Hudson v. Owens

• Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
• Writing for the Court: REED
• Citation: Hudson v. Owens, 439 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1969)
• Decision Date: 28 February 1969
• Parties: Dorothy HUDSON, Widow and Admrx., etc., Appellant, v. Charles C. OWENS, dba, etc., Appellees.

Page 565

439 S.W.2d 565

Dorothy HUDSON, Widow and Admrx., etc., Appellant, v. Charles C. OWENS, dba, etc., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 28, 1969.

J. David Francis, Whayne C. Priest, Jr., Bowling Green, for appellant.

Harold D. Ricketts, Harlin, Parker, Ricketts, Lucas & English, Bowling Green, J. Keller Whitaker, Workmen's Compensation Bd., Frankfort, for appellees.

REED, Judge.

Estell Hudson's widow claimed death benefits under the workmen's compensation law by reason of his death from a heart attack. The Workmen's Compensation Board ruled that the death was noncompensable because it found that the attack did not arise from the employment. The circuit court affirmed the board's decision. The widow has appealed here.

Hudson was the manager of a cut-rate gasoline station. He was paid $1.00 an hour plus a percentage on the gasoline and oil sold. His duties consisted of pumping gasoline and selling oil. The station did not change oil or perform repairs. He was supposed to keep the station open for sixteen hours, Monday through Saturday, and twelve hours on Sunday. He had authority to hire other employees to assist in the work at his discretion. He normally worked eight hours a day and hired another man to work the additional eight hours for a period of several years. On Saturday, October 10, 1964, his assistant was injured. For the next eleven days Hudson worked both shifts, or sixteen hours a day, except for Sundays when he worked twelve hours a day. On October 21, he found someone to work six hours a day and after that he worked ten and one-half hours a day.

On October 26, Hudson was not feeling well and went to a doctor who told him he should go into the hospital immediately because of a serious heart condition. Hudson refused to take this advice, giving as his reason that he had to keep the station open. He went back to the doctor on October 28 and received the same medical advice. He persisted in his refusal to obey the advice. On October 30, two hours after he went to work, be became ill and was taken to a hospital emergency room where he suffered the fatal heart attack which gave rise to this litigation.

Hudson had a known prior heart ailment and had changed from heavy construction work to lighter service station work because of this heart condition. However, the testimony of his attending physicians indicates that his heart condition, a result of childhood rheumatic fever, was reasonably stable prior to the current and culminating episode. Dr. Scott, testifying in behalf of appellant, stated that the cause of death was a cardiac arrythemia; that Hudson should not have been working in any type of employment and that the employment he was pursuing at the time of his death contributed to the heart attack. Dr. Martin, also testifying in behalf of appellant, stated that in his opinion Hudson's work contributed to the attack. It was Dr. Martin's further testimony that Hudson should not have been working becuase he was too sick to be working. As a matter of fact, the doctor testified that Hudson shouldn't even have walked up the steps to a hospital bed. He should have been carried, as his condition was that serious. Dr. Rutledge, introduced by appellee, testified Hudson's condition necessitated reduced activity and rest and that any increased activity would have demanded a greater response by the decedent's heart and could have contributed to his death.

The board found from the evidence that the heart attack was caused by the natural progress of Hudson's pre-existing heart disease. It found that the serious illness resulting from decedent's pre-existing condition began October 26, 1964, and extended over a period of days before he finally had the last seizure which resulted in his death. The board pointed out that the record was silent as to whether he was at work when he became ill on October 26. The record did disclose that on the afternoon of the 29th he was ill at the time he left work and that he was at work on October 30 when he was taken to the emergency room. The board made a specific finding that the decedent's death was not caused by his employment nor was it caused by a work-connected event. It, therefore, dismissed the claim for compensation.

Appellant relies principally upon the decisions in our cases of Grimes v. Goodlett and Adams, Ky., 345 S.W.2d 47; Young v. Eastern Coal Company, Ky., 408 S.W.2d 464; and Trailer Convoys, Inc. v. Holsclaw, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 563. She claims that the proof in the instant case requires reversing the board's findings as to causation.

This court is again faced with the problem of the compensability under our workmen's compensation law of a heart attack suffered during working hours. Furthermore, the case is made more complex by reason of the fact that the medical evidence indicates that there were two causes of death. The first and primary cause was a pre-existing diseased heart condition, and the secondary cause from a medical standpoint was stress and exertion present during the performance of employment by the deceased.

In view of the importance of the problem, the increasing prevalence of cardiac disease compensation claims, and the divergent views of respectable authorities concerning their compensability, we have concluded to re-appraise the law in this jurisdiction applicable to the situation presented.

First, considering the matter from the standpoint of general principles, we are confronted with the proposition that we are dealing with the interpretation of a statute of social legislation designed to compensate injured workmen which contains a legislative mandate that it is to be liberally construed as a matter of law in favor of the injured employee.

Secondly, the legislative intent is clearly enough expressed so as to be binding upon us that pre-existing disease is not to be used as a shield against any liability for a work-connected injury by the employer of a workman who suffers from such condition. In short, there is no statutory basis for treating pre-existing heart disease in a different category from any other form of pre-existing disease. As to resolving issues of fact, the statute vests that function in a board with judicial review restricted to a determination of whether the factual findings of the board are 'clearly erroneous.'

Although there is diversity of opinion about the matter, the majority of the court is committed to the rule as stated in Grimes v. Goodlett and Adams, Ky., 345 S.W.2d 47, and repeated in all of our cases considering the matter subsequent thereto that where the physical effort of a man's work precipitates his internal breakdown resulting in disablement, he has sustained a compensable personal injury within the meaning of our compensation law. Once a condition is accepted as a personal 'injury' it is necessarily accepted as traumatic. Therefore, we need not pursue this facet of the...