Hudgens v. Dean

• Decision Date: 26 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 50124,50124
• Citation: 27 Ill.Dec. 193,388 N.E.2d 1242,75 Ill.2d 353
• Parties: , 27 Ill.Dec. 193 Frank HUDGENS et al., Appellants, v. Anthony T. DEAN, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1242

388 N.E.2d 1242

75 Ill.2d 353, 27 Ill.Dec. 193

Frank HUDGENS et al., Appellants, v. Anthony T. DEAN, Appellee.

No. 50124.

Supreme Court of Illinois Jan. 26, 1979.

Harris & Lambert, Marion, for appellants.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago (Robert G. Epsteen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

THOMAS J. MORAN, Justice:

This is an action for a mandatory injunction to compel defendant, who at the time of trial was Director of the Department of Conservation (Department), to rebuild and reopen the portion of a road which is located in the village of Goreville (village) and runs through Ferne Clyffe State Park (park). In the alternative, plaintiffs seek $65,000 with which to rebuild the road. The circuit court of Johnson County rendered judgment for plaintiffs and issued the requested mandatory injunction. The appellate court reversed (53 Ill.App.3d 126, 11 Ill.Dec. 336, 368 N.E.2d 944), and we granted plaintiffs leave to appeal.

The State of Illinois obtained title by warranty deed in 1949 to the land which is now part of the park and over which runs Ferne Clyffe Road (the portion of Ferne Clyffe Road in question hereinafter referred to as the "road"). Protection and preservation of that land became the responsibility of the Department. Although the evidence fails to disclose that the village has ever had any recorded interest in the road, the evidence does disclose that the road is located entirely within the village limits. In 1965 the State acquired additional adjoining property and built a new entrance road to the park. Thereafter, a lengthy departmental task force study of the road was made. This study recommended that the defendant, as Director of the Department, order the road closed. In 1973, defendant ordered the road closed to vehicular traffic. The road was subsequently torn up and barricaded, after which the village and members of the village board brought this action against defendant individually, and not in his capacity as Director of the Department. Following a bench trial, the circuit court found that prior to the State's acquiring title, (1) the road had been established as a public highway by prescription; (2) the road became part of the village street system; and (3) there was an implied dedication of the road to public use and an implied public acceptance. The court further found that there has never been an abandonment of the road by the public. Based upon these findings, the court ruled that defendant's actions invaded the plaintiffs' rights, doing irreparable damage. It found defendant's actions were taken under "an assumption of authority which he did not have," and were therefore illegal. The court further ruled that defendant's acts were neither acts of the State nor acts of the Director, but acts of the defendant individually. The court then issued a mandatory injunction, ordering defendant and "his agents, servants and employees" to remove the barricades and rebuild the road. The appellate court reversed, dissolving the order and dismissing the cause, on the ground that the action was in reality one against the State and was therefore barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Section 4 of article XIII of the 1970 Constitution, effective July 1, 1971, provides:

"Except as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished."

The General Assembly subsequently enacted Public Act 77-1776, effective January 1, 1972, which provides:

"Except as provided in 'An Act to create the Court of Claims, * * * ' * * * the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court." Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 127, par. 801.

It is well settled that in determining whether a suit is in fact a suit against the State, the court is not bound solely by the formal identification of the parties to the record. Rather, the court is to analyze the particular issues involved and the relief sought. E. H. Swenson & Son, Inc. v. Lorenz (1967), 36 Ill.2d 382, 385, 223 N.E.2d 147; Moline Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue (1951), 410 Ill. 35, 37, 101 N.E.2d 71; Monroe v. Collins (1946), 393 Ill. 553, 558, 66 N.E.2d 670; Posinski v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co. (1941), 376 Ill. 346, 351, 33 N.E.2d 869; Adams v. Nudelman (1940), 375 Ill. 217, 219, 30 N.E.2d 742; Schwing v. Miles (1937), 367 Ill. 436, 442, 11 N.E.2d 944.

As evidenced by their complaint, plaintiffs' suit purports to be solely against defendant as an individual. The complaint reads:

"This suit, therefore is not brought against the State of Illinois, nor against Anthony T. Dean as Director of the Department of Conservation nor the Department of Conservation, but is brought solely against the defendant individually * * * ."

Such purport, however, is belied by the evidence and proceedings in the case. The evidence reveals that the decision to close the road was made while defendant was Director of the Department, and pursuant to a comprehensive management plan based upon an extensive study of and report on the park site. Clearly, defendant's decision to close the road was made in his official...