Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 95-1253
| Decision Date | 01 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-1253,95-1253 |
| Citation | 87 F.3d 1167 |
| Parties | , 5 A.D. Cases 1099, 17 A.D.D. 1126, 8 NDLR P 158 April L. HUDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP., Defendant-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Robert C. Ozer of Ozer, Ruppert & Ozer, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
John R. Webb of Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado (Edwin P. Aro of Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado, and William L. Kasley of MCI Telecommunications Corp., San Francisco, California, with him, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.
Before BALDOCK, BRISCOE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover for her termination by defendant, alleging that defendant's actions violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The district court granted summary judgment to defendant. The court held that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that she was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation by her employer. Because the accommodation plaintiff urges, unpaid leave of indefinite duration, does not constitute a "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA, we affirm.
Plaintiff April Hudson worked for defendant MCI Telecommunications from January 6, 1993, until May 24, 1994. As a customer service representative, Hudson's duties included answering customer phone calls and placing phone calls to current and potential MCI customers. These duties required Hudson to spend approximately six hours per day on the phone and at the computer keyboard. Although her performance and sales statistics were exemplary, Hudson had a history of attendance problems at MCI.
On March 22, 1994, Hudson complained to her supervisor that she was experiencing pain in her hands and arms. She was subsequently diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. In response to her initial complaint, Hudson's treating physician issued restrictions providing that she was to take fifteen minutes off for each hour of repetitive, digital activity. On April 13, 1994, Hudson's physician issued new restrictions prohibiting all typing and keyboard activity. From April 13, 1994, until the date of her termination, Hudson continued to work, coaching other customer service representatives and performing a variety of office and clerical tasks that did not involve typing or keyboard activity.
On May 24, 1994, after first being suspended for tardiness, Hudson was terminated. In July, two months after her termination by defendant, Hudson underwent nerve decompression surgery. In October, she was released from her physician's care with no specific work restrictions.
In September 1994, Hudson sued MCI, alleging discrimination and harassment in violation of the ADA. MCI moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hudson was neither disabled nor qualified under the ADA. The district court granted MCI's motion, holding that Hudson had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether she was qualified for her position at MCI. In making its decision, the trial court assumed that Hudson was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Hudson appeals.
The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, [or] the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to maintain a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she is qualified; and (3) that the employer terminated her because of her disability. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir.1995).
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to defendant on the grounds that she failed to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning her status as a qualified individual under the ADA. This court has adopted a two-part analysis for determining whether a disabled individual is qualified under the ADA:
First, we must determine whether the individual could perform the essential functions of the job, i.e., functions that bear more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue. Second, if (but only if) we conclude that the individual is not able to perform the essential functions of the job, we must determine whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable him to perform those functions.
White, 45 F.3d at 361-62 (quoting Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393-94 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1386, 128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994)). Examples of...
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