Huether v. Cont'l Aerospace Techs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-00783 |
| Citation | 580 F.Supp.3d 507 |
| Parties | Brian HUETHER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CONTINENTAL AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Douglas P. DesJardins, Pangia Law Group, Washington, DC, Josh Cannon, Bailey & Greer, PLLC, Memphis, TN, Thomas R. Greer, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff Brian Huether.
Anthony Tarricone, Joseph P. Musacchio, Kreindler & Kreindler, Boston, MA, Brandon E. Bass, John A. Day, Law Offices of John Day, P.C., Brentwood, TN, Kevin J. Mahoney, Kreindler & Kreindler, New York, NY, for Plaintiff Tracy A. Bumpus.
Kathryn E. Barnett, Morgan & Morgan, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff Brandon Wright.
Gary A. Gardner, Skinner Law Group, Melville, NY, Mark B. Roberts, Sherri R. Ginger, Armbrecht Jackson LLP, Mobile, AL, Will Skinner, Skinner Law Group, Woodland Hills, CA, William Bryan Jakes, III, Howell & Fisher, PLLC, Nashville, TN, Erik D. Slechta, for Defendants Continental Aerospace Technologies, Inc., Continental Motors, Inc., Continental Motors Group Limited, Continental Motors Services, Inc.
Arthur J. Park, Edward C. Bresee, Jr., Mozley, Finlayson & Loggins, LLP, Atlanta, GA, E. Jason Ferrell, Brewer, Krause, Brooks & Chastain, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for Defendant Direct Flight Solutions, LLC.
Plaintiffs in this matter are family members of Shelli Huether, Jessica Wright, and Alan Bumpus, each of whom died in a September 2020 airplane crash. Plaintiffs allege defective engine parts caused the crash. They are suing Continental Aerospace Technologies, Inc., and associated entities (collectively, "Continental"), claiming Continental designed, manufactured, and installed the defective engine parts and is responsible for the deaths of Plaintiffs’ family members. Plaintiffs originally sued in state court. Continental then removed the claims to this Court.
Before the Court are motions from both parties alleging the Court lacks jurisdiction. Continental has moved for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. Nos. 11, 14).1 Plaintiffs have moved for a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. Nos. 28, 33, 35). As is customary, the Court will consider whether it has subject matter jurisdiction first.2 Because the Court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it will remand this case to state court.
In May 2018, Ms. Huether purchased a Piper-PA-28-181 aircraft ("Piper Airplane").4 (Doc. No. 1-1 ¶ 12 ("Huether Compl.")). In "late 2018 or early 2019," Ms. Huether sought a vendor to rebuild the Piper Airplane's engine. (Id. ¶ 14). She chose Continental, which performed the rebuild on January 29, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 16). Continental replaced the engine's cylinders with new cylinders it had "manufactured and inspected." (Id. ¶¶ 16, 18). Later, in July 2019, Continental inspected the engine again and determined it was airworthy. (Id. ¶ 22).
On September 8, 2020, Ms. Huether took Ms. Wright and Mr. Bumpus on a flight in the Piper Airplane. (Id. ¶ 25; Complaint, Bumpus v. Continental Aerospace Technologies, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00784, 2021 WL 4783197 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 13, 2021), ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 2 ("Bumpus Compl.")). The plane suffered a "catastrophic engine failure" and crashed, killing Ms. Huether, Ms. Wright, and Mr. Bumpus. (Bumpus Compl. ¶ 2). Plaintiffs filed three separate actions against Continental in state court, alleging the engine parts it had installed were faulty. . In particular, Plaintiffs alleged the cylinders Continental placed in the Piper Airplane's engine were defectively designed. (Bumpus Compl. ¶ 31; Wright Compl. ¶ 56).
The design of cylinders like those Continental placed in the Piper Airplane's engine are subject to regulations set by the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"). See 14 C.F.R. § 183.29 ; United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 807, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984). The FAA uses Designated Engineering Representatives ("DERs") to help ensure aircraft manufacturers comply with FAA regulations. 14 C.F.R. §§ 183.1, 183.29. DERs are "private persons" authorized "to act as representatives of the [FAA] in examining, inspecting, and testing persons and aircraft." Id. A DER reviewed the "design data and accompanying substantiating engineering reports" of the new cylinders placed in the Piper Airplane's engine. (Declaration of Michael Ward, Bumpus v. Continental Aerospace Technologies, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00784, 2021 WL 4783197 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 13, 2021), ECF No. 2 ¶ 7 ("Ward Decl.")). The DER "recommended approval" of the cylinders. ( Id. ).
Continental removed Plaintiffs’ lawsuits to this Court on October 13, 2021. (Doc. No. 1; Notice of Removal, Bumpus v. Continental Aerospace Technologies, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00784, 2021 WL 4783197 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 13, 2021), ECF No. 1; Notice of Removal, Wright v. Continental Aerospace Technologies, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00785 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 13, 2021), ECF No. 1). Continental invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1442, which is also known as the "federal officer removal statute," as the basis for this Court's subject matter jurisdiction.5 Id. The Court consolidated Plaintiffs’ lawsuits into one action on October 22, 2021. (Doc. No. 21). Plaintiffs filed motions to remand alleging the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on November 1, 2021 and November 2, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 28, 33, 35). The motions have been fully briefed. (Doc. Nos. 28, 33, 35, 54, 59).
A court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case where it has the "statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) ). The "stakes" of inquiries into subject matter jurisdiction "are high." Id. "In the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, a federal court must dismiss the lawsuit—no matter how far along the litigation has progressed (including to the last-available appeal), no matter whether the parties forfeited the issue, no matter indeed whether the parties have waived it." Id. at 813–14.
On a motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the party that removed the case to federal court "bears the burden of establishing that removal was proper." State ex rel. Slatery v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 896, 902 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) ; see also Mays, 871 F.3d at 442 (); Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, courts resolve "all doubts ... in favor of remand."6 Slatery, 311 F.Supp.3d at 902 (quoting Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999) ).
Continental claims this Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1442. (Doc. No. 54 at 1). Under § 1442, the United States, its officers, and entities that have "acted under" such officers may remove state-court lawsuits to federal court if they are "being sued for actions taken under color of federal law." Mays, 871 F.3d at 443, 449. Continental argues removal was proper because it "acted under" the FAA in designing and manufacturing the Piper Airplane's allegedly defective engine parts. (Doc. No. 54 at 8). The Court disagrees.
The Supreme Court, and circuits across the country, have closely considered what it means for an entity to "act under" a federal officer under § 1442. E.g., Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 151, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (2007) ; Mays, 871 F.3d at 442 ; Lu Junhong, 792 F.3d at 809. They have held the entity must be in a relationship with a federal officer who holds "a superior position or office." Watson, 551 U.S. at 151, 127 S.Ct. 2301 (citation and quotation omitted). The relationship "typically involves subjection, guidance, or control." Id. And the entity must be involved in "an effort to assist , or to help carry out , the duties or tasks of the federal superior." Id. at 152, 127 S.Ct. 2301. For example, "a local police officer who accompanie[d] a federal agent on a drug raid and act[ed] under the federal agent's direction" could avail himself of § 1442. Lu Junhong, 792 F.3d at 809.
Notably, "the help or assistance necessary to bring a private person within the scope of [ § 1442 ] does not include simply complying with the law."7 Watson, 551 U.S. at 152, 127 S.Ct. 2301. This is true even where an entity's compliance efforts involve extensive interaction with federal officers. Hence, Mays held the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality did not "act under" the federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") even though it had to "periodically submit reports to the EPA detailing compliance with regulations." 871 F.3d at 446. Similarly, Lu Junhong held that an airplane manufacturer did not "act under" the FAA even though the FAA granted it authority to inspect aircraft designs and "self-certif[y]" that the designs complied with federal regulations. 792 F.3d at 808.
Continental has not established it assisted federal officers in the performance of their duties when it manufactured and installed the Piper Airplane's engine parts. Continental claims the " ‘acting under’ component is present in this case because the allegedly defective parts were designed with recommended approval from [a] DER." (Doc. No. 54 at 8). According to Continental,...
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