Huey v. Brock

• Decision Date: 27 October 1921
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 407.
• Citation: Huey v. Brock, 207 Ala. 175, 92 So. 904 (Ala. 1921)
• Parties: HUEY ET AL. v. BROCK ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

92 So. 904

207 Ala. 175

HUEY ET AL. v. BROCK ET AL.

6 Div. 407.

Supreme Court of Alabama

October 27, 1921

Rehearing Denied Jan. 19, 1922.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Hugh A. Locke, Judge.

Bill to quiet title to certain lands by D. A. Brock and others against Virginia Huey and others. Decree for complainants and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Theodore J. Lamar and A. Latady, both of Birmingham, and James J Mayfield, of Montgomery, for appellants.

Thomas J. Judge, of Birmingham, for appellees.

SAYRE J. A.

A. H Laird died in 1876, seised and possessed of the land here in controversy. His widow remained on this land after his death and shortly thereafter dower in it was assigned to her. Then she intermarried with one Tully, and is still living. Defendants are lineal descendents of Laird and his heirs at law. Laird had purchased the land from one May, and at the time of his death May held a vendor's lien as security for the purchase price. The record of a decree in chancery in a cause entitled "M. A. May v. M. M. Guin et al.," dated November 12, 1879, and purporting to declare a vendor's lien on the property in favor of May and ordering a sale, was introduced in evidence. By this decree the register was directed to sell first the reversionary interest in the land, and, in the event a satisfactory sum to satisfy the lien of complainant in that cause was not so realized, then the dower interest. Tully became the purchaser, and the sale to him was confirmed by the court. Complainants in this cause trace their title through mesne conveyances back to Tully. They have improved their several parcels, and they, or their predecessors in claim and title, have been in possession for more than 20 years. Unless barred by the proceeding in the chancery court, appellants are still the owners of an estate in reversion in the land in question. This bill was filed by appellees, in 1918, under the statute, to settle the title and clear up all doubts or disputes concerning the same.

M. M. Guin was administrator of Laird's estate. The complete record in the cause of May v. Guin was not offered in evidence; for what reason we do not know, but no question as to that is raised. We will assume that defendants in this cause were not parties to that. However, it does not necessarily follow that defendants have not been barred of their reversion by their failure for more than 40 years to assert their rights. It is true that in general the prescriptive period of 20 years does not begin to run against a remainderman or reversioner until he has a right to sue for the possession; that is, until the determination of the estate for life. We may cite to this proposition Bass v. Bass, 88 Ala. 408, 7 So. 243; Hall v. Condon, 164 Ala. 393, 51 So. 20; Blakeney v. Du Bose, 167 Ala. 627, 52 So. 746; Kidd v. Borum, 181 Ala.

144, 61 So. 100, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1226; Dallas Compress Co. v. Smith, 190 Ala. 423, 67 So. 289. And while a remainderman or reversioner may maintain a bill in equity to remove a cloud from his title or reversion pending the particular estate, he is under no duty to do so. Authorities supra.

But in this case, as in Woodstock Iron Co. v. Fullenwider, 87 Ala. 584, 6 So. 197, 13 Am. St. Rep. 73, complainants' predecessor in title acquired a special equity by his purchase under the decree against Laird's administrator. The purchase money paid by him went to relieve the title of an incumbrance subject to which defendants took their title in reversion. In these circumstances, it was necessary that a bill be filed to prevent the destruction of the title...