Hudson v. City of Chicago

Citation374 F.3d 554
Decision Date06 July 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-2690.,03-2690.
PartiesWilliam HUDSON and Bishop Pamon, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Joseph V. Roddy (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Kerrie Maloney Laytin (argued), Office of the Corporation Counsel, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs William Hudson and Bishop Pamon, former police officers with the Chicago Police Department, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Chicago. Hudson and Pamon claim that when the Department terminated their employment pursuant to an "absent without permission" ("AWOP") policy, the City (through the Department) failed to provide them with due process of law. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, and we affirm.

I. History

As officers in the police department whose "appointment[s] ha[d] become complete," Hudson and Pamon could only be fired "for cause." See 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-1-18.1 (2001); Chicago, Ill., Code § 2-84-030 (2001). At all times relevant to this case, a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") governed the employment relationship of police officers and the City. All officers receive a copy of the CBA.

Under article 23, section 23.1(D) of the CBA, the employment relationship between a police officer and the Department is terminated if the officer is AWOP for four consecutive days. The commanding officer of the AWOP officer's unit submits a form, known as a Personnel Action Request ("PAR"), along with any accompanying documentation, to the personnel division, specifying the days the officer was absent and requesting termination. Once personnel receives this information, an administrative sergeant calls the officer's district to confirm that the officer was indeed AWOP for four days. The commanding officer in personnel then signs off on the termination. Finally, the personnel department sends a letter to the AWOP officer; the letter purports to accept the "resignation" of the officer.

The CBA does not formally afford an officer a pre-termination hearing to contest a termination under the AWOP policy because the Department considers a four-day AWOP violation to constitute job abandonment. However, the City asserts that, in practice, the Department allows an officer an opportunity to be heard on an AWOP termination before a final decision is made. The CBA does contain extensive provisions that detail a post-deprivation grievance procedure for disputes between the parties concerning interpretation or application of the CBA.

If an officer must miss work for any reason, Department policy demands that the officer account for his or her whereabouts. An officer may use accrued personal time to be paid for missed days. If the officer does not have any personal time accrued, the officer must either provide daily notice to the district timekeeper of the reason he or she is not at work, or apply for and obtain an unpaid leave of absence (thus obviating the need to call in each day).1 In two unrelated incidents, Hudson and Pamon were, according to the city, AWOP for at least four days. They were subsequently fired.

After contesting these terminations with the Department (as described in detail below), Hudson and Pamon eventually filed suit against the City. The district court, finding that both men had been afforded all the process they were constitutionally due, granted summary judgment to the City.

A. Hudson

In the autumn of 2000, Hudson worked out of the Department's 18th District. After an early October incident involving allegations of domestic violence, the Department placed Hudson on paid leave pending an investigation. Before this investigation concluded, however, Hudson was arrested for domestic battery on January 26, 2001. As a condition of his release on bond, Hudson was not allowed to use or possess any firearms.2

On February 2, 2001, Hudson met with Sergeant Raymond Gawne at the Department's personnel division. Because Department policy requires officers to carry firearms, and Hudson no longer could as a condition of his release, Hudson's police powers were suspended and he was placed on no-pay status. Gawne told Hudson that he needed to call his district every day to inform them of his status. Hudson understood he could continue to receive paychecks if he used his accumulated personal time until it was exhausted; to do so, he had to call in each day to his district and inform them what type of personal time he wished to use that day.3

After meeting with Gawne, Hudson called the district timekeeper each day to apply his personal time to his work schedule. On March 18, 2001, Hudson exhausted all of his personal time. Unsure what to do, Hudson asked the district timekeeper for advice. The district timekeeper, also unaware of the proper procedures, referred Hudson to the watch commander; he, in turn, referred Hudson to the district commander, Commander Griffin. Hudson scheduled a meeting with Griffin through Griffin's secretary but failed to contact the commander by telephone or inquire elsewhere about what to do (it does not appear that Hudson and Griffin met before Hudson received his termination letter). On March 19, 20, 21, and 22, Hudson did not call in to account for his absence, nor did he apply for an unpaid leave of absence, the two options available to him under Department policy to avoid being considered AWOP. Hudson attributes this failure to ignorance; the procedures are not provided in the CBA, and Hudson denies that Gawne informed him of his options at their meeting.

After recognizing Hudson's AWOP status, the 18th District compiled, in accordance with Department policy, PAR forms detailing each day Hudson was AWOP. Griffin submitted the PAR forms and a memorandum to the personnel division. After Gawne processed the forms, he obtained a signed letter from Commander Powers, the head of the personnel division, and sent this letter to Hudson some time after March 22, 2001. The letter informed Hudson that he was in violation of the AWOP policy and that the Department accepted his "resignation" effective March 22.

Upon receiving the termination letter, Hudson contacted Gawne and insisted that a mistake had been made. Gawne suggested that Hudson should contact his commander, Griffin, and explain why the termination was a mistake. Griffin requested a memorandum from Hudson, which Hudson submitted on April 11, 2001. In it, Hudson claimed he was not aware of the Department policy that required him to request a leave of absence or call his timekeeper every day to explain his absence after his personal time was exhausted. Hudson requested a hearing or an evaluation of the incident. The Department reviewed this memorandum; on June 8, 2001, Commander Powers sent Hudson a letter indicating that the Department would not change its decision. The letter offered Hudson the opportunity to submit any additional information he wished. Instead, Hudson hired an attorney. The attorney requested that the Department reinstate Hudson; that request was declined. Hudson testified that he contacted the Union, but it refused to file a grievance on his behalf. Hudson filed suit against the City on February 15, 2002.

B. Pamon

In 2001, Pamon worked at the Department's 21st District. In the fall of 2001, Pamon began to plan an extended leave from the Department. Using his twenty-five days of authorized furlough, Pamon, on November 16, requested off for the month of January 2002. In addition, Pamon planned to submit a request for a "furlough extension" through February 26; officers may use any accumulated personal time to extend their leave with the approval of supervisors. On the last day of work before Pamon started his furlough, December 28, 2001, he requested the furlough extension by placing his request sheet and time slips in his supervising sergeant's in-basket.

Although the Department had never rejected Pamon's furlough-extension requests in the past, Pamon's watch commander, Captain Eugene Roy, denied Pamon's February furlough extension. He did so because Pamon had failed to comply with Department procedures for obtaining the extension — Pamon had placed it in a basket rather than discussing the matter personally with a watch commander (Roy had been on furlough himself until January 1, but Pamon should have talked to one of his replacements). Roy attempted to contact Pamon by telephone throughout the month of January. He also tried to inform Pamon that his furlough was denied by issuing a January 28 letter to Pamon's address of record. Finally, Roy added a note to Pamon's February 1 paycheck, requesting Pamon contact him. Despite personally picking up the check and seeing the note, Pamon did not contact Roy or otherwise inquire into his furlough status.

After Pamon's approved furlough ended on February 1, his unit continued to attempt to determine Pamon's where-abouts. Unable to find or communicate with him, the watch commander finally ordered that Pamon be noted as AWOP on February 13. Pamon failed to go to work or give notice to his district on February 13, 14, 15, and 19. The 21st District filled out PAR forms and sent them to the personnel division.

Pamon finally contacted Captain Roy on February 25, 2002. Roy, Pamon, and the desk sergeant met the next day. Pamon explained why he had taken the extended time and why he was out of contact — he had been traveling back and forth to the South to care for sick friends. Pamon expressed his desire to keep his job at this meeting. Shortly thereafter, however, Commander Powers sent Pamon a letter advising him that his employment was being terminated because of his unauthorized absence. Pamon met with Jim O'Leary, an officer of the Union; O'Leary explained that the Union would not...

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