Hudson v. Hudson

Decision Date28 February 2014
Docket Number2120884.
Citation178 So.3d 861
Parties Orrin C. HUDSON v. Clairerencia HUDSON.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Kenneth J. Lay of Hood & Lay, LLC, Birmingham, for appellant.

Traci Owen Vella of Vella, King & Jackson, Birmingham, for appellee.

MOORE, Judge.

Orrin C. Hudson ("the father") appeals from a judgment entered by the Shelby Circuit Court ("the trial court") addressing his petition to modify his child-support obligation and to terminate his periodic-alimony obligation. The father also appeals from that same judgment to the extent it granted relief based on the counterclaims filed by Clairerencia Hudson ("the mother"). We affirm.

Background

On September 27, 2011, the father initiated the underlying action by filing a petition to modify his child-support obligation and to terminate his periodic-alimony obligation. As grounds for that petition, the father asserted that he had become unable to work due to a disability and that two of the parties' three children had reached the age of majority. On December 13, 2011, the mother appeared pro se and answered the father's petition. On January 25, 2012, the mother, through legal counsel, filed an amended answer with counterclaims alleging that the father had violated the provisions of earlier judgments by failing to pay child support and periodic alimony, by failing to provide health insurance to cover the parties' children, by failing to reimburse the mother for uninsured medical expenses for the parties' children, and by failing to pay all expenses associated with the former marital residence. The mother requested that the trial court enter a judgment establishing the amounts the father owed to the mother and finding him in contempt.

On March 13, 2013, the trial court conducted a final hearing on the claims asserted by the father and the mother; ore tenus evidence was presented at that hearing. On April 2, 2013, the trial court entered its judgment. In its judgment, the trial court, among other things, eliminated the father's child-support obligation as to the two children who had reached the age of majority, determined that the father was voluntarily underemployed and imputed an income of $4,000 per month to him, ordered the father to pay $662 per month to support the parties' minor child, and denied the father's petition to modify his periodic-alimony obligation of $100 per month to the mother. In the same judgment, the trial court, among other things, awarded the mother $400 in past-due periodic alimony, found the father in contempt for failing to pay the health-care expenses for the parties' children and ordered him to reimburse the mother $18,185 for those expenses, and found the father in contempt for failing to pay the expenses relating to the former marital residence and ordered the father to pay the mother $107,950 to cover past unpaid household expenses and to pay $850 per month to the mother to cover the mortgage on the former marital residence until the youngest child attained the age of majority.

On May 1, 2013, the father moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its April 2, 2013, judgment. On June 5, 2013, after a hearing, the trial court denied that motion. The father timely filed his notice of appeal.

Discussion
I. Imputed Income

We first address the father's argument that the trial court erred in imputing income to him for child-support purposes. The father contends that, because an administrative law judge determined that he was disabled and awarded him Social Security benefits in the amount of $710 per month,1 the trial court erred in finding him voluntarily underemployed and in imputing to him an income of $4,000 per month.

The father contends that, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1, and applicable Social Security regulations, the trial court was bound by the findings of the Social Security Administration regarding his ability to earn wages. The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires each state to give a judgment entered in judicial proceedings in another state the same effect as the judgment would receive in the state in which it was entered.See Camp v. Kenney, 673 So.2d 436, 438 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). In this case, the evidence indicates that the Social Security Administration, a federal agency, determined that the father was entitled to Supplemental Security income benefits ("SSI benefits") as of January 2012.2 The father has failed to explain how the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to a determination of a federal agency and how application of that clause foreclosed the trial court from imputing income to him. " Rule 28(a)(10) [, Ala. R.App. P.,] requires that arguments in briefs contain discussions of facts and relevant legal authorities that support the party's position. If they do not, the arguments are waived." White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So.2d 1042, 1058 (Ala.2008) ; see also Bishop v. Robinson, 516 So.2d 723, 724 (Ala.Civ.App.1987) (quoting Thoman Eng'g, Inc. v. McDonald, 57 Ala.App. 287, 290, 328 So.2d 293, 294 (Civ.App.1976) ) (noting that an appellant should "present his issues ‘with clarity and without ambiguity’ " and "fully express his position on the enumerated issues" in the argument section of his brief); accord United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) ("It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.").

The father also argues that the imputation of income to him will adversely affect his eligibility for Social Security disability benefits.3 The father notes that federal regulations mandate a reduction in a recipient's disability benefits for excess earnings and asserts that the most he can earn without impacting his disability award is $1,039 per month.4 The father essentially maintains that the trial court could not impute additional monthly income to him above $1,039 without committing reversible error. The father has not presented this court with any legal authority to support the proposition that the imputation of income by a state court would actually affect eligibility for federal SSI benefits or reduce the amount of SSI benefits available to that recipient. More pointedly, the father has not directed this court to any legal authority preventing a state court from imputing income to a recipient of SSI benefits in an amount beyond $1,039. Hence, we consider those arguments waived under Rule 28(a)(10). See also Galloway v. Ozark Striping, Inc., 26 So.3d 413, 423 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (" ‘It is neither the duty nor the function of an appellate court to perform a party's legal research.’ " (quoting Sullivan v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 656 So.2d 1233, 1234 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) )).

The father also cursorily argues that the trial court imputed income to him of $4,000 a month "despite his presentation of undisputed evidence of his disability, and a complete lack of evidence regarding earning potential presented by [the mother]."

"In cases of voluntary underemployment, the amount of income to be imputed to the parent is a question of fact to be decided based on the evidence presented to the trial court. See G.B. v. J.H., [915 So.2d 570 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) ]; see also Clements v. Clements, 990 So.2d 383, 394 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (quoting Winfrey v. Winfrey , 602 So.2d 904, 905 (Ala.Civ.App.1992) ) (‘The trial court is afforded the discretion to impute income to a parent for the purpose of determining child support, and the determination that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed "is to be made from the facts presented according to the judicial discretion of the trial court."). We may reverse a judgment imputing income to a voluntarily underemployed parent that is based on ore tenus evidence only if that judgment is so unsupported by the evidence as to be plainly and palpably wrong. G.B. v. J.H., 915 So.2d at 575."

Stone v. Stone, 26 So.3d 1228, 1231 (Ala.Civ.App.2009).

The father testified that three doctors had diagnosed him with bipolar disorder, which, although he was in therapy, prevented him from working. The father testified that, in June 2012, he had been awarded Social Security disability benefits retroactive to January 2012 and that he was unemployed. Before that time, he had worked as the principal officer in Be Someone, a nonprofit corporation dedicated to teaching at-risk youth how to resolve their problems nonviolently, mainly through applying principles used in playing chess. According to the father, before his disability, his second wife had primarily paid the couple's living expenses while he tried to run Be Someone from their home because the organization had not been receiving adequate donations since at least 2008.

In its judgment, the trial court noted that the father

"presents as a currently unsuccessful, self-employed entrepreneur who has fallen on difficult times, and now suffers from debilitating depression and mental stress, which renders him too fragile to be gainfully employed."

However, the trial court did not accept that portrayal. The trial court described the father as a "voluntary underemployed, self-pitying malingerer." The trial court stated that, in 2000, it had concluded that the father was voluntarily underemployed and was capable of earning $4,000 per month and that no material change of circumstances had occurred to alter that determination.

From those statements, as well as the tenor of the overall judgment, it is apparent that, from its direct observations of the father, the trial court concluded that he was not emotionally disabled from working despite any contrary finding of the Social Security Administration.5 Besides observing the father, the trial court heard testimony, although somewhat disputed, that the father continued to work "sporadically" for Be Someone, that he had authored multiple books, that ...

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