accident scene admitted into evidence. The Defendant......
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§ 26.06 JURY VIEWS
...as to the layout of the jail. The trial judge was on the scene and balanced these concerns."); Hudelson v. Delta Intern. Machinery Corp. 127 P.3d 147, 153 (Idaho 2005) ("[T]here were numerous photographs, diagrams, and measurements of the accident scene admitted into evidence. The Defendant......