Huff v. McCauley

• Decision Date: 08 November 1866
• Citation: 53 Pa. 206
• Parties: Huff <I>versus</I> McCauley.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

53 Pa. 206

Huff versus McCauley.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 8, 1866.

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland county.

H. D. Foster, for plaintiffs in error, cited 8 Metc. 34; Cloffen v. Carpenter, 4 Id. 583; Wood v. Manly, 11 Ad. & E. 34; Rerick v. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267; Swartz v. Swartz, 4 Barr 357; 1 Metc. 316.

Marchand & Laird, for defendant in error, cited Addison on Cont. 31; Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East 610; Backenstoss v. Stahler, 9 Casey 251; Yeakle v. Jacob, Id. 376; Washabaugh v. Entriken, 12 Id. 513; Wood v. Wilson, 1 Wright 384; Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533.

The opinion of the court was delivered, November 8th 1866, by STRONG, J.

In the court below the defendants relied for their defence upon an arrangement alleged by them to have been made between the plaintiff McCauley and George Huff, by which the latter was authorized to take as much coal from McCauley's land as he wanted for the use of his salt-works, and to take it as long as he wished, in consideration of his agreement that McCauley might use his drift and scaffold to take out coal for himself. Under the instructions given to the jury, they must have found either that no such arrangement had been made, or, that if it had, Huff had made no expenditure upon the faith of it. To which of these conclusions they came it is impossible to tell. If there had been no such arrangement made, what the court declared would have been its legal effect, if made, is of no importance. The jury may, however, have found that the parties had entered into such mutual agreements; but that Huff had made no expenditure of money in reliance upon them, and hence that he was not in a condition to set up an estoppel in pais against the plaintiff. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider, whether the defendants were injured by the instruction given to the jury, respecting the rights of the parties to such an arrangement. It was a case of verbal agreement, and the charge of the court was, in effect, that if made, it was a revocable license and no more. In this it is insisted there was error, and it is argued that there having been a consideration given for the privilege accorded to Huff, in the allowance to McCauley to use Huff's drift and scaffold, that which otherwise might have been only a license became an irrevocable contract. It is manifest that if Huff took anything under the agreement, it must have been a license, or an easement, or an interest in land, or an incorporeal right arising out of it. It is observable that the case is unlike that class in which it has been held by the courts of this state, that a license to do something on the licensor's land, when followed by the expenditure of money on the faith of it, is irrevocable, and is to be treated as a binding contract. Of this class Lefevre v. Lefevre, 4 S. & R. 241, is the leading case. It was followed by Rerick v. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267; by Swartz v. Swartz, 4 Barr 353; by Ebner v. Stichter, 7 Harris 19, and perhaps by others. All these decisions rest upon the principle of estoppel. The parties cannot be placed in statu quo after the license has been executed, and work done, or money expended on the faith of it, and hence such a case is regarded as presenting a sufficient reason for a chancellor's interference to restrain any action of the licensor which would deprive the licensee of the benefit of the expenditure he was encouraged to make by the very party who seeks to make it fruitless. Equity treats the license thus executed as a contract giving absolute rights, and protects the licensee in the enjoyment of them. In doing so, however, the courts of this state have gone beyond the common law, and beyond the rulings of courts of equity elsewhere. But where there has not been expenditure on the faith of a license, as in the present case, there is no foundation for an estoppel, and the same reason does not exist for holding it irrevocable. Even if there has been a consideration paid, there is nothing in the way of restoring the parties to their original condition. No case in this state has gone to the length of ruling,...