Hudson v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co.

Citation152 Ky. 711,154 S.W. 47
PartiesHUDSON v. CINCINNATI, N. O. & T. P. RY. CO.
Decision Date11 March 1913
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pulaski County.

Action by William Hudson against the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Emmet Puryear and Robert Harding, both of Danville, and R. A Jackson, of Somerset, for appellant.

O. H Waddle & Sons, of Somerset, and John Galvin, of Cincinnati Ohio, for appellee.

LASSING J.

Prior to June 28, 1907, William Hudson was in the employ of the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company on its Chattanooga division as an engineman. Upon that day he was discharged for an infraction of the rules of the company. On September 1, 1911, he brought suit against the company for $2,000, the alleged value of time lost by him during the period between the date of his discharge and December 1 1908, charging that said sum was due him from the defendant because of its breach of a contract entered into by and between the defendant and the Order of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of which plaintiff was a member in good standing. The particular covenant upon which he bases his cause of action is as follows: "In case an engineman believes his suspension or discharge unjust he shall within ten days appeal to the superintendent by letter, and, if found to have been unjustly suspended or dismissed, he shall be reinstated and paid for all time lost. The proper officers of the company will at all times listen to any complaint that enginemen as a body or individually may wish to present, and under ordinary circumstances make prompt decision in regard thereto." It is charged by plaintiff that his discharge was unjust; that he, within 10 days thereafter, by letter appealed to the superintendent of defendant, his superior, for an investigation of the charges against him, offering therein to submit to said officer proof of his innocence of the charges and asked for a reinstatement, but that said officer refused to make known the result of his investigations or to reinstate plaintiff. A demurrer to this petition was sustained. In an amended petition plaintiff set out in full the contract alleged in his petition, averring that it was duly executed and delivered by the defendant company and by the duly authorized officers and agents of said Order of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. It is also alleged that "each and every member of the Order of Railroad Enginemen, and this plaintiff, was by said contract required to render to the defendant service as engineman under the terms and conditions set forth in said contract, and at the prices therein specified for two years from December 1, 1906, unless, by notice as in said contract provided, change was made, which notice was not given or change made." The contract referred to contains, first, a list of stations on the Chattanooga Division of defendant's railway and the rates of pay of enginemen for trips between such stations in the yards and on work trains. Then, under the caption of "Rates of Pay and Regulations," follow 34 articles. All deal with rates of pay, hours of work, seniority in service, computation of time and overtime, disputes as to time, tests of hearing and eyesight, and other minor details incident to the operation of engines, except article 21, relating to suspension and reinstatement, which had been quoted herein above, and article 34, which is as follows: "These rules and regulations will be in effect 2 years from date unless 30 days' notice is given by either party of any contemplated changes." A demurrer to the petition, as amended, was sustained. Plaintiff, declining to plead further and his petition having been dismissed, appeals.

For appellant, it is insisted, first, that the officers of the union, of which he was a member, in making the contract in question, acted as the agent of all its members; and, second, under said agreement, and particularly under article 34 thereof, the members of said union obligated themselves to work for the railway company, and the railway company bound itself to employ them, for the period beginning December 1, 1906, and ending two years thereafter, under the terms and conditions set forth in the other provisions of said contract. However, in one of the briefs filed on behalf of appellant this contention is abandoned to an extent, and it is insisted that only those members of said union, who accepted employment under this contract, undertook to work for a period of two years from December 1, 1906, upon the terms and conditions and for the wages therein provided. On the other hand, it is argued for appellee that individual members of a labor union are not bound by contracts between the union and employers, unless such agreements are ratified by them as individuals; that the contract is void for want of mutuality of obligation, as between it and appellant; that the effect of said agreement was merely to fix the rates of pay and regulations by which enginemen employed by it were to be compensated and governed during their employment within the period therein designated; that, if said agreement is a contract of employment, the term of service is indefinite and either party could at any time terminate it without cause; and that, under the terms of said agreement, the determination by its superintendent that the discharge of appellant was just is conclusive, and no cause of action arises upon an alleged wrongful decision of said officer.

The allegation relied upon to establish agency of appellant on the part of the officers in the execution of said agreement is that the contract "was duly signed and executed and delivered by the duly authorized officers and agents of the defendant company and said Order of Railroad Enginemen." If they were the agents of appellant, it is to be inferred only from the fact that appellant was a member of the organization, the agents of which they are admitted to be. Appellant has failed to enlighten us, by averment, as to the objects of the union, of which he was a member, as contained in its charter, if a corporation, or in its constitution, if it is an association, or whether the officers referred to were the agents of a local or general union. However, the court knows as a part of the history of the times that the Order of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and unions engaged in like efforts, are associations of craftsmen having for their objects improved working conditions, and resisting, in concert, the unjust exactions of capital. Their purposes are social, not commercial. Permanent improved labor conditions, not temporary contractual relations between individuals and employers, are the commendable objects with which they are engrossed. A labor union, as such, engages in no business enterprise. It has not the power, and does not undertake, to supply employers with workmen. It does...

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  • Earle v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 3.
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    ...entered or continued in the service of such employer with knowledge of its existence. See, also, Hudson v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47, 45 L.R.A., N.S., 184, Ann.Cas. 1915B, It is therefore a mistake to view this suit as one based upon the agreement between th......
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    ... ... Webb, 64 F.2d 902; ... Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Moore, 112 F.2d 959; Hudson ... v. Cin. & L.C. Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47. (4) ... These ... was a "borrowed" man and made no protest until ... after November 1, 1937. (3) Appellant has twice ... ...
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