Hudson v. Godowns

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BARNES
• Citation: Hudson v. Godowns, 320 Ga.App. 157, 739 S.E.2d 462 (Ga. App. 2013)
• Decision Date: 07 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. A12A2363.,A12A2363.
• Parties: HUDSON v. GODOWNS, et al.

320 Ga.App. 157

739 S.E.2d 462

HUDSON

v.GODOWNS, et al.

No. A12A2363.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 7, 2013.

Michael James Moses, Louisville, Walter C. McMillan Jr., for Appellant.

Dalton David Dowdy, Spivey, Carlton & Edenield, J. Franklin Edenfield, Swainsboro, for Appellees.

BARNES, Presiding Judge.

Following a bench trial, Brenda M. Hudson appeals the final order and judgment in this boundary line and trespass case. She contends that the trial court erred in finding an ambiguity in the parties' initial settlement agreement, that the court's order accepting the agreement was final and could not be modified outside that term of court in which it had been entered, and that the court erred in its factual determination of where the boundary line was located. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order.

Hudson filed a complaint against neighboring property owners Ricky Godowns and Belinda Sheram (collectively, “Godowns”), seeking an injunction and to have the boundary line between the properties established. She contended that Godowns had trespassed on her land and removed timber, for which she sought damages, and had been stubbornly litigious. After Godowns was served, the parties appeared in court for a hearing on the injunction and reached an apparent agreement, stipulating certain facts in open court that were reduced to a written order (the “Stipulated Order”). The parties agreed that the boundary line between their properties was as depicted on a certain plat, and Godowns renounced any claim to land south of the line “with bearing of N 69 degrees 07 minutes 05 seconds E on the plat.” The parties also agreed to each appoint a registered forester to determine if Godowns had cut any trees on Hudson's land, and if so, their monetary value. If the foresters disagreed on the value of the trees, the trial court without a jury would determine damages and the issue of litigation costs.

At a subsequent hearing scheduled to determine damages, it became clear that, despite the purported settlement, “the parties had a major disagreement as to the location of the property line,” as the trial court found. Hudson thought the line would be as shown on the plat between two points marked by “rebar found,” while Godowns thought the line would be started at one of those points but then follow the bearing on the plat to a different endpoint. In an order, the trial court found that the agreement embodied by the Stipulated Order could be interpreted two ways, and that parol evidence “clearly demonstrate[d] that there was no meeting of the minds and therefore no binding or enforceable agreement” (“the Rescinding Order”). Instead, the parties were “left where they began, with no agreement and a dispute as to the location of the property line along with all other issues[.]”

Hudson has challenged the trial court's Rescinding Order multiple times, in an unsuccessful application for interlocutory appeal to this court in opposition to Godowns' motion to open default, in a motion for summary judgment, in a motion titled “Plaintiff's Request of a Court Ruling on a Jury Resolution of Extrinsic Evidence,” and in a “motion to set aside judgment” under OCGA § 9–11–60(b), (d)(1). In separate, detailed orders, the trial court denied each motion, noting finally that Hudson had expended many resources arguing the same issue on multiple grounds.

After the parties waived their right to a jury trial, the trial court held a bench trial and the parties presented extensive testimony about the disputed boundary line. The court reviewed the evidence, made findings of fact, and concluded that the boundary line was located where Godowns thought it was. It also found that Godowns' surveyor had trespassed onto Hudson's land and awarded her $1 in nominal damages. Finally, the court awarded no attorney fees or costs, finding that each party had reasonable claims and none of them had acted in bad faith.

1. We note initially that Hudson's brief does not follow the form or sequences required by Court of Appeals Rule 25(a) and (c)(1). While she enumerates seven errors, her argument section does not follow the order of the enumeration of errors, is not correspondingly numbered, and does not address the issues in sequence. Hudson's failure to adhere to our rules has hampered our ability to ensure that all her enumerations are addressed, but “to the extent that we are able to discern which of the enumerations are supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument, we will address those enumerations.” John Crane, Inc. v. Wommack, 227 Ga.App. 538(1), 489 S.E.2d 527 (1997).

2. Hudson essentially argues that the Stipulated Order accepting the parties' agreement was final and could not be modified outside that term of court. An order adjudicating fewer than all the claims is not final, however, and “is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” OCGA § 9–11–54(b). See Hubbert v. Williams, 175 Ga.App. 393, 394(1), 333 S.E.2d 425 (1985). The trial court's Stipulated Order in this case was clearly not final because damages were still to be determined, as Hudson tacitly admitted by filing an application for interlocutory appeal of that order rather than a direct appeal. Because “no final order had been entered in the matter and the case remained pending, ... the superior court had authority to reconsider the [Stipulated Order], vacate it, and order that the matter proceed to trial.” Internal Med. Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga.App. 231, 235(1), 659 S.E.2d 668 (2008).

3. Hudson argues that the trial court erred in finding an ambiguity in the parties' initial...