Hudson v. The State

• Citation: 35 Del. 23,156 A. 881
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decision Date: 27 October 1931
• Parties: JOHN A. HUDSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Defendant in Error

156 A. 881

35 Del. 23

JOHN A. HUDSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Defendant in Error

Supreme Court of Delaware

October 27, 1931

Supreme Court of the State of Delaware.

Writ of Error to Court of General Sessions for New Castle County. Indictment in Court Below for obtaining money by false pretenses.

The defendant below was indicted for obtaining money by false pretenses by means of a forged check and was found guilty by a jury at the March Term of the Court of General Sessions 1929. A motion for a new trial and arrest of judgment was made but was subsequently withdrawn and this writ of error taken.

The material facts as disclosed by the evidence may be stated as follows:

John A Hudson, the defendant, a resident of the State of Maryland on June 8, 1927, deposited in his checking account in the People's National Bank of Princess Anne, Maryland, a check for seven hundred and fifty dollars made out to him as payee and endorsed in blank. The check in question appeared to have been drawn by Hannah Prince on her account in the Security Trust Company of Wilmington, New Castle County, Delaware, but she claimed that her signature thereto had been forged by the defendant. He denied the alleged forgery and claimed that such check had been signed by Mrs. Prince and handed by her to him at her home near Wilmington. He also testified that at the same time he had given her his note for $ 350.00, the additional amount represented by the check having been a gift by Mrs. Prince to him. One of the material facts in the case was the manner and purpose of the deposit of such check in the Maryland bank, that is to say: Whether the check was sold to that bank or deposited therein for collection. The assistant cashier of the Princess Anne bank testified that Hudson was a depositor in that bank; that on June 8, 1927, the check in question was received by that bank together with a deposit slip which contained no notation that it was deposited for collection; that it was credited to Hudson's account and he was allowed to check thereon; that such check was listed as one of the assets of the bank; that it was subsequently stamped on the back "Endorsement guaranteed" and was sent to the correspondent bank of the Princess Anne bank in Baltimore and such bank was given credit therefor by the Baltimore bank and that nothing was written on Hudson's deposit book which indicated that the check in question was received by the Princess Anne bank as an agent and merely for collection.

The assistant cashier further testified that his bank lost no money by reason of accepting the check, and that if it had not been paid and Mr. Hudson had not had enough money in his account to charge it back to him, the bank would have looked to Mr. Hudson for payment of it; and that if he had had enough money in his account, it would have been charged against him.

Ultimately, the check arrived through banking channels at the Security Trust Company in Wilmington, where it was paid.

The State produced two witnesses, detectives of the city of Wilmington, who testified that on January 26 of this year, John A. Hudson, the defendant, at the time of his arrest, admitted putting this check through in the bank at Princess Anne, Maryland, for collection. They further testified that Hudson admitted seeing the check after June 7 or 8, and going to the Security Trust and getting the canceled check later.

Seven assignments of error were filed by the defendant.

The first six assignments were all to the effect that the record showed that he had procured the money on the Prince check in the state of Maryland and that the trial court, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the case.

The seventh assignment of error was to the effect that the Court below had erred in allowing the Attorney-General and his deputy to comment to the jury on the failure of the defendant to produce character witnesses to testify on his behalf.

W. W. Knowles and W. T. Knowles for Plaintiff in Error.

Reuben Satterthwaite, Attorney-General, and Charles F. Richards, Deputy Attorney-General, for Defendant in Error.

WOLCOTT, Chancellor, PENNEWILL, C. J., RICE, RICHARDS and RODNEY, J. J., sitting.

OPINION

PENNEWILL, C. J., delivering the opinion of the Court:

The first six assignments of error refer entirely to the jurisdiction of the trial Court and it is conceded in the brief of plaintiff below, that this question of jurisdiction depends upon whether the defendant below, John A. Hudson, sold the check in question to the People's National Bank of Princess Anne, Maryland, or deposited it there for collection from the Security Trust Company in the city of Wilmington.

It is true, as contended by the plaintiff below, that whether a bank receiving from a customer a check endorsed in blank, which it places to his credit, becomes the owner of the check or a mere agent for collection, depends upon the intention of the parties. This is not disputed, but such intention must appear from the evidence.

In the case upon which the plaintiff in error relies, Fayette National Bank v. Summers, 105 Va. 689, 54 S.E. 862, 863, 7 L. R. A. (N.S.) 694, the Court said:

"The court instructs the jury that if they shall believe from the evidence that the plaintiff bank received the check * * * as a deposit to be treated as cash, and that such was the intention of the parties * * * at the time the check was received and deposited, then title to said check passed to the bank at that time. But if the jury shall believe from the evidence that the parties intended that the bank should not receive said check as cash, but only as an agent for collection, then title to said check did not vest in the bank at the time of the deposit."

This seems to be, according to the weight of authority, a correct statement of the law and where the material facts are undisputed, as they were in most of the cases cited, it becomes the duty of the trial court, under such law, to decide the question and instruct the jury accordingly.

Ordinarily, in cases of this kind, the intention of parties must be ascertained from their acts because very rarely is the intention expressed in words; and many courts have regarded certain acts as indicative of intention when a check, endorsed by a depositor, is received by the bank.

There are numerous cases cited by plaintiff in error upon this point, but particular reference will be made to only two of them.

In the leading case of Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 25 S.Ct. 243, 245, 49 L.Ed. 482, it appears from the Court's opinion that the indictment averred the receipt by the defendant of the different checks described therein at the city of St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, and the payment of the money thereon to the defendant at St. Louis, as compensation for services theretofore performed by the defendant for a certain company. It turned out on the trial that each of the checks was received by the defendant in the city of Washington, D. C., and by him there endorsed and deposited with the Riggs National Bank of that city and that they were afterwards duly paid by the Commonwealth Trust Company at St. Louis; that the amount of each was immediately credited by the Riggs National Bank to the account of the defendant with the bank, and the cashier testified that the defendant had the right, immediately after the credit was made, to draw out the whole or any part thereof, without waiting for the payment of the check at St. Louis.

In that case, the Court, after reciting the facts, continued as follows:

"There was no oral or special agreement made between the defendant and the bank at the time when any one of the checks was deposited and credit given for the amount thereof. The defendant had an account with the bank, took each check when it arrived, went to the bank, indorsed the check, which was payable to his order, and the bank took the check, placed the amount thereof to the credit of the defendant's account and nothing further was said in regard to the matter. In other words, it was the ordinary case of the transfer or sale of the check by the defendant, and the purchase of it by the bank, and upon its delivery to the bank, under the circumstances stated, the title to the check passed to the bank, and it became the owner thereof. It was in no sense the agent of the defendant for the purpose of collecting the amount of the check from the trust company upon which it was drawn. From the time of the delivery of the check by the defendant to the bank, it became the owner of the check; it could have torn it up or thrown it in the fire or made any other use or disposition of it which it chose, and no right of defendant would have been infringed. The testimony of Mr. Brice, the cashier of the Riggs National Bank, as to the custom of the bank when a check was not paid, of charging it up against the depositor's account, did not in the least vary the legal effect of the transaction; it was simply a method pursued by the bank of exacting payment from the indorser of the check, and nothing more. There was nothing whatever in the evidence showing any agreement or understanding as to the effect of the transaction between the parties,--the defendant and the bank,--making it other than such as the law would imply from the facts already stated. The forwarding of the check 'for collection,' as stated by Mr. Brice, was not a collection for defendant by the bank as his agent. It was sent forward to be paid, and the Riggs bank was its owner when sent. With reference to the jurisdiction of the court over the offense described in the sixth and following counts in the indictment, the court held that if the checks were actually received by the defendant in Washington, and the money paid to him by the...