Hudson v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-289 (JEB) |
| Parties | EUGENE HUDSON, JR., Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
In the latest skirmish between Plaintiff Eugene Hudson, Jr. and Defendant American Federation of Government Employees, Hudson seeks reinstatement as a member of AFGE such that he can continue his quest to be elected President of the Union. He has thus brought this suit alleging that AFGE's refusal to reinstate him constitutes race discrimination and a violation of various federal labor statutes. In now moving for Court intervention to allow his candidacy at the forthcoming June convention, Hudson contends that he has satisfied the preliminaryinjunction factors. Believing that he has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court holds otherwise.
Chronicling the full history of this labor dispute would require the powers of a Thucydides. Lacking such abilities and wishing to spare the reader, the Court offers only a precis of the action. The genesis of the earliest suit Hudson brought was his ouster as National Secretary Treasurer of AFGE and his inability to run for President in 2016. See, e.g. Hudson v. American Federation of Gov't Employees, 318 F.Supp.3d 7 (D.D.C. 2018) (Hudson I).
Another suit focused on the Union's prior removal of certain of his duties as NST. See, e.g., Hudson v American Federation of Gov't Employees, No. 17-2094, 2021 WL 5083436 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2021) (Hudson II). A third challenged his being purged from the membership rolls. See, e.g., Hudson v. American Federation of Gov't Employees, No. 19-2738, 2020 WL 3035039 (June 5, 2020), aff'd, 2021 WL 4811388 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 2021) (Hudson III).
This time around, in a Complaint that is rather digressive and difficult to follow at points, Hudson alleges that “AFGE violated [his] rights . . . by refusing to accept Local 3723's retroactive reinstatement of [his] AFGE membership.” ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶ 216. Apparently, after Local 1923, his original local, determined that Plaintiff had lost his retired-member status for failure to pay dues, a separate local, Local 3723, “attempted to correct the unfair termination of Mr. Hudson's membership by retroactively admitting [him] as an AFGE Local 3723 Retired member in good standing, ” which effort AFGE subsequently stymied. Id., ¶¶ 246-47.
Plaintiff alleges that this refusal to permit reinstatement, which prevents him from running for office at the upcoming June convention, was racially motivated. Id., ¶ 221. Hudson, who is Black, cites AFGE's permitting a White member, Barbara Galle, to run for and hold two AFGE offices despite not having paid dues. Id., ¶ 222. Unlike Hudson, Galle was allegedly reinstated retroactively, the same treatment Plaintiff asserts is being denied him. Id., ¶ 227.
In addition to bringing his race-discrimination claim (Count I), Hudson alleges that AFGE violated his rights under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) (Count II) and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) (Counts II and III). The alleged labor-law violations also stem from AFGE's adoption of “Local 1923 President Autrey's April 2019 decision to irrevocably sever Mr. Hudson's AFGE membership for nonpayment of dues even though Defendant AFGE was fully aware [of a Department of Labor determination] that [he] had fully paid his dues to Local 1923.” Id., ¶ 245. This, Hudson contends, contravened both statutes, in part through its violation of the AFGE National Constitution and the Local 3723 Constitution. Id., ¶¶ 252, 256. Last, he appends a defamation claim under D.C. common law (Count IV) for AFGE's publishing the statement that he had not paid his dues. Id., ¶ 270.
On March 3, 2022, Hudson moved for a Temporary Restraining Order, which this Court denied after a hearing on March 8. See Minute Order of March 8, 2022. Given the organizational oddities in his initial brief, see ECF No. 14-2 (TRO/PI Motion) (15-page “Statement of Facts” located at pages 29-43 of brief following legal argument), the Court suggested that Plaintiff would be better served by filing an Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which he did on March 23. See ECF No. 18 (Am. Mem.). He now “asks the Court to order AFGE to immediately reinstate him as a Retired AFGE member in good standing so that Plaintiff may announce his candidacy and run for office during the June 2022 AFGE National Convention.” Id. at 24. AFGE opposes such relief.
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). “The moving party bears the burden of persuasion and must demonstrate, ‘by a clear showing,' that the requested relief is warranted.” Hospitality Staffing Solutions, LLC v. Reyes, 736 F.Supp.2d 192, 197 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
Historically, these factors have “been evaluated on a ‘sliding scale.'” Davis v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Davenport v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). In other words, if the movant makes an “unusually strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor.” Id. at 1291-92. This Circuit has hinted, though not held, that Winter - which overturned the Ninth Circuit's “possibility of irreparable harm” standard - establishes that “likelihood of irreparable harm” and “likelihood of success” are “‘independent, free-standing requirement[s].'” Sherley, 644 F.3d at 392-93 (quoting Davis, 571 F.3d at 1296 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)); see League of Women Voters v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (). At any rate, our Circuit has held that a failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits alone is sufficient to defeat a preliminary-injunction motion. See Ark. Dairy Co-op Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 573 F.3d 815, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
In seeking injunctive relief, Hudson contends that he has satisfied all four of the Winter factors. See Am. Mem. at 39-41. AFGE's Opposition focuses on the first - likelihood of success - contending both that preemption robs the Court of jurisdiction and that he cannot succeed on any of his counts. See ECF No. 19 (Def. PI Opp.) at 3-17. The Court concurs that it need not venture beyond the initial injunction prong.
As AFGE notes in its Opposition, the structure of Hudson's Amended Memorandum is rather perplexing. After a “Statement of Facts” spanning 24 pages (and including some legal argument), Plaintiff spends his next 14 pages explaining why the Court has jurisdiction over his claims. See Am. Mem. at 1-24 & 25-38. Perhaps constrained by page limits, he then devotes precisely one full page to arguing why he is likely to succeed on the merits. Id. at 39. The cursory arguments therein are not enough to carry the significant burden an injunction movant bears.
To be more specific, Hudson's abbreviated argument focuses almost entirely on his discrimination claim, maintaining that he “is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that AFGE discriminated against him on the basis of race as compared with AFGE's more favorable treatment of Barbara Galle, a Caucasian American AFGE member.” Id. This is because Defendant “retroactively reinstat[ed] her AFGE membership after Ms. Galle was two years late in paying her AFGE dues, ” but did not do the same for Hudson. Id. He argues that this treatment violates “Article III, Section 1(a) of the AFGE Constitution, the LMRA, the LMRDA, and the federal and District of Columbia civil right statutes.” Id.
The problems with Plaintiff's position are manifold. First, we are never told even what sections of the LMRDA or LMRA are violated by AFGE's purported actions. To succeed on such claims certainly requires more. Second, while the cited section of the AFGE Constitution does indeed prohibit race discrimination in membership eligibility, Hudson does not explain through what statutory vehicle such claim could be enforced. Third, to the extent that this is a straight civil-rights claim - e.g., under Title VII or the D.C. Human Rights Act - the facts alleged are too thin. In other words, all we know is that Galle is White and that she was retroactively reinstated, while he is Black and was not. There is no evidence that these results was in fact based on race, as opposed to myriad other possible reasons. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) () (emphasis added). That she is White and he is Black, standing alone, does not suffice. This is particularly so at the preliminary-injunction stage, where the Court is not required to accept Plaintiff's allegations as true.
While Hudson contends in his Reply that he has evidence that race discrimination was the basis for the disparate treatment of himself and Galle, see ECF No. 22 (Reply) at 5-6, 16-17, that is plainly an overstatement. First, he...
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