Huff v. Cruz Contracting Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-CV-641 (KMK).,07-CV-641 (KMK).
• Parties: Adrian HUFF, as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Teamsters Local 445 Construction Division Welfare, Pension and Annuity Funds and Teamsters Local 445 Education and Training Fund, Plaintiff, v. CRUZ CONTRACTING CORP., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

643 F.Supp.2d 344

Adrian HUFF, as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Teamsters Local 445 Construction Division Welfare, Pension and Annuity Funds and Teamsters Local 445 Education and Training Fund, Plaintiff, v. CRUZ CONTRACTING CORP., Defendant.

No. 07-CV-641 (KMK).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

January 29, 2009.

William David Frumkin, Esq., Sapir & Frumkin LLP, White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff.

Ronald L. Tobia, Esq., Tobia & Sorger Esqs., LLC, Harrison, NJ, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Adrian Huff, as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Teamsters Local 445 Construction Division Welfare, Pension and Annuity Funds and Teamsters Local 445 Education and Training Fund ("Plaintiff" or "Funds"), filed this action against Defendant Cruz Contracting Corp. ("Defendant" or "Cruz") pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., seeking principally an award of late fees from Defendant's alleged failure to make timely contribution payments to the Funds.¹ Before the Court are Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and Defendant's cross-motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim for statutory damages pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2) ("Section 1132(g) (2)").

I. Background

The Court assumes the Parties' familiarity with the factual and procedural background of this case as it is thoroughly set forth in Magistrate Judge Lisa Margaret Smith's Report & Recommendation dated May 1, 2008 ("R & R").² In her R & R, Magistrate Judge Smith recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment awarding Plaintiff either statutory or contractual damages, and that the Court grant Defendant's crossmotion for partial summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs claim for statutory damages pursuant to Section 1132(g)(2). (R & R 27.) Plaintiff filed timely objections to the R & R.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

1. Review of Magistrate Judge's Report & Recommendation

A district court reviewing a magistrate judge's report and recommendation addressing a dispositive motion "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Donahue v. Global Home Loans & Fin., Inc., No. 05-CV-8362, 2007 WL 831816, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2007). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), parties may submit objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The objections must be "specific" and "written," Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), and must be made "[w]ithin 10 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition," id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plus an additional three days when service is made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C)-(F), see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d), as was the case here (R & R 365-66).

Where a party submits timely objections to a report and recommendation—as Plaintiff did here, by submitting objections on May 20, 2008—the district court reviews de novo the parts of the report and recommendation to which the party objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Donahue, 2007 WL 831816, at *1. The district court "may adopt those portions of the ... report [and recommendation] to which no `specific written objection' is made, as long as the factual and legal bases supporting the findings and conclusions set forth in those sections are not clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Eisenberg v. New England Motor Freight, Inc., 564 F.Supp.2d 224, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2)).

2. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment may be granted when it is shown that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant." Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir.2003). "When considering cross-motions for summary judgment, a court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration." Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. CSX Lines, L.L.C., 432 F.3d 428, 433 (2d Cir.2005). "When the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim. In that event, the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment." Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir.2008) (internal citations omitted). "When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (footnote omitted); see also McPherson v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 215 n. 4 (2d Cir.2006) ("[S]peculation alone is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.").

B. Analysis

1. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on Claim for Statutory Damages Pursuant to Section 1132(g)(2)

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the Funds' claim for statutory damages pursuant to Section 1132(g)(2), contending that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to Defendant's obligation under an existing collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") to make timely contributions to the Funds or as to Defendant's delinquency in paying its contributions owed between May 2005 and September 2006. (PL's Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Mem.") 2-3.) Plaintiff argued that, as a matter of law, because Defendant was delinquent in its obligations and because Plaintiff "brought the instant action to enforce the terms of the CBA in accordance with [29 U.S.C. § 1145]," the Funds were "statutorily entitled," under Section 1132(g)(2), to "(a) interest on the unpaid contributions; (b) liquidated damages not to exceed twenty percent; [and] (c) reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action." (Pl.'s Mem. 6.) Defendant, opposing Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and cross-moving for partial summary judgment, argued that because it was undisputed that all of Defendant's contributions were paid prior to Plaintiffs filing of the action, Section 1132(g)(2) provided no grounds for relief as a matter of law. (Def.'s Letter Br. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Br.") 4-5.) Magistrate Judge Smith concluded that Defendant's interpretation of Section 1132(g)(2) was correct, and recommended that the Court (1) deny Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the Funds' claim for statutory damages, and (2) award Defendant partial summary judgment on that claim. (R & R 357-60, 365.) Plaintiff submitted a specific written objection to this recommendation. (Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Objections to R & R ("Pl.'s Obj.") 4-9.) For the following reasons, and for those stated in the R & R, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and grants Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.

Employers must follow CBA-dictated terms in making contributions to multiemployer pension plans: "Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 1145 ("Section 1145"). ERISA also specifies the types of relief that should be awarded to such a pension plan in an action to enforce the Section 1145 right to contributions in accordance with CBA terms:

In any action under this subchapter by a fiduciary for or on behalf of a plan to enforce section 1145 of this title in which a judgment in favor of the plan is awarded, the court shall award the plan—

(A) the unpaid contributions,

(B) interest on the unpaid contributions,

(C) an amount equal to the greater of—

(i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or

(ii) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in an amount not in excess of 20 percent (or such higher percentage as may be permitted under Federal or State law) of the amount determined by the court under subparagraph (A),

(D) reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action, to be paid by the defendant, and

(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2).

The Second Circuit has held that a plaintiff bringing suit pursuant to Section 1132(g)(2) need not demonstrate that contributions remain unpaid as of the date of judgment. "[Section] 1132(g)(2) does not require that a favorable judgment be awarded on each of the four items of relief specified therein." Iron Workers Dist. Council of W. New York v. Hudson Steel Fabricators & Erectors, Inc., 68 F.3d 1502, 1507 (2d Cir.1995). "It simply directs that once there is a favorable judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to all the measures of relief not already obtained." Id. Otherwise, an employer could "escape its statutory liability for interest, liquidated damages or double interest, attorney fees, and costs...