Huerta v. Phillips 66 Co.
| Decision Date | 29 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:19-cv-00213 |
| Parties | JOSEPH HUERTA, Plaintiff. v. PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Joseph Huerta (“Huerta”) alleges that Defendant Phillips 66 Company (“Phillips 66”) discriminated and retaliated against him in the workplace in violation of federal law. Phillips 66 has filed a motion for summary judgment, see Dkt. 23, and a motion to strike a declaration filed by Huerta in his response to the motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. 26. After reviewing the summary judgment briefing, examining the record, and analyzing the relevant case law, the motion to strike is DENIED. I also recommend that the Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, and this case dismissed.
Huerta is a Mexican-American born on April 1, 1968. He suffers from type 2 diabetes. Phillips 66 is a major American energy company, employing almost 14, 000 individuals worldwide with its headquarters located in Houston, Texas.
Huerta worked for Phillips 66 as an Operator at the Sweeny Refinery for 28 years-from June 1990 until his termination effective June 8, 2018. As an Operator, Huerta was responsible for ensuring that the refinery equipment in his unit was maintained properly and in safe working order.
The events leading to Huerta's termination began on May 7 2018. A few hours after working a full shift without any issues, Huerta told the lead operator that he felt sick and would not be reporting to work the following day, May 8. This raised a few eyebrows at the company because Huerta had seemed unhappy on May 7 when Patrick Buentello (“Buentello”), the shift leader, told Huerta that he would have to perform console duties on May 8. After learning that Huerta had called in sick, Buentello told Jeff Farley (“Farley”), Huerta's direct supervisor, that he believed Huerta falsified the reason for not coming to work because he did not want to work the console. Confronted with this information, Farley contacted the Human Resources department to see if a private investigator could be retained to determine whether Huerta's stated reason for missing work (being sick) was true. Phillips 66 hired a private investigator and surveillance began. On the afternoon of May 8, the private investigator spotted Huerta making repairs to the roof of a commercial building in Bay City. On May 9, the private investigator again observed Huerta working on the roof of the same building. Later that evening, the private investigator witnessed Huerta coaching a Little League baseball game.
Although Phillips 66 viewed these activities as inconsistent with Huerta's alleged sickness, the company did not immediately fire him. On May 10, Huerta's doctor faxed Phillips 66 an incomplete Employee Health Report (“EHR”), [1] stating that Huerta suffered from “uncontrolled diabetic neuropathy” and could resume work on May 16. Dkt. 23-5 at 5. But Huerta did not report back to work on May 16. Instead, that day his doctor submitted another incomplete EHR. This one stated that Huerta needed to be off work due to his uncontrolled diabetes for another two months-to July 15. On May 17, Phillips 66 granted Huerta's request for approved leave under the FMLA retroactive to May 8.
After receiving the initial EHR from Huerta's doctor, Phillips 66 officials reached out to Huerta to better understand his condition, limitations, treatment plan, and how he was able to perform the strenuous activities the private investigator documented, but not report to work. Phillips 66 maintains that it contacted Huerta on nine separate occasions to discuss his absence from work, obtain additional documentation, and request that he submit to a medical evaluation at the refinery. Phillips 66 claims Huerta was not responsive to those requests. Huerta counters that he promptly responded to the company's calls and letters. For the purposes of this summary judgment motion, it does not matter whether Huerta was or was not quick to respond to the company's numerous inquiries.
On June 7, Huerta and Krystle King (“King”), a Phillips 66 Human Resources employee, finally spoke. King claims she told Huerta that the company had not yet terminated him for job abandonment, as she still wanted an opportunity to speak with him to discuss his absence from work and the lack of proper documentation verifying his need for medical leave. King directed Huerta to meet her at the Sweeny Refinery the next day, June 8, at 10 am. According to King, she specifically told Huerta that “if he declined to attend the meeting, he would be terminated for job abandonment.” Dkt. 23 at 21. On the morning of June 8 20 minutes before the scheduled 10 am meeting, Huerta called King and informed her that he would not be attending the meeting at the refinery. As a result, King recommended that Phillips 66 terminate Huerta's employment for job abandonment. The HR Manager concurred, and Huerta was terminated effective June 8.
Huerta claims in this lawsuit that Phillips 66 terminated him because of his age (50 at the time of this termination) disability (diabetes), and national origin (Mexican-American), and retaliated against him for taking leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Phillips 66 has filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims, asking me to dismiss this lawsuit in its entirety. Phillips 66 has also moved to strike a 22-page declaration filed as an exhibit to Huerta's summary judgment response. See Dkt. 26.
Phillips 66 contends that Huerta's declaration is objectionable for a multitude of reasons: it is “conclusory, unsubstantiated, unspecific, without proper foundation, not based on personal knowledge, speculative, and/or constitute[s] inadmissible hearsay.” Dkt. 26 at 1. Phillips 66 asks that I strike Huerta's declaration entirely, or, in the alternative, strike 19 specified portions of the declaration.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a declaration “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify to the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). After reviewing Huerta's declaration, I am reluctant to strike any portion of the document. Simply stated, I do not find the declaration to be rife with conclusory allegations, speculation, or unsubstantiated assertions. As far as Phillips 66's claim that certain statements in the declaration are hearsay, I note that the challenged statements all appear to be made by Phillips 66's employees. These statements are admissions by a party opponent, so they are not hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) ().
Given that I am required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party at the summary judgment stage, I think the best approach is to fully consider Huerta's declaration as part of the summary judgment record. Defendant Phillips 66 Company's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence is, therefore, DENIED.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the nonmovant. See Rodriguez v. Webb Hosp. Corp., 234 F.Supp.3d 834, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
The movant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Brandon v. Sage Corp., 808 F.3d 266, 269-70 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must “present competent summary judgment evidence to support the essential elements of its claim.” Cephus v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm'n, 146 F.Supp.3d 818, 826 (S.D. Tex. 2015). The nonmovant's “burden will not be satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Rather, the “nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate how that evidence supports that party's claim.” Brooks v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F.Supp.3d 577, 584 (S.D. Tex. 2015). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I must construe “the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Darden v. Simplicity Fin. Mktg., Inc., No. 4:18-CV-1737, 2019 WL 6119485, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2019).
Huerta brings several discrimination claims against Phillips 66: (1) a disability discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”); (2) an age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”); and (3) a national origin discrimination claim under Title VII.
Unlawful discrimination may be established through either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2010). Because Huerta relies on circumstantial evidence, I must utilize the familiar burden-shifting test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) to analyze his discrimination claims. See EEOC v. LHC Grp Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014). Under this framework, a...
To continue reading
Request your trial