Hudson and Others v. Guestier Lafont v. Bigelow
| Decision Date | 01 February 1808 |
| Parties | HUDSON AND OTHERS v. GUESTIER. LAFONT v. BIGELOW |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
THESE cases were argued in connexion with that of Rose v. Himely.
This case differs from that of Rose v. Himely in one material fact. The vessel and cargo, which constitute the subject of controversy, were seized within the territorial jurisdiction of the government of St. Domingo, and carried into a Spanish port. While lying in that port, proceedings were regularly instituted in the court for the island of Guadaloupe, the cargo was sold by a provisional order of that court, after which the vessel and cargo were condemned. The single question, therefore, which exists in this case is, did the court of the captor lose its jurisdiction over the captured vessel by its being carried into a Spanish port.
The seizure was indisputably a valid seizure, and vested the lawful possession of the vessel in the sovereign of the captor. The right consequently existed in full force to apply immediately to the proper tribunals for an examination of, and decision on the offence alleged to have been committed. The jurisdiction of those tribunals had attached, and this right to decide upon the offence was complete.
When a seizure is thus made for the violation of a municipal law, the mode of proceeding must be exclusively regulated by the sovereign power of the country, and no foreign court is at liberty to question the correctness of what is done, unless the court passing the sentence loses its jurisdiction by some circumstance which the law of nations can notice. Recapture, escape, or a voluntary discharge of the captured vessel would be such a circumstance, because the sovereign would be thereby deprived of the possession of the thing, and of his power over it. While this possession remains, the res may be either restored or sold, the sentence of the court can be executed, and therefore this possession seems to be the essential fact on which the jurisdiction of the court depends.
The laws of the United States require that a vessel which has been seized for violating them should be tried in the district where the offence is committed, and certainly it would be irregular and illegal for the tribunal of a different district to act upon the case. But of this irregularity, it is believed, no foreign court could take notice. The United States might enable the admiralty courts of one district to decide on captures made for offences committed in another district. It is an internal regulation, to be expounded by our own courts, and of which the law of nations can take no notice. The possession of the thing would be in the sovereign power of the state, and it is competent to that power to give jurisdiction over it to any of its tribunals. There exists a full power over the subject, and an ability to execute the sentence of the court. The sovereign power possessing jurisdiction over the thing, must be presumed by foreign tribunals to have exercised that jurisdiction properly. But if the res be out of the power of the sovereign, he cannot act upon it, nor delegate authority to act upon it to his courts.
If these principles be correct, it remains to inquire whether the brig Sea Flower remained in the possession and in the power of the sovereign of the captor after being carried into a Spanish port.
Had this been a prize of war, we have precedents and principles which would guide us. The cases cited from Robinson's Reports, and the regulations made by Louis XVI. in November, 1779, show that the practice of condemning prizes of war while lying in neutral ports has prevailed in England, and has been adopted in France. The objections to this practice may perhaps be sufficient to induce nations to change it by common consent, but until they change it the practice must be submitted to, and the sentence of condemnation passed under such circumstances will bind the property, unless the legislature of the country in which the captured vessel may be claimed, or the law of nations, shall otherwise direct.
The sovereign whose officer has in his name captured a vessel as prize of war, remains in possession of that vessel, and has full power over her, so long as she is in a situation in which that possession cannot be rightfully divested. The fact whether she is an enemy vessel or not ought however to be judicially inquired into and decided, and therefore the property in a neutral captured as an enemy is never changed until sentence of condemnation...
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