Huff v. Firstenergy Corp.
| Decision Date | 29 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 5:12cv2583 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
| Parties | REGGIE HUFF, et al., PLAINTIFFS, v. FIRSTENERGY CORP., et al., DEFENDANTS. |
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are two of plaintiffs' motions: (1) a motion styled "Motion to Alter Dismissal" (Doc. No. 33), and (2) a motion styled "Combination Motion to Recuse Due to Apparent Ex Parte Access and/or Bias & Rule 59(e) to Correct Order[.]" (Doc. No. 36.) Defendants have responded to both motions. (Doc. No. 37 []; Doc. No. 40 []). Plaintiffs have filed replies. (Doc. No. 39 []; Doc. No. 41 [].) 1
The facts underlying the present litigation were set forth in considerable detail in the Court's September 17, 2013 Memorandum Opinion dismissing the case.(Doc. No. 31.) The Court will only provide enough factual and procedural background here to place the present motions in context. Plaintiffs Reggie and Lisa Huff filed this civil RICO action against certain current and former justices of the Ohio Supreme Court, as well various private entities and individuals associated with FirstEnergy Corp.2 (hereinafter "FirstEnergy defendants"). The complaint raised claims under federal and state law for civil RICO and RICO conspiracy, and a separate claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiffs alleged that the FirstEnergy defendants conspired with certain justices of the Ohio Supreme Court to influence litigation involving FirstEnergy defendants. In particular, plaintiffs maintained that the FirstEnergy defendants orchestrated a bribery and straw donor scheme to ensure that Ohio Edison would ultimately prevail in a personal injury action Lisa Huff brought in state court against Ohio Edison and another company.3
The Court issued a memorandum opinion dismissing the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and it is this ruling that is the subject of the present motions. With respect to the civil RICO claims, the Court found that they were chiefly held together by stray "innocuous facts mixed with conclusory allegations." (Doc. No. 31 at 489.) In particular, the Court determined that these claims were fatallydeficient because they failed to set forth the requisite predicate acts, a pattern of racketeering, or the existence of an enterprise. (Id. at 485-93.) The Court also determined that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring these claims because Lisa Huff's unliquidated personal injury claim did not constitute a property interest necessary to maintain a civil RICO action. (Id. at 494-95.) The Court also denied plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint because such an effort would have been futile as the proposed amendments would not survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). (Id. at 504.)
By their first motion, plaintiffs seek to alter the Court's ruling granting defendants' motion to dismiss. They identify Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the sources for the requested relief.
A party may seek to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) by filing a motion "no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A Rule 59(e) motion is rarely granted "because it contradicts notions of finality and repose." Mitchell v. Citizens Bank, No. 3:10-00569, 2011 WL 247421, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 26, 2011). While the rule permits the reconsideration of rulings, it does not permit parties to effectively "re-argue a case." Howard v. United States, 533 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998)). Rule 59(e) motions are not "designed to give an unhappy litigant an opportunity to relitigate matters already decided[.]" Davidson v. Roadway Express, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 2d 971, 984 (N.D. Ohio 2008). Instead, the moving party "must either clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present newly discovered evidence."Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ'g, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Although the Sixth Circuit has not precisely defined the term "manifest error" in the context of Rule 59(e) motions, definitions from other courts demonstrate that a high standard applies. The Seventh Circuit defines "manifest error" as the "wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent." Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) () (internal quotation and citation omitted). In like fashion, the Northern District of Texas cautions courts to possess a "clear conviction of error" before finding the presence of manifest error. H & A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, Tex., No. 4:02-CV-458-Y, 2005 WL 6803499, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
An even higher standard applies to motions under Rule 60(b). Relief may only be granted under this rule for certain specified reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic) misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Like Rule 59(e), Rule 60(b) does not permit parties torelitigate the merits of claims. See O'Connel v. Miller, 8 F. App'x 434, 435 (6th Cir. 2001). Its application is also "circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of litigation." Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of UMWA Combined Benefit Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001).
According to plaintiffs, they are entitled to relief from the Court's judgment of dismissal because they believe that the Court erred in finding that they lack standing to raise claims for civil RICO. In particular, they complain that the Court misapplied the Ohio Supreme Court's decision of Groch v. Gen'l Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St. 3d 192, 222-23 (2008). The decision in Groch was one of many cases the Court relied upon in finding that Lisa Huff's unliquidated personal injury claim did not constitute a property interest for purposes of civil RICO standing. (Doc. No. 31 at 494-95.)
While the Court concludes, on review, that its initial ruling was correct, the Court also finds that had its decision been erroneous, it would not have qualified as a reason for which relief may be granted under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). For the most part, plaintiffs seek to reassert the arguments they raised in opposition to defendants' dispositive motion. To the extent plaintiffs now also look to the Ohio tax code and Ohio statutory law on the accrual of product liability claims for relief (see Doc. No. 33-1 at 510), these irrelevant statutes do not change the fact that Ohio law does not treat the opportunity to pursue an unliquidated personal injury claim as a property interest. (See Doc. No. 31 at 494-95 [].) Upon reconsideration, the Court concludes, again, that plaintiffs do not have standing to raise civil RICO.
Of course, the Court's finding that standing was lacking was one of many fatal deficiencies the Court identified in plaintiffs' civil RICO claims. Even if the Court were to determine that its ruling on standing constituted error, which it will not because the ruling was correct, plaintiffs would still not be entitled to relief from the Court's judgment. Each deficiency identified in the Court's memorandum opinion represented an independent and sufficient reason to grant defendants' motion to dismiss the civil RICO claims.
Plaintiffs also attack the Court's refusal to permit them to amend their complaint to add allegations relating to Justice Yvette McGee Brown's recent employment as a partner at Jones Day. Relying upon the same arguments raised previously, plaintiffs persist in arguing that the fact that Justice McGee Brown is now employed by the same law firm that is representing defendants is a "game changing event[]." (Doc. No. 33-1 at 512.)
While a court "should freely give leave when justice so requires[,]" leave need not be given when amendment would be futile. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Carson v. United States Office of Special Counsel, 633 F.3d 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2011). Justice McGee Brown was never named as a party defendant, and there are no allegations that she played any role in the alleged RICO conspiracy. The fact that plaintiffs find it significant that their former counsel purportedly exchanged text messages with McGee Brown on her physical appearance and the perceived rudeness of a fellow justice duringoral argument does not cure the many deficiencies in plaintiffs' RICO claims.4 Such an amendment would, therefore, be futile.
Plaintiffs clearly disagree with the Court's ruling on defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and would like the Court to revisit their initial arguments and reach a contrary conclusion. Because their motion fails to meet any of the requirements under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), however, plaintiffs are not entitled to relief from the Court's judgment. Given that plaintiffs simply view the law in a manner contrary to that of this Court, their proper recourse lies in an appeal to the Sixth Circuit. Dana Corp v....
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