Hudson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
Decision Date | 16 April 2019 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 8:15-cv-1912-T-23JSS |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Parties | TERRY LAMAR HUDSON Applicant, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
Terry Lamar Hudson applies for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and challenges the validity of his state convictions for possessing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a park with intent to sell, possessing drug paraphernalia, and resisting officers without violence, for which convictions Hudson serves ten years imprisonment. Numerous exhibits ("Respondent's Exhibit ___") support the response. (Doc. 8) The respondent admits the application's timeliness. (Doc. 8, p. 6 n.2)
The police received an anonymous tip that Hudson was selling illegal drugs at a location in a high crime area known for drug activity. Detective James Ring andDetective Jasper Yzaguirre, both undercover and in an unmarked police vehicle, went to that location and observed Hudson standing in an intersection and obstructing traffic. The detectives saw Hudson flag down a passing vehicle and engage in a hand-to-hand exchange with an occupant of the vehicle. Next, the detectives saw Hudson engage in a hand-to-hand exchange with a passing pedestrian. Detective Ring called in canine officer Jose Bosque. When Officer Bosque approached Hudson, Hudson fled. Detective Ring and Detective Yzaguirre pursued Hudson. Detective Ring saw Hudson remove an object from his waistband and throw it. Detective Ring subdued Hudson. Officer Bosque recovered from where Hudson threw the object a clear plastic bag containing ten small bags of powder cocaine.
Hudson was arrested and charged with possessing cocaine with intent to sell within 1000 feet of a park, possessing drug paraphernalia, and resisting officers without violence. A jury convicted Hudson of the three offenses, and the judge sentenced Hudson to ten years' imprisonment for possessing cocaine and to "time served" on each of the other two convictions.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highlydeferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). See White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 427 (2014) () (citing Richter); Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) () (citing Woodall, 572 U.S. at 419). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412.
The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the state case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications inorder to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 694. A federal court must afford due deference to a state court's decision. "AEDPA prevents defendants — and federal courts — from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) () (citations omitted).
When the last state court to decide a federal claim explains its decision in a reasoned opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific reasons as stated in the opinion and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (). When the relevant state-court decision is not accompanied with reasons for the decision, the federal court "should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." Sellers, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. "[T]he State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision . . . ." Sellers, 138 S. Ct. at 1192.
In a per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate court on direct appeal affirmed Hudson's convictions and sentences. (Respondent's Exhibit 4) In another per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate court affirmed the denial of Hudson's Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. (Respondent's Exhibit 10) The state appellate court's per curiam affirmances warrant deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 (), and Bishop v. Warden, 726 F. 3d 1243, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2013) ( ).
As Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181-82, explains, review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court:
We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that "resulted in" a decision that was contrary to, or "involved" an unreasonable application of,established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court.
Hudson bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court factual determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(...
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