Hudson v. State, A19A2108
| Decision Date | 14 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | A19A2108 |
| Parties | HUDSON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Clark & Towne, for Appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Samuel R. d’Entremont, Lee F. Tittsworth, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Following a bench trial, Robert Lee Hudson was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, statutory rape, and aggravated child molestation. He appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Viewed favorably to the verdict, the evidence shows the following. See Blackwell v. State , 337 Ga. App. 173, 174, 786 S.E.2d 552 (2016). On November 30, 2015, the mother of 13-year-old D. M. reported to police that she had discovered sexually explicit social media messages exchanged between D. M. and Hudson. The police interviewed D. M., who stated that she and Hudson had met online, corresponded via social media, and engaged in both sexual intercourse and oral sex on several occasions at her home. D. M. picked Hudson’s picture out of a photographic lineup and identified him as the man with whom she had sex. After interviewing D. M. and reviewing the sexually explicit messages, the investigating officers went to the apartment complex where Hudson possibly lived and saw him walking toward an apartment that had been leased by his wife. They lost sight of Hudson and, believing that he had entered the apartment, knocked on the front door. No one responded. Instead, the officers spotted Hudson running behind the apartment building. They apprehended him after a short chase, arrested him, placed him in a patrol car, and read him his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
After receiving his Miranda warnings, Hudson made several statements to police. He initially denied any inappropriate conduct and asserted that he did not know D. M. The following conversation then occurred:
After that exchange, Hudson admitted that he and D. M. had engaged in sexual intercourse and oral sex and that he had placed his fingers inside her vagina. He insisted, however, that D. M. had told him she was 20 years old.
Prior to trial, Hudson moved to suppress his statements to police. The trial court granted the motion in part, excluding any custodial statements Hudson made before he was advised of his Miranda rights, but denied the motion as to relevant statements made after he received the Miranda warnings. The case proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated evidence, and the trial court found Hudson guilty of aggravated sexual battery, statutory rape, and aggravated child molestation. Hudson filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied, and this appeal followed.
1. Asserting that his "confession was the product of a threat," Hudson argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the incriminating statements. Before admitting evidence of a confession, a "trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances and assess whether the defendant made the statement voluntarily." Blackwell , supra at 175 (1), 786 S.E.2d 552 ; see also OCGA § 24-8-824 (). We will not reverse a trial court’s determination as to voluntariness absent clear error. See Blackwell , supra. Hudson argued below that the police coerced his confession by "saying they would throw the book at [him] if [he did not] confess[.]" The trial court rejected this claim, finding the officer’s statement to be "akin to a mere ‘truism’ or recounting of fact rather than a threat of injury that would render the statement involuntary."
We agree. "There is a material difference between a statement to a [suspect] that it would be better for him to tell the truth, and one wherein he is told that it would be better for him to make a confession." Rogers v. State , 142 Ga. App. 387, 388 (2), 236 S.E.2d 134 (1977) (citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). Mere "exhortations that [an accused] should tell the truth" do not render a confession involuntary because "no hope of benefit springs from such an admonishment." Morales v. State , 337 Ga. App. 614, 617 (2) (b), 788 S.E.2d 535 (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). Undoubtedly, the officer in this case admonished Hudson not to lie. But the officer did not tell Hudson that he would be better off if he confessed, offer Hudson any benefit in exchange for the confession, or threaten injury if Hudson refused to cooperate with the police. And "[t]elling a suspect that truthful cooperation might be considered by others does not render a statement involuntary[.]" Rogers v. State , 289 Ga. 675, 679 (3), 715 S.E.2d 68 (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted). Moreover, the officer’s statements "did not involve physical or mental torture, the hallmark of inducement by a fear of injury." Smith v. State , 295 Ga. 283, 287 (1) (b) (i), 759 S.E.2d 520 (2014). He merely warned Hudson of the consequences of lying to the police.
The totality of these circumstances authorized the trial court to conclude that Hudson confessed voluntarily. We find no error, therefore, in the trial court’s refusal to suppress the incriminating statements on voluntariness grounds. See Dozier v. State , 306 Ga. 29, 37 (4) (c), 829 S.E.2d 131 (2019) (); Smith , supra (); Blackwell , supra at 176 (1), 786 S.E.2d 552 () (citation and punctuation omitted).
2. Hudson further argues that his arrest was illegal because the arresting officers did not have an arrest warrant or probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. He thus claims that his incriminating statements, which in his view were "discovered as a result of the unlawful arrest," should have been suppressed. This claim has no merit.
To continue reading
Request your trial