Hudson v. White

• Decision Date: 24 October 1891
• Citation: 17 R.I. 519,23 A. 57
• Parties: HUDSON v. WHITE et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

23 A. 57

17 R.I. 519

HUDSON

v. WHITE et al.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Oct. 24, 1891.

Action in equity by Mary E. Hudson against George W. White and others to establish a resulting trust. On the hearing on bill, answer, and proofs a decree was granted in accordance with the prayer of the bill.

Charles Bradley and Walter F. Angell, for complainant.

Stephen A. Cooke, Jr., and Louis L. Angell, for respondents.

TILLINGHAST, J. This is a bill in equity brought by the complainant, as one of the children and heirs at law of Henry R. Mathewson, deceased, to establish and enforce a resulting trust in certain real estate in the town of Johnston, R. I., which, it is alleged, was purchased and paid for by said Henry R. Mathewson, but the deeds of which were taken in the name of his then wife, Marcy W. Mathewson, although, as complainant contends, in trust for himself. The bill shows that said Henry R. Mathewson was twice married; that by his first wile he had six children, of whom the complainant is one; that three of the others are still living, together with issue of the other two, who are deceased; that said Henry married, for his second wife, Marcy W. Kelly, who has deceased, leaving one child, the respondent Eleanor Rand. The bill further shows that said Henry R. Mathewson, in his life-time, purchased at different times certain tracts of land in Olneyviile, in said Johnston, paying for the same with his own money, but taking the deeds thereof, excepting those of certain interests in the Kelly homestead estate, in the name of his wife, Marcy W. Mathewson; not with the intent, however, that such real estate should belong to her absolutely, as a gift or advancement, but that she should merely hold the legal title thereof temporarily, for the benefit and under the control of said Henry R. Mathewson, for convenience in the management and for the protection of the same; that prior to said purchases said Henry went to California to engage in business, leaving his family in said Johnston; that at the time said purchases were made, he then being in business in California, he caused said real estate, with the exception of a part of the Kelly homestead, to be conveyed to his said wife in order that she might the better attend to the care and management thereof as his agent, and for his sole use and benefit, and also to protect the same from any possible attachment during his absence be then having a controversy with certain parties in Rhode Island, whose claims and demands upon him, if any they had, he was able to pay or satisfy out of other property, and which controversy was in fact afterwards settled; that it was well understood and agreed between said Henry and his said wife, at the time said conveyance were made to her, that the deeds were taken in her name with the intent and purposes aforesaid, and that, if said Henry should die while his said wife held the legal title to said estate, the same should belong to his children, precisely as though he held the legal title thereto; that in October, 1875, said Henry conveyed to his said wife all the interest which he then had in the Kelly homestead estate without any consideration, and for convenience, merely, as aforesaid. The bill further shows that said Marcy, in her life-time, frequently acknowledged and declared that she held said lands only for the reasons aforesaid; that they belonged to her husband; that these facts were well known to the respondents Edwin D. Rand and Eleanor Rand; that said Henry always treated said real estate as his own; that he deceased intestate in November, 1881; that said Marcy also deceased intestate shortly afterwards; and that the legal title to said estate thereupon devolved upon said Eleanor Rand. The bill further shows that the complainant was always permitted by her father in his lifetime to occupy a part of said estate as her home, rent free, and that, in recognition of her rights, said Marcy, and said Edwin D. and Eleanor Rand, allowed her to continue in such occupancy in the same manner, after her father's decease, and that she still occupies the same as her home. The bill further shows that said Edwin D. and Eleanor Rand, by deed of August 21, 1888, conveyed the legal title to said real estate to the respondents George W. White and Nathan B. Harris, who have executed a mortgage back to said Eleanor Rand; that prior to said conveyance the complainant gave notice in writing to said White & Harris of her interest in said property, and that they took said conveyance with full knowledge of her claim thereto; that they refused, however, to recognize her right therein, but, on the contrary, claim to be seised of the same in fee-simple, and have entered into possession thereof, and collected and received the rents and profits of the same, and refuse to account with the complainant therefor. The bill prays that said White & Harris may be decreed to hold said estate in trust for the complainant and the other children of said Henry R. Mathewson, excepting said Eleanor Rand; that they may be ordered to convey to the complainant the legal title to her share of said estate; and for an account.

The answer of the respondents, Eleanor and Edwin D. Rand and George W. White and Nathan B. Harris, denies all of the material allegations contained in said bill, excepting as to the relationship of the parties as therein set forth, and excepting, also, as to the conveyance to said Marcy of the land in question, and the conveyance by said Edwin D. and Eleanor Rand to the respondents White & Harris. And it sets up and avers that said land was purchased and paid for by said Marcy with her own money; that she was seised of the same as her own property and estate in fee-simple; that she did not hold said land in trust for her said husband; and that, upon her decease, it vested in said Eleanor Rand as her sole heir at law. It also sets up that the respondents White & Harris were bona fide purchasers, for value, without notice, of said estate, excepting that they did have notice of a small claim that complainant had as heir at law of her father in the Hannah Kelly homestead estate, and it admits her interest therein to that extent. The answer also sets up section 7 of the statute of 29 Car. II. c. 3, known as the "Statute of Frauds and Perjuries," in bar of said suit. The case is before us on bill, answer, and proofs.

In order to establish a resulting trust in favor of the complainant in any of the land set out in the bill, it is incumbent upon her to prove—First, that said Henry R. Mathewson paid the purchase money therefor; second, that he did not intend the conveyance thereof to his wife to operate by way of advancement, there being a presumption that it was so intended when a husband pays for real estate and takes the deed to his wife, (2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1039; 10 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 18, and cases cited; Bartlett v. Bartlett, 13 Neb. 456, 14 N. W. Rep. 385; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1204; Hill, Trustees, 97, 98;) and, third, that the respondents White & Harris were not bona fide purchasers for value of said land without notice of the complainant's claim.

Before considering the evidence adduced by the complainant in support of these propositions of fact, it is proper to consider an objection raised by the respondents to the admissibility of parol evidence to establish a resulting trust and the defense of the statute of frauds. Their contention is that, under section 7 of said statute, declarations or creations of trust or confidence, if proved by verbal evidence only, are utterly void and of no effect; and that, as the respondents have in their answer set up this statute in defense, it is a complete bar to the complainant's bill, there being no sufficient written proof or manifestation of any declaration of trust concerning the land in question in the evidence offered. In support of this position, they cite Taft v. Dimond, 16 R. I. 584, 18 Atl. Rep. 183; Bisp. Eq. (4th Ed.) 97, and cases cited; and Cook v. Barr, 44 N. Y. 156, 159. In Tafty. Dimond the complainant's claim was based on the ground of an express trust, any trust by implication being inconsistent with the covenant of warranty in the deed. Hence the court held, and rightly, of course, that the claim was within said section 7 of the statute of frauds.

In the case at bar, however, the complainant's claim is not based upon any declaration of trust, but upon a trust which arises by operation of law, independently of any declaration whatever, viz., a resulting trust. And such a trust is expressly excepted from the operation of the statute of frauds by section 8 thereof, which enacts as follows: "Provided, always that where any conveyance shall be made of any lands or tenements by which a trust or confidence shall or may arise or result by the implication or construction of law, or be transferred or extinguished by an act or operation of law, then, and in every such case, such trust or confidence shall be of the like force and effect us the same would have been it this statute had not been made; anything hereinbefore contained to the contrary notwithstanding." The other authorities cited by the respondents in support of their position also relate to express trusts, and hence are not pertinent to the question before us. The statute of frauds being in force in this state, (Taft v. Dimond, 16 R. I. 584. 18 Atl. Rep. 183.) and resulting trusts being thus excepted from the operation thereof, (Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sum. 173,) it follows that said statute cannot be interposed as a bar to the present suit, and that the objection to the admissibility of parol evidence is not sustainable. That the transaction out of which a trust results may be proved by parol is familiar law. See 1 Perry, Trusts, (4th Ed. § 137, and cases cited in note 1; Bisp. Eq. (3d Ed.) § 83, and cases cited in note 1; Livermore v. Aldrich, 5 Cush. 431; 10 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 27, and cases cited; Whitten v. Whitten, 3 Cush. 191...