Hudson v. McClaskey, 82A04-9402-CV-74
| Decision Date | 11 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 82A04-9402-CV-74,82A04-9402-CV-74 |
| Citation | 641 N.E.2d 36 |
| Parties | M.R. HUDSON, Mary Hudson, Vandegrift and A.B. Hudson, Appellants, v. Marvin Randall McCLASKEY, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
F. Wesley Bowers, David E. Gray, Cedric Hustace, Bowers, Harrison, Kent & Miller, Evansville, for appellants.
Jack N. Van Stone, Evansville, for appellee.
Defendants-Appellants M.R. Hudson, Mary Hudson Vandegrift, and A.B. Hudson (collectively below, Hudson) appeal an award of damages and costs in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Marvin Randall McClaskey (McClaskey).
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Hudson presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing witness Shaffer to testify as an expert on valuation of land.
2. Whether the damage award to McClaskey was proper.
3. Whether the trial court erred in awarding costs of defense, in the form of attorney and engineering fees, to McClaskey.
4. Whether the trial court erred in compounding interest on the damage award.
McClaskey raises the following issue on cross-appeal:
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's award of a set-off to Hudson.
On December 21, 1984, Hudson conveyed a 41.83 acre parcel of property to McClaskey by warranty deed. Prior to this conveyance, the State of Indiana had acquired an easement over 8.59 acres of this real estate. The warranty deed McClaskey received, however, did not reveal the existence of the State's easement.
In November of 1986, pursuant to a project to widen U.S. 41, the State initiated condemnation proceedings against McClaskey seeking to appropriate that portion of McClaskey's real estate which abutted the highway. McClaskey attempted to defend the State's action on the basis that the easement was invalid. He also filed a cross-complaint against Hudson for breach of warranty.
The trial court held the easement was valid and also entered summary judgment in favor of Hudson. The summary judgment was appealed and reversed. See McClaskey v. Bumb and Mueller Farms, Inc. (1989), Ind.App., 547 N.E.2d 302. The cause was then remanded to the trial court to determine what remedy McClaskey should receive as a result of the breach of warranty. The trial court's judgment on this issue ultimately reached our supreme court. In Hudson v. McClaskey (1992), Ind., 597 N.E.2d 308, 309, the supreme court affirmed this court's finding that rescission was not a proper remedy. The court then remanded to the trial court with directions "to conduct a hearing to determine all proper damages to be awarded [McClaskey] resulting from [Hudson's] breach of warranty." Id.
A hearing was held on the issue of damages. Following the hearing, the trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
1. The Court of Appeals has previously decided the issue of liability in favor of McClaskey and against the Hudsons.
2. The fair market value of the Real Estate which is the subject matter of this litigation on December 21, 1984, without an easement, was $80,000.
3. The fair market value of the Real Estate which is the subject matter of this litigation on December 21, 1984, with an easement, was $20,000.
4. The Diminution of Value of the real estate by reason of the Breach of Warranty is $60,000.
5. At the time of the purchase and sale of the property, McClaskey executed a mortgage to the Hudsons ... which mortgage bears interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum.
6. Ten percent (10%) per annum is the statutory interest to be applied to McClaskey's recovery in this case.
7. Interest on $60,000 is to be computed from December 21, 1984, until satisfaction.
8. George Barnett, Sr. gave notice to the Hudsons on December 12, 1985, that the State of Indiana was claiming an easement and if the State would be successful, McClaskey would demand damages for Breach of Warranty.
9. The Hudsons were parties to this lawsuit from the beginning and therefore had notice that the State was claiming title to the easement.
10. McClaskey retained Barnett & Barnett, attorneys, and Jack N. VanStone, attorney, to represent him in defending his title.
11. Barnett & Barnett and Jack N. VanStone charged McClaskey $12,061.92 attorney fees for defending his title.
12. $12,061.92 is a reasonable fee for the services rendered to McClaskey by Barnett & Barnett and Jack N. VanStone defending his title in this cause.
13. McClaskey incurred engineering expenses in the process of defending his title in this case in the amount of $2,699.00.
14. The total cost of defending title, including attorneys fees and engineering costs incurred and paid by McClaskey was $14,760.92.
15. The statutory interest on the total cost of defending title shall be ten percent (10%) per annum.
16. At the time of the filing of the Cross-Claim for foreclosure by the Hudsons against McClaskey, McClaskey was not in default of his mortgage nor has he been thereafter.
17. McClaskey is entitled to judgment on the Cross-Claim of foreclosure.
18. The Hudsons are entitled to recover on the set-off of the note and mortgage given by McClaskey for the purchase of the property.
19. To the extent any Finding of Fact may be construed as a Conclusion of Law, such is/are incorporated into the Court's Conclusions of Law.
1. The Court of Appeals has previously decided the issue of liability in favor of McClaskey and against the Hudsons.
2. McClaskey is entitled to recover damages for Breach of Warranty of Title in the amount of $60,000 with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum from December 21, 1984, in the amount of $85,760.11 until satisfaction.
3. McClaskey is entitled to recover the total cost of defending title of $14,760.92 with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum from the date the expenses were paid in the amount of $12,965.33 until satisfaction.
4. McClaskey is entitled to judgment on the cross-claim of foreclosure.
5. The Hudsons are entitled to recover on the set-off of the note and mortgage given by McClaskey for the purchase of the property.
6. To the extent any Conclusion of Law may be construed as a Finding of Fact, such is/are hereby incorporated into the Court's Findings of Fact.
JUDGMENTIT IS THEREFORE ... ordered .. that McClaskey recover from [the Hudsons'] judgment in the amount of $173,486.36 with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of this Judgment until satisfaction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ... that [the Hudsons] recover on the set-off of the note and mortgage given by McClaskey for the purchase of the property.
* * * * * *
(R. 42-45).
On appeal, this court affords special findings a two-tier standard of review. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Porter County Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bolde (1988), Ind.App., 530 N.E.2d 1212, 1215, reh'g denied. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed if this court concludes that the special findings support the judgment and are not clearly erroneous. ITT Industrial Credit Co. v. R.T.M. Development Co., Inc. (1987), Ind.App., 512 N.E.2d 201, 203; Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). A judgment is clearly erroneous where a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Porter County, 530 N.E.2d at 1215.
In reviewing the court's findings, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. We consider only the evidence in the record which supports the judgment along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. We will disturb the trial court's findings only if the record is devoid of facts or inferences to support the findings. Moody v. Moody (1991), Ind.App., 565 N.E.2d 388, 390.
Hudson contends the trial court erred in allowing Lee Shaffer to testify as an expert on the value of the property. Hudson argues that Shaffer's lack of formal training in appraisal of property should have disqualified him from "expert" status.
The competency of a witness to testify as an expert is a matter for the trial court to determine and is subject to its discretion. Hegerfeld v. Hegerfeld (1990), Ind.App., 555 N.E.2d 853, 855. Competency to testify is "to be determined by [the witness'] knowledge of the subject matter generally, whereas his knowledge of the specific subject of the inquiry goes to the weight to be accorded to his opinion." Martin v. Roberts (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 896, 901 (quoting Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349, 365). Simply stated, the witness is competent if he has "sufficient skill and knowledge in the field to aid the trier of fact in its search for the truth." Id. (quoting Underhill v. Deen (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 1136, 1139).
In the present case, Shaffer testified that he was an Auctioneer, Real Estate Broker, and Appraiser with Kurtz Auction and Realty Company. He further testified that he had taken a number of appraisal courses and had experience as an agent buying and selling real estate. Shaffer's work experience, coupled with his more formal training, was sufficient to aid the trier of fact in determining the value of the property in question. Accordingly, the trial court was justified in admitting his testimony as an expert and there was no abuse of discretion in doing so.
McClaskey presented three witnesses on the issue of the diminution of the value of the land. Frederick Bumb, a farmer who had farmed the land for thirty-one years, testified that only eighteen acres of the land was suitable for farming because of lack of drainage. He further testified that the farm land was worth $1000.00 per acre. He...
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